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Abstract 
Corporate Governance in Saudi Arabia: 
A Stakeholder Perspective 
This thesis investigates corporate governance in Saudi Arabia by examining the 
perceptions of different stakeholder groups. The study examines the understanding of 
corporate governance, the current practice, the corporate governance framework and the 
impact of the social, cultural and economic aspects on the situation on corporate 
governance in Saudi Arabia. The study uses semi-structured interviews and a 
questionnaire survey with wide groups of stakeholders and an accountability perspective 
is adopted to interpret the results. The findings suggest that corporate governance in 
Saudi Arabia is in its early stages and is characterised by a lack of accountability, a weak 
legal framework and poor protection of shareholders. The influence of the social, cultural 
and economic factors is evident and boards of directors are dominated by major 
shareholders; thus good corporate governance practices have many challenges. 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
2 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Preamble 
The massive collapse and enormous failures of companies such as: "Enron"; 
"WorldCom"; "Parmalat" and "Tyco" has resulted in corporate governance gaining far 
more attention from a range of parties who are concerned about business. In recent years 
there has been a remarkable worldwide effort to issue and develop corporate governance 
principles and standards in order to ensure that good corporate governance codes are in 
place for companies, to improve their practice of corporate governance and protect 
companies' stakeholders from potential crises that poor corporate governance could 
cause. This effort has been accorded regardless of the nature and the size of the capital 
market or the legal system of these countries. Furthermore, some codes have been issued 
for specific continents or regions in the world or by specialist organisations such as the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 
In Saudi Arabia corporate governance did not become an issue until the stock market 
crash in February 2006, when the debate started about the need for good corporate 
governance in the Saudi business environment. As a result of this crash the Capital 
Market Authority issued the corporate governance code for Saudi companies in 
November 2006. The period after issuing the Saudi code drove attention to issues relating 
to the practice of corporate governance in Saudi. There were debates about the need for 
such regulation in the local environment and its benefits, the ability of local companies to 
comply with corporate governance principles, and the nature of the corporate governance 
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framework to assist good practices. To date, there has been a lack of studies that describe 
the consideration of corporate governance by Saudi stakeholders, of companies' current 
practices and the evaluation of the corporate governance code and framework in the 
Saudi business environment. In addition, there is a lack of research that investigates: 
ownership structures; shareholders' rights; board of directors' composition, authorities 
and responsibilities; sub-committees; the legal system in Saudi Arabia; and the impact of 
social, political and economic factors over companies' practices. In addition, no research 
has been published in relation to the perception and the practice of accountability and 
Islamic accountability in the Saudi business environment. All the above has motivated 
the researcher to carry out a study that investigates corporate governance from the 
perspective of Saudi stakeholders in order to provide a general picture of how Saudi 
stakeholders perceive corporate governance and to seek their opinion about the current 
practice of corporate governance by Saudi companies, as well as their evaluation of the 
corporate governance framework. The issues related to accountability and Islamic 
accountability are also considered. 
1.2 Research Aims and Questions 
The thesis examines corporate governance in Saudi Arabia from a stakeholder 
perspective and assesses the adequacy of the corporate governance framework in Saudi 
Arabia. In order to achieve this aim, the research addresses the following questions: 
1. What is the understanding of the concept of corporate governance in Saudi 
Arabia and does this fit in with an accountability and stakeholder framework? 
2. Do the current practices of corporate governance in Saudi Arabia reflect 
corporate accountability to stakeholders? 
3. How adequate is the corporate governance framework in Saudi Arabia? 
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And the answers of these three questions will lead to answer the fourth research 
question of 
4. What is the understanding of accountability and its current practice in Saudi 
Arabia and does it differ between different stakeholder groups? 
1.3 Scope of the Research 
The main objective of the study is to examine corporate governance in Saudi from a 
stakeholder perspective using an interpretive paradigm, as identified by Burrell and 
Morgan (1979), and using an accountability theoretical framework to interpret Saudi 
stakeholder perceptions. Different groups of people who are considered to be company 
stakeholders will be included such as: company directors, managers and employees; 
shareholders; regulators; auditors; academics; and financial consultants. Semi-structured 
interviews and a questionnaire survey are used to seek their opinions in regard to 
different corporate governance issues. The stakeholder approach has been chosen because 
of the significant accountability relationships that stakeholders have with companies and 
their perceptions will be very important in portraying a general picture about corporate 
governance in Saudi. The stakeholders are asked to express their views on issues related 
to corporate governance, obtained both from the literature and from corporate governance 
principles. The research will focus on issues such as how corporate governance is 
perceived in Saudi and the importance of corporate governance for Saudi companies. The 
translations of the English term "corporate governance" to the Arabic language will also 
be discussed. The stakeholders will be asked about boards of directors in Saudi 
companies and the process of selecting directors; the board's sub-committees; the board's 
meetings, the board's authorities and responsibilities. The study will investigate the 
ownership structure in Saudi companies and the influence of major shareholders over 
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companies will be highlighted as well as the rights of shareholders including minority 
shareholders. Furthermore, disclosure and transparency will be considered as well as 
stakeholders and their rights and influence over companies. The perception of 
accountability and Islamic accountability and their application in the business 
environment will be included. In addition, the corporate governance framework will be 
examined as well as the role of other factors such as the social, political and economic 
situation over the practices of corporate governance in Saudi. 
The study contributes to filling the gap in the literature in relation to corporate 
governance in Saudi and contributes to knowledge by providing the perspective of 
stakeholders about corporate governance in a developing country such as Saudi; it will 
help our understanding of the perception of corporate governance in Saudi and the 
current practices and obstacles and possible improvements that could be made. The 
current study will contribute to an understanding of corporate governance in developing 
countries and in particular the Arabian Gulf countries as well as in the Islamic countries. 
Moreover, one of the main contributions of the study is investigating the relationship 
between corporate governance and the Islamic teachings of Sharia and the impact of such 
regulations over corporate governance, in addition to the concept of Islamic 
accountability and practices in an Islamic society. 
1.4 Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis has been divided into seven chapters. The current chapter gives an 
introduction to the study. Chapter 2 reviews the general literature related to corporate 
governance such as: definitions; legal systems; board of directors; disclosure and 
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transparency; and stakeholders. The Chapter also covers the literature related to corporate 
governance in developing countries. In addition, it provides a general overview about the 
Saudi Arabian environment such as: the political, social, economic and legal system. In 
addition, it gives an overview about the accounting and auditing profession and corporate 
governance developments and regulations in Saudi. 
Chapter 3 lays out the accountability theoretical framework that is used to interpret the 
study results. The chapter also provides a brief view of the Islamic conception of 
accountability. Chapter 4 describes the methodology and methods that the study will use. 
The chapter sets out the assumptions relating to the nature of social science (ontology, 
epistemology, human nature and methodology) and considers the methods that are used 
to collect the primary data (semi-structured interviews and the questionnaire survey). 
Chapter 5 reports the interview results that were held with twenty two individual 
stakeholders in Saudi between May and July 2007. The chapter summarises and analyses 
the findings gathered from the participants in relation to corporate governance issues. 
Chapter 6 presents the results of a questionnaire survey that was administered in Saudi 
between April and June 2008. The chapter presents the results of the statistical analysis 
and summarises the findings. 
Chapter 7 discusses the main findings obtained from both the interviews and the 
questionnaire, and the contribution to knowledge and presents some suggestions to 
improve corporate governance in Saudi; it identifies some limitations of the current study 
and makes suggestions for further research. 
Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
S 
Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the literature that relates to corporate governance in general and to 
emerging markets and then Saudi Arabia specifically and discusses various issues in 
order to provide a general picture of current practices. The vast majority of studies look at 
corporate governance from a positivist agency perspective and take into account only 
shareholders' interests. Shareholders are deemed to be interested in performance 
measured using different factors such as Tobins Q, abnormal share price returns etc. 
These studies comment on "good" governance from this narrow shareholder perspective. 
This thesis therefore reviews the literature based mainly on agency theory; in such a 
context the literature review may refer to best practice and good governance from that 
narrow perspective. However the theoretical and methodological perspectives of this 
thesis encompass a wider, stakeholder, perspective than that taken by the positivist 
studies. The empirical evidence examines perceptions of a range, although by no means 
an exhaustive range, of stakeholders. Section 2.2 of this chapter looks at the major 
aspects of corporate governance. Section 2.3 addresses issues relating to corporate 
governance in emerging markets, followed by Section 2.4 with focuses on corporate 
governance in Saudi Arabia. Finally, Section 2.5 concludes the chapter. 
9 
2.2 Corporate Governance Aspects 
In order to give a general perception of the current practice of, and concerns about, 
corporate governance according to the literature, a range of topics related to corporate 
governance will be highlighted in this section, especially various concepts of corporate 
governance, corporate governance models, boards of directors and ownership. 
2.2.1 Corporate Governance Concept 
Corporate governance has gained a lot of attention in the last decade from different 
interested parties such as regulators, professional bodies and academics, but despite this 
fact no specific definition has won general agreement among these parties. Consequently, 
the literature includes various definitions to explain what corporate governance means. 
These definitions reflect different understandings and perspectives on corporate 
governance. 
One of the most popular and earliest definitions of corporate governance is that provided 
by Sir Adrian Cadbury in his report on corporate governance (The Cadbury Report, 
1992); it defined corporate governance as: "The system by which companies are directed 
and controlled". Further, MacAvoy and Millstein (2003) state that: 
"[Corporate governance is] a set of structure relationships that determines 
authority and responsibility for the conduct of an organisation and its 
management. " 
These definitions are based on a narrow agency perception of corporate governance as an 
internal task of a company. K easey and Wright (1993), however, consider c orporate 
governance from the success of a company by defining corporate governance as: 
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"The structures, processes, cultures and systems that engender the 
successful operation of the organization". 
Another perspective on corporate governance emphasises shareholders; Parkinson's 
(1994) description states that it is: 
"The process of supervision and control intended to ensure that the 
company's management acts in accordance with the interests of 
shareholders". (p. 159). 
This standpoint extends corporate governance to accountability to an important related 
party to a company, i. e. its shareholders. Other definitions have adopted a wider 
perspective that takes into account other stakeholders rather than only shareholders. For 
example, Tricker (1984) argues that: 
"The governance role is not concerned with the running of the business of 
the company per se, but with giving overall direction to the enterprise, with 
overseeing and controlling the executive actions of management and with 
satisfying legitimate expectations of accountability and regulation by 
interests beyond the corporate boundaries. " 
In the same context, the OECD's (2004) principles of corporate governance also 
acknowledge a wide view of corporate governance, with a stakeholder emphasis, by 
stating that: 
"Corporate governance involves a set of relationships between a company's 
management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate 
governance also provides the structure through which the objectives of the 
company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring 
performance are determined. Good corporate governance should provide 
proper incentives for the board and management to pursue objectives that 
are in the interests of the company and its shareholders and should facilitate 
effective monitoring. " (p. 11). 
However, using a stakeholder perspective, a good corporate governance system should 
determine the accountability relationships between a company and a wide set of 
stakeholders. As Bain and Bland (1996) state, it is: "To add value to as many 
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organisational stakeholders as possible". Based on a broad accountability perspective to 
all stakeholders, Solomon (2007) defines corporate governance as: 
"The system of checks and balances, both internal and external to 
companies, which ensures that companies discharge their accountability to 
all their stakeholders and act in a socially responsible way in all areas of 
their business activity" (p. 14). 
Thus, there are a set of definitions which refer to corporate governance based on various 
perspectives and emphasizing different sets of stakeholders. However, all the perceptions 
seem to recognise that accountability is a key, but the difference between them relates to 
whom that accountability is due; some restrict the duty of accountability to shareholders, 
and others have a wider standpoint to include all of a company's stakeholders. 
2.2.2 Corporate Governance Models 
The literature indicates two models of corporate governance: the outsider model, which is 
used in Anglo-American countries (e. g. US, UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand), and 
the insider model, which applies more in countries such as Germany, Japan and France. 
The outsider model places a great reliance on: equity finance; dispersed ownership; 
strong legal protection of shareholders; strong bankruptcy regulations and the courts; less 
role for creditors, employees and other stakeholders in company management; strong 
requirements for disclosure; and considerable freedom to merge with or acquire other 
organisations (Rosser, 2003). The insider model is characterised by: a high reliance on 
bank finance; concentrated ownership; weak legal protection of minority shareholders; a 
central role for stakeholders in the ownership and management of companies; weak 
disclosure; and limited freedom to merge or acquire (Rosser, 2003). However, Table 2.1 
summarises characteristics of both models of corporate governance. 
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Table 2.1 Characteristics of Insider and Outsider Models of Corporate Governance 
Insider Outsider 
Owners Insider shareholders Outsider shareholders 
Ownership structure Concentrated Dispersed 
Separation of ownership Little Separated 
and control 
Control over management Insider shareholders Managers 
Agency problems Rare Exist 
Hostile takeover activity Rare Frequent 
Protection of investors Weak Strong 
Shareholders' rights Potential for abuse of power Potential for shareholder 
by majority shareholders democracy 
Shareholders voting Majority of shareholders tend Shareholders characterized 
to have more `voice' in their more by `exit' than by 
investee companies `voice' 
Source: Solomon (2007) 
Note: This Table summarises the differences between insider and outsider models of corporate 
governance 
2.2.3 Board of directors 
The board of directors is a significant mechanism to improve corporate governance in 
both market-based and bank-based systems (Andres et al., 2005). The following sections 
will focus on different aspects related to the board of directors. 
2.2.3.1 Unitary and Dual Boards of directors 
There are two popular forms of boards of directors in the business world, the unitary 
(one-tier) and dual (two-tier) boards. The former is widespread in Anglo-Saxon, English- 
speaking and common law countries (e. g. US, UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand), 
while in countries with civil law (e. g. Germany, France, Austria, Netherlands) the dual 
board is dominant (Solomon, 2007). The unitary board comprises both executive and 
non-executive directors (NEDs) in one single board, where directors are elected by 
shareholders and their responsibilities cover all the company's activities (Lynch-Fannon, 
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2005 and Mallin, 2004). In contrast, the dual board consists of two entities, the 
supervisory board, whose members are appointed by shareholders and others to oversee 
the direction of business, and the executive (management) board, appointed by the 
supervisory board to run the business (Maw et al., 1994; Mallin, 2004). Some 
commentators and reformers criticise what they see as a lack of independence in unitary 
boards (Maassen and van den Bosch, 1999); furthermore, within a unitary board 
executive and non-executive directors work together in an unequal environment in 
respect of the adequacy of the information to which they have access (Maassen and van 
den Bosch, 1999). 
Proponents of dual boards argue that a two-tier structure has the benefit of giving 
stakeholders (e. g. employees and banks) the opportunity to have representatives on the 
board, enabling them to protect their interests (Solomon, 2007). One other advantage of 
the dual board is the clear separation between executive and non-executive directors, and 
between the roles of chairman and chief executive officer (CEO) (Maassen and van den 
Bosch, 1999). In addition, there is a lack of a separation between the functions of 
monitoring and management on a unitary board (Mallin, 2004). On the other hand, the 
supporters of unitary boards claim that adopting a one-tier system provides a closer 
relationship between directors and better information flows (Mallin, 2004). 
2.2.3.2 Board Composition 
The board of directors is responsible for planning and monitoring a company's objectives 
and it is essential to have an effective board of directors with an appropriate composition 
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of directors to assist the board in achieving its goals and the success of the company. The 
composition of the board has a direct impact on a company's activities (Klein, 1998) and 
on its potential and ability to oversee managers (Davidson et al., 1998). Van der Walt and 
Ingley (2003) claim that: 
"While boards need to be reflective of their ownership and the wider social 
environment, diversity per se is insufficient in building effective corporate 
boards. The boards of today's companies need to focus foremost on merit 
criteria for director selection and, ideally, to comprise qualified individuals 
reflecting in the mix-gender and a range of expertise, experience and 
ethnicity. Boards also need to be cognisant of the potential to add value by 
utilising the social capital contributed collectively by their directors as a 
strategic resource for their organisation. " (p. 232). 
The most important factors that should be considered by the board of directors to promote 
efficiency are: a balance of both executive and non-executive directors, since both groups 
bring different essential skills to the board (Solomon, 2007); and a diversity and 
complementarity of the board managers. It should consist of a mix of directors with 
different personalities and educational, occupational and functional backgrounds, but 
they must also be complementary. Boards of directors that appoint "clones" do not work 
and are even dangerous (Van den Berghe and Levrau, 2004). Appropriate attention 
should also be given to directors' compensation and appointing the right people on the 
board as this is a crucial step to building a strong and effective board of directors 
(Walker, 2005). However, although previous studies emphasized the substantial role that 
the board of directors have, some studies have minimized the impact of the board of 
directors characteristics over companies (Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 1991; and Bhagat and Black, 1997). The next section will draw attention to the 
separation of chairman and CEO roles. 
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2.2.3.3 Chairman and CEO 
The chairman leads the board of directors. Chairmen's duties include running board 
meetings and overseeing the process of hiring, firing, evaluating and compensating the 
CEO (Jensen, 1993). Jensen argues that chairmen should be independent if they are to act 
objectively and carry out leadership tasks; it may be impossible for a CEO to act other 
than from self-interest; consequently, the problem of conflicts of interest arises (Fama 
and Jensen, 1983; Jensen, 1993), it is thus essential for the firm's effectiveness to 
separate the positions of chairman and CEO. The separation of CEO and chairman can 
assist in reducing the domination of management over the board (Van den Berghe and 
Levrau, 2004). To protect shareholders rights, agency theory suggests that the roles of 
CEO and chairman should be split (Williamson, 1985). The OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance (2004) recognise this and state that: 
"Separation of the two posts may be regarded as good practice, as it can 
help to achieve an appropriate balance of power, increase accountability and 
improve the board's capacity for decision making independent of 
management. " (p. 63). 
The UK Combined Code (2006) also recommends the separation of the role of CEO and 
chairman: 
"There should be a clear division of responsibilities at the head of the 
company between the running of the board and the executive responsibility 
for the running of the company's business. No one individual should have 
unfettered powers of decision. " (p. 4). 
However, although the literature appears to be in favour of the separation of the role of a 
company's chairman and CEO, some studies do not agree with that. For example, 
Brickley et al. (1997) take an opposing view; although the separation of chairman and 
CEO is justified and has potential benefits for the firm, the potential costs of such 
separation are greater. Further, Baliga et al. (1996) find weak evidence that CEO- 
16 
chairman duality negatively affects companies. In addition, Donaldson and Davis (1991) 
find that CEO-chairman duality can positively affect companies. 
Thus, although there are some studies which disagree with the importance of splitting the 
role of chairman and CEO, there is a wide range of researchers and also regulatory bodies 
who consider the separation of chairman and CEO roles as good practice of corporate 
governance which would help to enhance board independence and efficiency and reduce 
potential conflict of interests. The next section deals the role of non-executive directors as 
another important aspect related to the board of directors. 
2.2.3.4 Non-Executive Directors 
As mentioned previously, it is essential for a company to have an effective board of 
directors to achieve its goals, and it has been argued that non-executive directors (NEDs) 
are one of the main tools for an effective board. The key roles that NEDs should fulfil 
include: preventing the undue exercise of power by executive directors; safeguarding 
shareholders' interests in board decision-making; contributing to strategic decision- 
making; and ensuring competitive performance (Pye, 2001). The UK Combined Code 
(2006) states that: 
"Non-executive directors should constructively challenge and help develop 
proposals on strategy. Non-executive directors should scrutinise the 
performance of management in meeting agreed goals and objectives and 
monitor the reporting of performance. They should satisfy themselves on the 
integrity of financial information and that financial controls and systems of 
risk management are robust and defensible. They are responsible for 
determining appropriate levels of remuneration of executive directors and 
have a prime role in appointing, and where necessary removing, executive 
directors, and in succession planning. " (p. 3). 
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Randoy and Jenssen (2004) argue that there is less need for NEDs to monitor in highly 
competitive industries t han that in less c ompetitive ones. H igh level of competition 
increases the pressure over the board to perform in good way, while the lack of such 
pressure in a low-competition environment could lead to an increase in the risk of 
conflicts of interest and the role of NEDs would be crucial to oversee the board. Further, 
Beasley (1996), in a study of the role of NEDs in reducing financial statement fraud, 
found that non-fraudulent companies had a greater number of NEDs than fraudulent ones. 
However, although, according to conventional wisdom, NEDs should add value to a 
board, the results of many studies have shown that the more NEDs the worse it is for the 
company (Yermack, 1996; Klein, 1998). Bhagat and Black (1999) investigated the board 
composition of US companies and found no strong evidence that companies did benefit 
from the existence of a great number of NEDs on the board, but there was some evidence 
that companies benefit from a moderate number of inside (executive) directors. In 
addition, Lee et al. (1999) found stock market reaction to be negatively correlated with 
the announcement of new NED appointments. 
However, it is necessary for NEDs to practice effectively in order to contribute to the 
board; therefore, suitable guidance and training to assist their effectiveness should be 
available and NEDs should have appropriate knowledge, skills, experience and time 
(Ezzamel and Watson, 2005). In the UK, the Higgs review (2003) focused on the role and 
effectiveness of NEDs. Higgs states: 
"To be effective, non-executive directors need to be well-informed about the 
company and the external environment in which it operates, with a strong 
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command of issues relevant to the business. A non-executive director should 
insist on a comprehensive, formal and tailored induction. An effective 
induction need not be restricted to the boardroom, so consideration should 
be given to visiting sites and meeting senior and middle management. Once 
in post, an effective non-executive director should seek continually to 
develop and refresh their knowledge and skills to ensure that their 
contribution to the board remains informed and relevant. " (p. 63). 
It seems that NEDs face difficulties in fulfilling their roles for a number of reasons, such 
as: they are usually in part-time posts, are simultaneously members of other boards, and 
are often required to undertake complicated tasks on the basis of insufficient information. 
These impede their performance and may lead to unsatisfactory performance by NEDs 
(Bozec, 2005). Also NEDs may be prevented from accomplishing their tasks by obstacles 
they face. Pay (2001) states that: 
"Even where NEDs are encouraged to contribute to and interrogate 
executive actions and proposals, they do not have perfect access to 
information or even access to perfect information: hence even those who 
have no prior connection with a board (i. e. `truly independent') are still very 
much in the hands of the chairman and the CE in terms of how agendas are 
put together, meetings are framed, information shared and decisions made. " 
(p. 191). 
This finding seems less surprising, however, in light of what is now known about the 
methods and standards of appointment of NEDs and their characteristics. The tracking of 
the use of the term `non-executive director' in past studies shows clearly that it has been 
misused as if it designated an independent director, whereas in fact indications run 
against the independence conception (Lawrence and Stapledon, 1999). The following 
section will look at independent non-executive directors. 
19 
2.2.3.5 Independent Non-Executive Directors 
There is a wide acceptance that the appointment of independent NEDs is a crucial device 
to assist the board of directors in monitoring a firm's management (Stapledon and 
Lawrence, 1997). The importance of outsider directors is in fulfilling the role of 
monitoring management, which they are only able to do properly if unaffiliated (Hanson 
and Song, 1998). The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (2004) state that: 
"Independent board members can contribute significantly to the decision- 
making of the board. They can bring an objective view to the evaluation of 
the performance of the board and management. In addition, they can play an 
important role in areas where the interests of management, the company and 
its shareholders may diverge such as executive remuneration, succession 
planning, changes of corporate control, take-over defences, large 
acquisitions and the audit function. " (p. 64). 
Cotter and Silvester (2003) find evidence that Australian companies benefit from the 
existence of independent NEDs on the boards. Bhagat and Black (2002) find that 
companies suffering from some difficulties respond by ' increasing the proportion of 
independence NEDs on their board. However, Stapledon and Lawrance (1997) and 
Lawrence and Stapledon (1999) offer the following suggestions as to why independent 
directors fail to add value to their firms: 
a) There may be a lack of efficiency or effectiveness when independent directors 
perform a monitoring role; 
b) Sometimes poor performance is related to the company's history and has nothing 
to do with independent directors; 
c) Independent directors may be a minority compared to executive directors and 
affiliated non-executive directors; 
d) Some independent directors may lack ability or their other engagements may 
prevent or limit their contribution; 
e) Monitoring by independent directors may be seen as a hindrance in some 
situations (e. g. decision-making in high-volatility environments); 
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f) There may be personal relationships between independent directors and the CEO; 
g) Independence may be diluted by working as an independent director for many 
years; 
h) If the independent directors are executive directors in other firms, that may affect 
their desire to monitor. 
However, the literature indicates the major role that independent non-executive directors 
are assumed to play on the board which could help to monitor management and ensure 
that the interests of different parties are considered when making decisions. At the same 
time, it is critical that independent NEDs have appropriate independence and are able to 
fulfil their expected roles. 
2.2.3.6 Role of the Board of Directors 
It is essential for every company to have a well-functioning and effective board of 
directors (Solomon, 2007), and boards of directors should have clearly defined roles, 
duties, and responsibilities (Mallin, 2004). The UK Combined Code (2006) states that: 
"The board's role is to provide entrepreneurial leadership of the company 
within a framework of prudent and effective controls which enables risk to 
be assessed and managed. The board should set the company's strategic 
aims, ensure that the necessary financial and human resources are in place 
for the company to meet its objectives and review management 
performance. The board should set the company's values and standards and 
ensure that its obligations to its shareholders and others are understood and 
met" (p. 3). 
The board is also supposed to monitor and control a company in order to improve 
corporate governance (Andres et al., 2005). Blake (1999) has identified the main 
functions of the board of directors as being: providing strategic direction and values; 
approval of planning; monitoring and control of performance; ensuring organisational 
21 
capability; awareness of, and compliance with, legal responsibility. From his perspective 
Walker (2005) points out that boards of directors play three important roles: providing 
strategic advice to help to maximise long-term values for shareholders; helping to 
manage risk; and holding management accountable for their actions. 
2.2.3.7 Size of the Board of Directors 
Some studies have looked at the size of the board of directors in order to suggest an 
appropriate size for the board. These studies generally indicate that a small board of 
directors seems to act much better and to be more effective than a large one. Using a 
sample of 452 large American companies, Yermack (1996) found that a small board of 
directors is better for companies. Ahmed et al. (2006) also discovered the same result. 
Furthermore, Eisenberg et al. (1998) investigated the effect of board size on mid-size and 
small companies, and found that smaller boards were best. Similarly, Huther (1997) 
found that companies were negatively affected by large boards of directors. 
Small boards may thus be better whereas large boards may result in ineffectiveness and 
lead to the domination by the CEO of the board (Jensen, 1993). A recent study conducted 
on 450 non-financial companies in 10 OECD countries had results similar to those of 
previous studies; large board size appears to be worse than a small board, and given the 
variation in board composition and functions within the sample, large boards may suffer 
from a lack of c oordination, flexibility and communication, w hich may outstrip the 
benefits of having large boards (Andres et al., 2005). 
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2.2.3.8 Board of Directors' Sub-Committees 
The board of directors may establish different committees and delegate some activities to 
these committees which should report to the board about their works, as the board is 
responsible for these committees' activities (Mallin, 2004). The UK Combined code 
(2006) recommends three types of committees that board of directors should have, audit; 
remuneration; and nomination committees. However, companies may establish other 
types of committee such as risk and executive committees according to companies' 
circumstances. The following sections discuss three main board sub-committees. 
2.2.3.8.1 Audit Committee 
The audit committee plays an important role as a board subcommittee. The Smith Report 
(2003) explains its role thus: 
"While all directors have a duty to act in the interests of the company, the 
audit committee has a particular role, acting independently from the 
executive, to ensure that the interests of shareholders are properly protected 
in relation to financial reporting and internal control. " (p. 3). 
An analysis of the corporate governance codes of twenty European countries by Collier 
and Zaman (2005) showed that their codes assign a set of functions which should be 
fulfilled by an audit committee as follows: a) oversight of external audit; b) oversight of 
internal audit; c) involvement in external auditor selection or dismissal; d) oversight of 
risk and internal control reporting by the board; and e) oversight of financial reporting 
quality. The audit committee functions as a representative of the full board to provide 
personal contact and communication between the board, external auditors, internal 
auditors, the finance director and the operating executives (Song and Windram, 2004). 
Song and Widram (2004) describe one of the audit committee's functions as acting as a 
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final safeguard to approving the financial statements prior to their release to shareholders 
and other stakeholders. 
Haron et al. (2005) from a principal -agent perspective claim that the audit committee is 
expected to protect the interests of the principals and ensure that the agents carry out their 
roles in accordance with their contracts. They enumerate three roles for the audit 
committee: to ensure that management does not override established prudent financial 
practices and procedures; to assist the board of directors in discharging its responsibilities 
for financial reporting and internal controls; and to provide an impartial channel for 
complaints concerning the management and direction of the company. Furthermore, Kala 
(2001) sees the audit committee's role as assisting the board of directors in overseeing 
and ensuring the adequate functioning of the internal control mechanisms, monitoring 
and focusing on the review of financial risk and other aspects of risk management. 
2.2.3.8.2 Remuneration Committee 
The remuneration committee' can be seen as an administrative device that ensures an 
acceptable degree of integrity in the setting of executive remuneration (Main et al., 2008). 
As a response to concerns about directors' remuneration the Greenbury Report (1995) 
stated that: 
"To avoid potential conflicts of interest, boards of directors should set up 
remuneration committees of non-executive directors to determine on their 
behalf, and on behalf of the shareholders, within agreed terms of reference 
the company's policy on executive remuneration and specific remuneration 
packages for each of the executive directors, including pension rights and 
any compensation payments. " (p. 14). 
1 Remuneration committee called compensation committee in some parts of the literature. 
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The Greenbury Report did not attempt to reduce directors' salaries, rather, it provided a 
means of establishing a balance between the salaries and the performance of directors 
(Solomon, 2007). The UK Combined Code (2006) recommended that companies 
establish a remuneration committee of at least three, or in the case of smaller companies 
two, independent non-executive directors. The Code stated that: 
"The remuneration committee should consult the chairman and/or chief 
executive about their proposals relating to the remuneration of other 
executive directors. The remuneration committee should also be responsible 
for appointing any consultants in respect of executive director 
remuneration. " (p. 12). 
2.2.2.8.3 Nomination Committee 
There are two major roles for a nomination committee; the first is identifying the required 
skills for the replacement of, or the appointment of additional, directors and to approach 
potential candidates, and the second and more critical is to review the performance of the 
board on a regular basis (Carson, 2002). As a result, the protection of stakeholders' 
interests should be greater in companies with a nomination committee than other 
companies, as the existence of a nomination committee should lead to fewer grey 
directors2 compared to other companies that lack a nomination committee (Vafeas, 1999; 
Shivdasani and Yermack, 1997). 
Indeed, the UK combined Code (2006) reports that: 
"There should be a nomination committee which should lead the process for 
board appointments and make recommendations to the board. A majority of 
members of the nomination committee should be independent non-executive 
directors. " (p. 7). 
2 Grey directors are those directors who may develop a fiduciary relationship to the firm by providing 
business services for personal gain. Given their potential business ties to the firm, their independence is 
compromised and they are less likely to protect shareholder interests with the same dedication as 
unaffiliated outside directors (Baysinger and Butler, 1985). 
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2.2.4 Ownership Structure 
As an essential dimension of corporate governance, many studies have investigated 
companies' ownership structures and their impact over corporate governance practices. 
La Porta et al. (1999) identify five different forms of company ownership structure 
whereby firms may be owned by: a family; the state; a widely-held financial institution 
(e. g. bank, pension fund or insurance company); a widely-held corporation; or a 
miscellaneous grouping. It has been argued that a country's legal system has a crucial and 
direct impact on the ownership structure of firms. In other words, in any country where 
minority shareholders' rights are protected, there will be many more firms with 
diversified shareholder bases, while in contrast, in a country where there is less protection 
of minority shareholders' rights there is discouragement of diverse shareholder bases. 
Family-controlled firms are more likely to exist, and families are liable to retain control 
of firms for longer, as a result of investors finding it undesirable to invest in these firms 
because they see their rights as being unprotected (La Porta et al., 1997; Mallin, 2004). In 
this context La Porta et al. (1999) argue that: 
"In these countries, controlling shareholders have less fear of being 
expropriated themselves in the event that they over lose control through a 
takeover or a market accumulation of shares by a raider, and so might be 
willing to cut their ownership of voting rights by selling shares to raise 
funds or to diversify. In contrast, in countries with poor protection of 
minority shareholders, losing control involuntarily and thus becoming a 
minority shareholder may be such a costly proposition in terms of 
surrendering the private benefits of control that the controlling shareholders 
would do everything to keep control. They would hold more voting rights 
themselves and would have less interest is selling shares in the market. " (p. 
473). 
La Porta et al. (2002) conducted a study of 539 firms in twenty seven wealthy economies, 
some with a good regime of protection of minority shareholders' rights and others 
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without. They found that family-controlled firms were the most common; those with 
widely-held shares, state-controlled firms and those controlled by financial institutions 
were far less common. They note that there are several advantages of concentrated 
ownership. For example, it can be a valuable tool to monitor managers, in addition to 
overcoming agency problems such as the misalignment of interests between shareholders 
and managers. On the other hand, it may lead to other sorts of agency problems; for 
instance, controlling shareholders with privileged access to the management may only be 
concerned with a firm's performance from their own personal interests at the expense of 
other stakeholders (Kim 2006). La Porta et al. (1999) state that: 
"These firms are run not by professional managers without equity 
ownership who are unaccountable to shareholders, but by controlling 
shareholders. These controlling shareholders are ideally placed to monitor 
the management, and in fact the top management is usually part of the 
controlling family, but at the same time they have the power to expropriate 
the minority shareholders as well as the interest in so doing. " (p. 511). 
Anderson and Reeb (2003) studied family owned firms in the US and note that family 
firms are better than non-family firms and that it is also better when firms' CEOs are 
family members. A study by Mishra et al. (2001) found similar results among Norwegian 
firms. Cadbury (2000) claims that: 
"Family firms have distinctive characteristics from which they can derive 
significant competitive advantage. A long-term perspective comes from 
building a business for future generations while the strength of most family 
firms' founding values gives them a clear identity in an increasingly 
faceless corporate world. " (p. 2). 
However, family-controlled firms are not perfect. Klein et al. (2005) did not find any 
ownership type better than any other amongst Canadian firms; for example, family- 
controlled firms could face internal obstacles due to disagreements among the family 
members and between the generations. As mentioned previously, such firms also could 
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suffer from agency problems, there being a concern that managers would tend to act in 
favour of the family and ignore the other shareholders (Morck and Yeung, 2003). 
Furthermore, Mishra et al. (2001) state that: 
"One potential drawback of founding family ownership is that these firms 
might have difficulty accepting professional managers capable of 
responding to new technology and increased competition. Family businesses 
can also confiscate corporate property for personal use. " (p. 236). 
Using a sample of 1500 publicly traded firms in 1935 and 4220 firms in 1995, Holdemess 
et al. (1999) found that the percentage of managerial ownership of publicly traded firms 
had increased from 13% in 1935 to 21% in 1995, and Cheung and Wei (2006) found that 
companies with insider ownership do well. In addition, Jensen and Meckling (1976) state 
that: 
"As the owner-manager's fraction of the equity falls, his fractional claim on 
the outcomes falls and this will tend to encourage him to appropriate larger 
amounts of the corporate resources in the form of perquisites. This also 
makes it desirable for the minority shareholders to expend more resources in 
monitoring his behaviour. " (p. 12). 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) identify three elements of agency costs: a) the monitoring 
expenditures by the principal; b) the bonding expenditures by the agent; c) the residual 
loss. By studying the relationship between agency costs and ownership structure in small 
firms, Ang et al. (2000) suggest that the agency costs increase as the equity share of the 
owner-manager declines, while agency costs increase with the number of non-manager 
shareholders and out sider-managers increase the agency costs, whereas agency costs 
should be reduced within family-controlled firms. Also, small firms could reduce agency 
costs by delegating monitoring to banks. Patibandla (2006) investigated the role of 
outside investors in overseeing and controlling management. The findings show that 
outside institutional investors have a positive effect on firms. In countries such as Japan 
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and Germany, large banks play a significant role in raising capital for firms, acting as 
monitors, and in the case of financial distress, serve as guarantors for other creditors 
(Morck et al., 2000). Furthermore, the results of a study by Morck and Nakamura (1999) 
of bank ownership structure in Japan suggests that there is a positive relation between 
investment expenditure and bank ownership, higher bank ownership being associated 
with higher company liquidity, with a positive relation between bank ownership and 
interest costs for firms that meet regulatory restrictions for issuing public debt. 
Regarding government ownership, Patibandla (2006) found that government financial 
investment negatively affected firms. However, Ang and Ding (2006) also investigated 
government ownership but their results showed that it was beneficial to be a government- 
linked firm. Ang and Ding argue that: 
"The government can lead in providing risk capital when the venture capital 
industry is not yet developed, and may serve as a large monitoring 
shareholder when institutional investors have not yet reached the critical 
threshold of share ownership. It may set the standard of corporate 
governance for other privately controlled companies to emulate. However, it 
should be recognized that, beyond the transition period of development, 
when the economy is developed and other institutions and mechanisms for 
control are in place, government-linked firms may outlive its usefulness and 
be phased out. " (p. 66). 
However, a review of the ownership structure literature indicates that each type of 
ownership has some problems related to it. Insider ownership may decrease the agency 
cost but this may lead to greater control over a company resulting in less consideration 
for other stakeholders' interests. 
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2.2.4.1 Institutional Investors 
Institutional investors consist of organisations such as insurance companies, investment 
trusts, pension funds, and unit trusts. The importance of institutional investors arises from 
the significance of the proportion they own in their investee companies, so they are 
expected to play a role equal in importance with their holdings. Mallin (1996) states that 
institutional investors own between 65% and 75% of British quoted companies, and in 
the US between 47% and 50%. Table 2.2 shows the ownership structure in the largest six 
industrial countries and indicates the significant proportions of equities that institutional 
investors have in these markets. 
For example, according to the UK Combined Code (2006), institutional investors should 
undertake: 
a) Dialogue with companies: "Institutional shareholders should enter into a dialogue 
with companies based on the mutual understanding of objectives. " (p. 19). 
b) Evaluation of governance disclosures: "When evaluating companies' governance 
arrangements, particularly those relating to board structure and composition, 
institutional shareholders should give due weight to all relevant factors drawn to 
their attention. " (p. 19). 
c) Shareholder voting: "Institutional shareholders have a responsibility to make 
considered use of their votes. " (p. 20). 
Furthermore Figure 2.1 signifies the increase in the amount of investments of institutional 
investors in OECD countries from 1989 to 2001. Consequently, institutional investors 
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should recognize their responsibility to control firms in which they invest by practicing 
their right to vote; indeed, they should take it as a fiduciary duty (Mallin, 2001). 
However, many questions should be raised in regard to institutional investors, such 
whether they have the appropriate experience and skills to participate in controlling and 
as managing investee companies; the accountability they seek in investee companies 
(Jackson, 2001); and they have a long-term view of their investee companies. 
Table2.2 The Ownership Structure of Common Stock in the Six Largest Industrial 
Countries 
France 
1994 
USA 
1994 
Japan 
1992 
Germany 
1993 
Italy 
1994 
UK 
1993 
Financial institutions 7.8 44.5 48.0 29.0 7.8 61.8 
Banks 3.8 0.1 18.9 14.3 4.4 0.6 
Insurance 1.9 6.0 19.6 7.1 3.4 17.3 
Other 2.1 38.4 9.5 7.7 -- 43.9 
Non-financial institutions 92.2 55.5 52.0 71.0 
92.2 38.2 
Non-financial enterprises 57.9 -- 24.9 38.8 24.5 3.1 
Households 19.5 51.4 22.4 16.6 50.5 17.7 
Government 3.7 -- 0.7 3.4 8.0 1.3 
Foreigners 11.1 4.2 4.0 12.2 9.2 16.3 
Source: OECD Economic Surveys (1997) 
Note: The Table show the percentage of different ownership types in the six largest industrial countries. 
Jackson (2001) recognizes that there are barriers to institutional investors' participation in 
voting, including the free-rider effect. Whereby, when one institution takes an activist 
stance, all the others reap the benefits, questioning the rationality of individual activism. 
He also suggests that activism might manifest itself in differing ways, including through 
formal and informal meetings with investee companies, which can achieve the required 
results without any damaging effects on the company. Webb et al. (2003) claim that it is 
impossible to expect institutional investors to have a long-term partnership with investee 
companies, such as those of banks, because they have different constraints, objectives, 
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horizons and abilities. Graves and Waddock (1994) support the contention that 
institutional investors have a short-term perspective. Furthermore, Sherman et al. (1998) 
found that not all institutional investors are "patient investors". 
Farrar and Girton (1981) suggest that business relationships between institutions and their 
portfolio companies may tend to diffuse the identity of interests between institutional and 
other stockholders, and may even introduce a conflict between the interests of the 
institutions and the beneficiaries of the portfolios under their management. 
2.2.4.2 Shareholders' Rights 
As mentioned above, the separation of ownership and control is a widely adopted model 
in the world of business, which leads to a situation where managers, and possibly 
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Note: The Figure shows the total financial assets of institutional investors in OECD countries (United 
States, Japan, United Kingdom, France, Germany and Other OECD countries) in million US dollars and as 
percentage of GDP. 
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majority shareholders, control and manage firms, whereas minority shareholders are 
without any authority to intervene in a firm's business; consequently, it is very important 
to protect minority shareholders and other stakeholders by giving them some rights to 
ensure that they are protected from the other parties' ascendancy. These rights vary from 
country to country, based on a number of factors such as the legal, political, economic 
and social systems. Kang and Sorensen (1999) claim that: 
"Legal rights are important because they protect economic rights and define 
the basic context for the exercise and transfer of rights. In particular, legal 
rules are the foundation of modern corporate governance, as the property 
rights of shareholders are created and defined by federal securities 
regulations and case law. " (p. 126). 
The OECD Principles (2004) describes group of stakeholders rights, those of 
shareholders which should be assured by a corporate governance framework as the 
following: 
1. Shareholders rights should include the right to: a) secure methods of 
ownership registration; b) convey or transfer shares; c) obtain relevant and 
material information on the corporation on a timely and regular basis; d) 
participate and vote in general shareholder meetings; e) elect and remove 
members of the board; and f) share in the profits of the corporation. 
2. Shareholders should have the right to participate in, and to be sufficiently 
informed on, decisions concerning fundamental corporate changes cush as: 
a) amendments to the statutes, or articles of incorporation or similar 
governing documents of the company; b) the authorisation of additional 
shares; c) extraordinary transaction, including the transfer of all or 
substantially all assets, that in effect result in the sale of the company. 
3. Shareholders should have the opportunity to participate effectively and 
vote in general shareholder meetings and should be informed of the rules, 
including voting procedures, that govern general shareholder meetings: a) 
shareholders should be furnished with sufficient and timely information 
concerning the date, location and agenda of general meetings, as well as full 
and timely information regarding the issues to be decided at the meeting; 
b)shareholders should have the opportunity to ask questions to relating to 
the annual external audit, to place items on the agenda of general meetings, 
bbb. - 
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and to propose resolutions, subject to reasonable limitations; c) effective 
shareholder participation in key corporate governance decisions, such as the 
nomination and election of board members, should be facilitated; d) 
shareholders should be able to vote in person or in absentia, and equal effect 
should be given to votes whether cast in person or in absentia. 
4. Capital structures and arrangements that enable certain shareholders to 
obtain a degree of control disproportionate to their equity ownership should 
be disclosed. 
It has been argued that greater protection of stakeholders, especially shareholders' rights 
should help monitor managements and increase a company's performance (Jiraporn and 
Gleason, 2007; and Chi, 2005). 
2.3 Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets 
The term `emerging market' is used to refer to the markets of developing countries that 
have grown in recent decades. According to Singh (2003), most emerging markets are not 
active markets for corporate control in the Anglo-Saxon sense; these markets are likely to 
be even more imperfect and suffer from greater informational deficits than markets in the 
US and the UK. Emerging markets are different from developed markets in areas such as 
accounting transparency, liquidity, corruption, volatility, governance, taxes and 
transaction costs (Bruner et al., 2002). 
It has been widely discussed that the weakness of corporate governance is one of the 
most significant reasons for the waves of economic crisis suffered by emerging markets. 
For example, Singh and Zammit (2006) assess the most important defects of the Asian 
way of doing business as follows: a) poor corporate governance; b) the poor state of 
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competition; c) the close relationship between government, business and banks, which 
leads to crony capitalism. Oman et al. (2003) report that: 
"In developing countries, the widespread preponderance of smaller firms 
that do not have listed shares, and of large family-owned, state-owned 
and/or foreign-owned companies whose shares are also not widely traded 
locally, is thus an important reason why the potential importance of 
corporate governance was long ignored. " (p. 7). 
Singh (2003) believes that emerging markets are unlikely to introduce satisfactory 
solutions to serious corporate governance issues. Consequently, it is essential for 
emerging markets to develop their standards of corporate governance, as better corporate 
governance will help companies in those markets to avoid any potential crises. However, 
although these markets are still less developed as a whole, some emerging markets (in 30 
of 150 developing countries) are in transition to higher levels of economic development, 
while pre-transition countries also offer interesting investment opportunities (Bruner et 
at., 2002). As better corporate governance is good for companies (Klapper and Love, 
2004) it necessary for these markets to encourage companies to have good corporate 
governance practices. In addition, Singh (2003) states that: 
"Although there might be shortcomings in corporate governance in many 
developing countries, leading emerging countries have vibrant product 
markets, displaying as much intensity of competition as that observed in 
advanced countries. Further, despite the capital market imperfections, stock 
markets in these countries have been growing fast and contributing 
significantly to corporate growth through new primary issues. " (p. 460). 
2.3.1 The Importance of Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets 
Bruner et al. (2002) argue that emerging markets will continue to attract foreign 
investors, adding that the economies of roughly 30 emerging countries widely followed 
by investors are growing at real rates two or three times higher than those of developed 
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countries, and the roughly 150 countries not regarded as developed are not only huge but 
also account for the predominance of the world population, land mass and natural 
resources. Figure 2.2 shows the foreign investment in emerging markets between 1990 
and 2002. The Figure indicates a rapid increase in foreign direct investment in emerging 
markets. 
Figure 2.2 Foreign Direct Investments in Emerging Markets between 
1990 to 2002 
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Note: The Figure shows the foreign direct investments in emerging market in billion US 
dollars in twelve years. 
Good corporate governance plays a significant role in attracting foreign investors and is a 
good motivation for emerging markets to develop their corporate governance systems 
(Black et al., 2006). Furthermore, good corporate governance has a crucial role to play in 
helping emerging markets to increase the flow and lower the cost of the financial capital 
that firms need to finance their investment activity; this role has grown significantly 
recently and is likely to continue, as the needs of corporations for extra-firm finance to 
bý 
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supply those needs has greatly diminished (Oman, 2001). Oman et al. (2003) go so far as 
to state that: 
"Corporate governance matters not only because the health of a country's 
corporate sector matters for the country's entire economy but because the 
quality of a country's institutions of governance matters greatly for national 
development. The ability to move from heavily relationship-based to 
predominantly rules-based institutions of corporate as well as public 
governance is central to the success of the long-term development process in 
all countries. " (p. 8). 
2.3.2 Board Structure in Emerging Markets 
The board of directors has a major influence over the practices of corporate governance 
in emerging markets as well as in developed markets. There is no particular form of a 
board of directors in emerging markets (see Table 2.3) as there are different social, 
cultural and political factors in each one. 
Barton and Wong (2006) identify six major characteristics that could be considered to 
influence the board of directors' effectiveness in emerging markets: a high concentration 
of ownership; weak recruitment processes and a shortage of experienced directors; poor 
focus; an inadequate supply of information; complex cultural traditions; and 
underdeveloped legal regimes. 
Various studies have examined boards of directors in emerging markets and identified 
certain characteristics. For example, Chen et al. (2006) conducted a study in China to 
explore the relationship between fraud and board structure as an aspect of corporate 
governance. The results indicate that boardroom characteristics are a factor in explaining 
fraud and that a company could reduce fraud by increasing the number of outside 
directors on the board of directors. Another study in Greece indicates that concentrated 
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ownership leads to strong ties between major owners and management and that the board 
of directors is generally very passive and follows management's decisions. Further, non- 
executive directors in these companies, who should look after stakeholders' interests, do 
not actually supervise the management efficiently (Spanos, 2003). Furthermore, studying 
the top 50 Egyptian listed companies, Abdelsalam et al. (2008) do not find any significant 
evidence that board of directors' composition has any impact over Egyptian companies. 
However, Kaymak and Bektas (2008) in Turkey, found that more insider directors 
positively affect companies and that duality of CEO and chairman and board tenure have 
a negative impact on companies. 
Table 2.3 Board of Directors in Some Emerging Markets 
Unitary Dual 
Greece, South Korea, India, Czech Republic, Poland, 
Malaysia, South Africa, Uganda, Russia, Hungary, Taiwan, 
Kenya, Egypt, Jordan, China, Brazil 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, 
Qatar, Oman, UAE 
However, other studies found different results. For example, in Thailand the composition 
of the board of directors' has a positive impact over companies (Connelly and 
Limpaphayom, 2004), and Choi et at. (2007) find that a greater proportion of outside 
directors is better for Korean companies. 
These results indicate that there is no clear pattern that explains the influence of the 
composition of boards of directors over companies in emerging markets. 
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2.3.3 Ownership Structure in Emerging Markets 
It has been discussed above that ownership structure has a major impact over companies' 
practices of corporate governance. This section reviews som e studies that deal w ith 
ownership structure in emerging markets. 
Claessens et al. (2000) study the ownership structure of East Asian firms by using data 
from 2980 publicly traded companies from nine countries. The results, supported by La 
Porta et al. (1999), indicate that the separation of management from ownership control is 
rare in those countries, due to the fact that more than two thirds of firms are controlled by 
a single shareholder. Furthermore, ownership of about 60% of firms whose shares are not 
widely held are related to the family of the controlling shareholder. They also find that 
large families control more than half of firms; however, there are differences from one 
country to another: firms in Indonesia and Thailand are mainly family controlled, while 
state control is significant in Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand, 
whereas in Japan, a developed country, firms are generally widely held. 
A study conducted in Malaysia to study corporate finance and governance structure 
before and after the financial crisis, suggests that ownership concentration helps to 
mitigate conflict between managers and owners (Suto, 2003). Kim (2006) examines the 
impact of controlling families' block ownership and capital structure on the productivity 
of Korean firms. He presents evidence that family ownership concentration is associated 
positively with firm-level productivity performance. Xu and Wang (1999) studied the 
impact of ownership structure on publicly listed companies in China, and emphasised the 
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importance of large institutional shareholders in corporate governance, the inefficiency of 
state ownership, and the potential problems in an overly-dispersed ownership structure. 
Other research has focussed on the role of foreign investors in emerging markets. An 
empirical study by Patibandla (2006) shows that a stronger presence of foreign 
institutional investors has a positive impact on companies, whereas firms that depend on 
their own government's financial institutions for external finance are worse; Patibandla 
(2006) goes so far as to state that: 
"In recent years, several developing economies have opened their financial 
and equity markets to foreign institutional investors. These institutional 
investors not only are able to invest in information to monitor and discipline 
managers of firms but also to bring in efficient tools to monitor agents. This 
should improve corporate governance in developing economies by 
increasing transparency and thereby facilitating convergence of basic tenets 
of institutional conditions. " (p. 40). 
In the same context, studying the effects of the economic crisis in Korea, Baek et al. 
(2004) found that firms with large equity ownership by foreign investors were much 
better than those whose ownership was concentrated in the hands of owner-managers or 
affiliated firms. In addition, Suto (2003) found that foreign ownership was beneficial in 
the financial liberalisation in Malaysian companies. 
Lins (2003) investigated ownership structure using data from 1433 firms in 18 emerging 
markets and provides evidence that large non-management block-holders can be 
beneficial to firms. Douma et al. (2006) argue that the effect of ownership in emerging 
markets is likely to be different: the external mechanisms are less developed in emerging 
markets, so the governance of listed corporations takes place mainly through internal 
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mechanisms; furthermore, institutional factors like family-run business groups play a 
distinctive role. However, they add that in these markets government-controlled financial 
institutions are often important shareholders and have different incentives and objectives 
from those of other stakeholders. 
However, these studies show that the ownership structure in emerging markets is mainly 
concentrated on family, state or institutional investors. These major stakeholders have a 
direct impact on companies, and companies with a concentrated ownership, especially 
companies with family and institutional investors as owners, perform much better than 
dispersed ownership structure companies. 
23.4 The Legal System in Emerging Markets 
A country's legal system generally influences corporate governance, not only laws 
related to corporate governance but also other laws that may impact on corporate 
governance practices (Luo, 2007). However, countries with a civil law system usually 
have ineffective stakeholders' protection (Mallin, 2004). 
Klapper and Love (2004) use data from 14 emerging markets to explore the differences in 
firm-level governance mechanisms and their relationship with a country's legal 
environment. They find that: 1) firms in countries with weak overall legal systems have 
on average lower governance rankings; 2) firm-level governance is correlated with 
measures such as firm size, sales growth and intangibility of assets; 3) firms that trade 
shares in the United States have higher governance rankings, especially those based in 
countries with weak legal systems; and 4) good governance is positively correlated with 
performance. Klapper and Love (2004) suggest that companies could improve 
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stakeholders' protection by increasing disclosure, selecting well-functioning and 
independent boards, and imposing disciplinary mechanisms to prevent management 
malpractice. 
Doidge et at. (2007) claim that country characteristics are expected to play an 
overwhelming role as a determinant of governance in poorly developed countries. 
Furthermore, they state that it is costly to improve stakeholders' protection in countries 
with weak development, because the institutional infrastructure is lacking and good 
governance has political costs. Consequently, in such countries the benefits of improving 
governance may be weaker because their capital markets lack depth. 
2.3.5 Corruption in Emerging Markets 
Transparency International defines corruption as the misuse of entrusted power for 
private gain. Corruption includes activities such as bribery, fraud, extortion, and 
favoritism (Luo, 2007). Although different markets suffer from corruption, emerging 
markets in developing countries in general have a more corrupt environment (see Figure 
2.3) and weaker corporate governance institutions; therefore, financial markets tend to 
price assets in emerging markets at a discount with respect to comparable assets in 
developed markets (Bruner et al., 2002). 
Using firm-level data from 43 countries, Lee and Ng (2004) investigate the impact of 
corruption on companies. Their results indicate that firms from more corrupt countries 
trade at significantly lower market multiples and vice versa. Further analysis shows that 
this result is attributable primarily to higher required rates of equity return in in ore 
corrupt countries. Another study conducted by Wu (2005) looked at the linkage between 
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corporate governance and corruption; the results suggest that the improvement in 
corporate governance may be a catalyst to break the vicious cycle of bribery and 
corruption. He also found that firms from countries with lower corporate governance 
standards are more likely to be involved in bribery practices when they export goods or 
services to other nations. Therefore, improving corporate governance in some leading 
exporting nations should be a top priority in the global anticorruption campaign. 
Future 2.3 Corruption Perceptions Index 2005 
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Source: Transparency International (2009). 
Note: The score relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business 
people and country analysts, and ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt). 
2.4 Corporate Governance in Saudi Arabia 
The third section of this chapter concentrates on corporate governance in Saudi Arabia. It 
starts with a general background to the Kingdom including political, social and 
economics issues and the legal system in Saudi Arabia as an important feature of 
corporate governance framework. 
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2.4.1 Background to Saudi Arabia 
In order to study the business environment in Saudi Arabia it is necessary to give a 
general background concerning a number of aspects of Saudi politics, economics and 
culture. This section will provide a brief background to Saudi Arabia by showing the 
most important aspects of the Saudi environment. 
Figure 2.4 Map of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
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King Abdulaziz Al-Saud (1880-1953) announced the foundation of the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia on 23 September 1932, after great efforts to unite the different parts of the 
Arabian Peninsula under one flag (Al-Angari, 1999; Al-Turaiqi, 2008) and the country 
has since become one of the most significant in the Middle East. As shown in Figure 2.4, 
Saudi Arabia is located in the South West of Asia, having an area of about 2,100,000 
square kilometers (868,730 square miles), with a population of 24 millions; the annual 
population growth was 3% in 2006 (World Bank, 2009). 
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The system of governance in Saudi Arabia is a monarchy, limited to male descendants of 
King Abdulaziz. It is a centralized system, the King being the head of the Council of 
Ministers, which is responsible for the management of the internal and external affairs of 
the Kingdom, in addition to organising and coordinating the various branches of 
government (Fundamental Governance System, 1992). Furthermore, the three 
fundamental powers, executive, legislative and judicial, are vested in the King. 
According to the Fundamental Governance System, the Saudi constitution is based on the 
Holy Quran and all legislation is subject to Islamic law (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
2007). Chapter 8 of the Fundamental Governance System states that: 
"Governance in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia rests on fairness, consultation 
and equality, pursuant to Islamic legislation. " 
Saudi Arabia has a special position in the Islamic world because it contains the holiest 
Moslem sites of Mecca (the direction of prayer for more than one billion Muslims) and 
Medina (t he city of which prophet Mohammed (PBUH) emigrated a nd where he is 
buried). Furthermore, it is the land of prophecy and the cradle of Islam, which spread 
from there to all parts of the earth. Each year about two and a half million Muslims come 
to these holy lands to take part in the Hajj (pilgrimage). The Islamic religion has a 
distinct influence on most aspects of life in Saudi Arabia, and this goes back to the 
establishment of the Kingdom, when Mohammed Ibn Saud (the political leader) agreed 
with Sheikh Mohammed Ibn Abdulwahhab (the religious leader) in 1744 to set up a state 
(the first Saudi State) occupying most of the Arabian peninsula, governed by the House 
of Al Saud (from which Saudi Arabia takes its name) and adopting Islamic legislation 
(Al-Rumaihi, 1997; Al-Turaiqi, 2008 ; and Bowen, 2008). Saudi Arabia is a charter 
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member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the League of Arab States (LAS), the 
Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and the United Nations (UN). 
Saudi Arabia is a developing country; its economy depends on oil exports, which are the 
main source of national income (90-95% of total national income and 35-40% of GDP). 
It is estimated to hold about one quarter of the world's proven oil reserves and will 
continue as the largest producer of oil for the foreseeable future (Ministry of Economy 
and Planning, 2007). It is presently the dominant producer, having produced 32% of 
OPEC output in 2004 (OPEC, 2005) (See Figure 2.5). 
Figure 2.5 Output of OPEC Countries in Oct 2004 
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Saudi produces about 11% of the world production of oil and Figure 2.6 shows the Saudi 
yearly production of oil from 1981 to 2007. The Figure indicates that the average in 2006 
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was 8.9 million barrels per day and it is planning to increase its production capacity to 
12.5 million barrels per day by 2010 (MPMR, 2007a). Ras Tanura Port in the Eastern 
coast of Saudi witnessed the first Saudi oil shipment in May 1939 to the international 
market (MPMR, 2009a). Since then, oil has played, and still plays, a significant role in 
the life of Saudi Arabia. This also will continue in the future, as the Ministry of 
Petroleum and Mineral Resources (MPMR) estimates that the proven and recoverable 
reserves of oil in Saudi are about 260 billion barrels, and undiscovered resources are 
conservatively estimated at 200 billion barrels. Six new oil and gas fields discovered 
between 2004 and mid 2005 in the Kingdom, these all indicate that Saudi Arabia will be 
able to produce oil for more than a hundred years into the future (Cordesman, 2003; 
MPMR, 2007a). 
Figure 2.6 The Saudi Oil Productions between 1981 and 2007 in 
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Note: The Figure shows the daily average of oil production by Saudi Arabia in million of 
barrels. 
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Although it is a huge country (equal in size to the UK, France and Germany together), it 
lacks natural resources such as rivers and lakes. Indeed, about 80% of its area is desert. 
Life before 1938 (when oil was discovered) was very simple, and Saudi Arabia was one 
of the poorest countries in the world. The rate of change has been particularly great since 
the 1970s, especially after the remarkable increases in oil prices. The government started 
five-year plans at this time, targeting the development of the education and healthcare 
systems and improving the infrastructure for many aspects of life. All of that would have 
been impossible without oil. 
Today in Saudi Arabia there is a trend towards reform in politics and business; it is now 
ranked as the 59th least corrupt country. The government has recently updated its 
regulations and systems to fulfill the WTO's requirements. In December 2006, Saudi 
Arabia became the 149th member of the WTO, after very long rounds of negotiations over 
the last 12 years (Ministry of Commerce and Industry, 2006). Also in this field, the 
government has created the Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority (SAGIA), 
which aims to improve the investment environment and remove the obstacles with which 
both local and foreign investors have been faced. 
2.4.2 The Legal Framework in Saudi Arabia 
The legal system in operation before the establishment of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
can be categorized as of two kinds, the Desert Adjudication, and the second, the 
Metropolitan Adjudication. The Desert Adjudication applied in most of the Arabian 
Peninsula, where the land was occupied by Arabian tribes and clans, who lived in 
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traditional way dominated by customs and tradition; those transmitted conventions have 
affected the nature and procedures of the legal system in those areas, in addition to 
Islamic legislation. The other type of legal system, which applied in the more urban 
areas, was the so-called Metropolitan Adjudication. Due to the cultural diffusion of 
academic learning and sciences in the cities, people were aware of the role and 
importance of the existing legal system, based on Islamic legislation. Furthermore, the 
availability of qualified educators, because of the spread of religious education, 
contributed to the strengthening of this system (Ministry of Justice, 2007). 
After taking power, King Abdulaziz became concerned about the legal system as part of 
reorganising his new country; the adjudication was very simple and its procedures 
suffered from lack of organisation and construction, so the establishment of a proper legal 
system was an urgent requirement at this stage of the country's history. Consequently, 
King Abdulaziz issued sets of regulations to organise the status of the courts and to 
ensure the hegemony and independence of the judiciary (Ministry of Justice, 2007). In 
particular, the King stressed that Islamic legalisation was the fundamental basis of the 
legal system, adopting more specifically the Hanbli doctrine, one of the four doctrines of 
Sunnism (The Islamic Sunni party regulations follow four major schools that belong to 
their scholars' thoughts named as: Malki, Shafeai, Hanafi and Hanbli). The Law of the 
Judiciary issued by the Royal Decree No. M/64 in 1975 painted the broad lines of the 
legal system in the KSA. Article No. I stated that: 
"Judges are independent and, in the administration of justice, they shall be 
subject to no authority other than the provisions of Sharia (Islamic 
legalisation) and laws in force. No one may interfere with the Judiciary. " 
According to the Law of the Judiciary (1975), courts in the KSA have four forms: 
f{ 
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a) The Supreme Judicial Council, whose role is to supervise the courts in addition to 
looking into issues required by the King or the Minister of Justice. The Council is 
composed of eleven members: five full-time members of the rank of Chief of the 
Appellate Court, who shall be appointed by Royal Order; five part-time members, 
who shall be the Chief of the Appellate Court or his deputy, the Deputy Minister of 
Justice, and three among those having the longest service as Chief Judges of the 
General Courts in the major cities; presided over by the Chairman of the Council. 
b) The Appellate Court, composed of a Chief Judge and a sufficient number of judges. 
The Court shall have a panel to look into criminal cases, another to examine cases of 
personal status, and a third to look into other cases. The deputies of the Chief Judge 
of the Appellate Court are appointed by the Minister of Justice on the 
recommendation of the Supreme Judicial Council. Appellate Court decisions become 
final only when approved by the Minister of Justice. 
c) General Courts, composed of one or more judges appointed by the Minister of Justice 
on the recommendation of the Supreme Judicial Council. 
d) Summary Courts, similarly composed of one or more judges appointed by the 
Minister of Justice on the recommendation of the Supreme Judicial Council. 
Articles No. 53 and 54 state that the appointment, promotion and remuneration of the 
judges shall be effected by a Royal Order based on the decision of the Supreme Judicial 
Council, stating that the statutory conditions in every individual case have been fulfilled. 
On the other hand, according to article No. 87, the role of the Ministry of Justice is to: 
"Assume the administrative and financial supervision over the courts and 
other judicial panels, take actions, and submit to the appropriate authorities 
such proposals and projects as may secure the proper standard for the justice 
system in the Kingdom. It shall also study the proposals and decisions 
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which it receives from the Supreme Judicial Council, and submit to the 
High Authorities those which require issuance of Royal Orders or Decrees. " 
2.4.3 Corporate Governance in Saudi Arabia 
This section highlights the issues in relation to corporate governance in Saudi Arabia 
such as: the companies regulatory, supervision and monitoring bodies; the accounting and 
auditing profession; other corporate governance aspects; the corporate governance code; 
and the major studies that have looked at corporate governance in Saudi Arabia. 
2.4.3.1 Companies Regulatory, Supervision and Monitoring Bodies in Saudi Arabia 
There are four major bodies in charge of regulating, supervising and monitoring 
companies in Saudi Arabia. The Consultative Council, the Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry, the Capital Market Authority and the Saudi Organization for Chartered Public 
Accountants which will all be briefly described. 
2.4.3.1.1 The Consultative Council (Shura Council) 
The Consultative Council holds legislative power in the KSA established by Royal 
Decree No. A191 in 1992. It consists of one hundred and fifty members chosen by the 
King, their nomination depending on their knowledge, experience and education in 
various fields, such as management, economics, politics, education, health and the 
military. Council members' ranks, rights, duties and all their affairs are defined by royal 
decree. Article No. 15 of the Consultative Council law which defines the Council's 
function as to express its opinion on the general polices referred by the Prime Minister. 
Its duties include: 
51 
a) Discussing general plans for economic and social development and giving its 
view; 
b) Revising laws and regulations, concessions, international treaties and agreements, 
and making whatever suggestions it deems appropriate; 
c) Analyzing laws; 
d) Discussing the annual reports of government agencies and attaching new 
proposals when it deems it appropriate. 
In relation to Consultative Council decisions Article No. 17 of Shura Council Law (1992) 
states that: 
"The Council's resolutions shall be submitted to the King, who decides 
what resolutions are to be referred to Cabinet. If the views of both the Shura 
Council and the Cabinet agree, the resolutions are issued after the King's 
approval. If the views of both councils vary, the issue shall be returned to 
the Shura Council (Consultative Council) to decide whatever it deems 
appropriate, and send the new resolution to the King, who takes the final 
decisions. " 
2.4.3.1.2 The Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MCI) 
The Ministry of Commerce and Industry is considered as the major body that looks after 
companies in Saudi Arabia. The MCI is responsible for regulating and supervising and 
monitoring all kinds of companies, and it has, by law, to ensure companies' compliance 
with The Company Act and other related regulations. One of the main roles that the 
Companies General department at the MCI holds is studying and authorising the 
applications of establishing new joint stock companies and reviewing the articles of 
incorporation. In addition, the ministry is responsible for registering and monitoring 
companies' businesses and checking companies' balance sheets and supervising the 
implementation of the Company Act (TMCI, 2007a). 
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2.43.1.3 The Capital Market Authority (CMA) 
The CMA which was established by royal decree in 2004 is an independent government 
organisation and reports directly to the Prime Minister. For the purpose of regulating and 
developing the Saudi capital market, the CMA issues rules and regulations for the 
implementation of the provisions of Capital Market Law (the CMA, 2007). However, in 
order to achieve its goals, the CMA is authorised to (the CMA, 2007): 
- Regulate and develop the capital market; 
- Protect investors and the general public from unfair and unsound practices 
involving fraud, deceit, cheating, manipulation and insider trading; 
- Achieve fairness, efficiency and transparency in securities transactions; 
- Develop measures to reduce the risks pertaining to securities transactions; 
- Develop, regulate and monitor the issuance and trading in securities; 
- Regulate and monitor the activities of entities subject to the control of the CMA; 
- Regulate and monitor full disclosure of information related to securities and their 
issuers; 
- Regulate proxy and purchase requests and public share offerings. 
2.4.3.1.4 Saudi Organization for Chartered Public Accountants (SOCPA) 
The accounting and auditing profession suffered two major defects; the first was the lack 
of an appropriate professional system of education and training and the lack of qualified 
national human resources. The second was the absence of a specialised organisation to 
look after, organise and develop the profession, which led to an absence of professional 
standards, rules and regulations in relation to practices of accounting and auditing (Al- 
Angari, 2004). 
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In 1991, Royal Decree No. M/12 authorised a new regulation of chartered public 
accountants in Saudi and included the establishment of SOCPA which operates under the 
supervision of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, and aims to promote the 
accounting and auditing profession and develop and improve the practice of the 
profession in Saudi. The main objectives for SOCPA are to (SOCPA, 2007a): 
- Review, develop and approve accounting standards. 
- Review, develop and approve auditing standards. 
- Establish the necessary rules for fellowship certificate examination (Certified 
Public Accountants exam. ) including professional, practical and scientific aspects 
of audit profession and applicable regulations. 
- Organize continuous education programs. 
- Establish an appropriate quality review program in order to ensure that Certified 
Public Accountants implement professional standards and comply with the 
provisions of Certified Public Accountants Regulations and relevant by-laws. 
- Conduct special research work and studies covering accounting, auditing and 
other related subjects. 
- Publish periodicals, books and bulletins covering accountancy and audit related 
subjects. 
- Participate in local and international committees and symposiums relating to the 
profession of accounting and auditing. 
2.4.3.2 The Accounting and Auditing Profession in Saudi Arabia 
The accounting and auditing profession in Saudi Arabia is relatively young compared 
with countries that have had a long history of professional application and practice, such 
as the United States and the United Kingdom. This is because people in the Arabian 
Peninsula have traditionally practiced a different kind of commerce. Mecca was the most 
important place for trade, as many pilgrims visited the city, even before the Islamic era. 
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As early as the fourteenth century, Islamic regulations required Muslims to record the 
details of their business transactions, so that these could be used when needed: 
"0 Believers, when you contract a debt for a stated term, write it down; and let 
a writer write down between you justly. " (The Holy Quran, Albakarah, 282). 
The practice of record-keeping remained connected to the general level of civilisation and 
commercial development in the Islamic world. The modern profession appeared rather 
late in Saudi Arabia. The Income Tax regulations issued in 1950 mentions, in Section 16, 
that financial statements provided by taxpayers were to be deemed correct and complete 
if they were audited by an internationally certified accountant. This clause was 
considered to be the first regular acceptance of the accounting and auditing profession in 
Saudi Arabia, although no audit firms actually existed in the new Kingdom at that time. 
There were many reasons for the lack of domestic auditors, including the low level of 
economic activity, the lack of professionals and the complete absence of accounting 
education. Thus, the situation at that time can be seen as consisting of a few companies 
working in a very restricted economic environment in a new country with a very simple 
regulatory system. In such a juvenile country with a developing economy at an early 
stage of building its infrastructure, the majority of professionals were foreigners who 
practiced according to their own background and efforts (Al-Angari, 2004). This status 
continued until 1955, when the first licence for an audit firm was issued by the Ministry 
of Finance and National Economics, which later granted seven licences, six of them to 
foreigners and one to a Saudi (see Figure 2.7), before the issuing of professional licences 
was transferred to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry in 1957. 
55 
The period from 1950 to 1965 can be seen as a time of the birth of the profession in Saudi 
Arabia, since there is no mention of the accounting and auditing profession before 1950, 
whereas there were a number of licensed audit firms after 1955. Nevertheless, these firms 
tended to practice the profession as they saw fit, according to their education, knowledge 
and experience. Lacking a professional body or any regulations or standards to control 
audit firms' performance and the process of issuing licenses, the profession remained 
without a clear identity (Al-Angari, 2004). 
Figure 2.7 Number of Audit Firms in Saudi Arabia from 1957 to 2006 
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The Companies Act issued by the Ministry of Commerce in 1965 marked a significant 
step forward for the audit profession in Saudi Arabia, as it required the management of all 
companies to prepare a financial statement and submit it to a chartered public accountant 
(Al-Twaijry et at., 2003). This was the first regulation obligating companies to have 
audited financial statements; before that, preparing a financial statement was an optional 
operation. Despite the importance of this step, there was no system to control an audit of 
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firms' performance, or any standards to monitor professional practice, which was left 
entirely in the hands of the audit firms themselves. However, three years later, in 1968, 
the Ministry of Commerce closed this organizational gap by establishing a set of 
requirements for licensed audit firms, including their nationality, residence, reputation, 
qualifications and years of experience. However, this regulation excluded an important 
requirement, that of passing a professional examination to measure the practical 
competence of the auditor (Al-Angari, 2004). 
During this period, King Saud University opened a Management Sciences College in 
1959, which was a great step towards satisfying the need for national qualified 
accountants. The Department of Accountancy at this college was the main resource of 
Saudi accountants and auditors, and it played an important role in improving the level of 
accounting education in Saudi Arabia at that time, when the majority of accountants and 
auditors who worked in Saudi Arabia were foreigners (Al-Angari, 1999). Moreover, the 
Department shouldered the responsibility of developing the accounting and auditing 
profession by organising conferences to discuss issues of importance to the profession 
and ways to advance it. One of these efforts resulted in the foundation of the Saudi 
Accounting Association (SAA). SAA aims to (Al-Angari, 1999): 
a) Promote and develop the academic study of accounting; 
b) Provide opportunities for professionals to contribute to the scientific progress 
of accounting; 
c) Facilitate the process of exchange of publications and scientific ideas in the 
accounting field between interested organisations within Saudi Arabia; and 
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d) Provide consultation services and carry out necessary studies to increase the 
level of professional performance in different organisations and establishments. 
However, the Royal Decree No. m/43 in 1974 was the first law concerning certified 
public accountants in Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, it was the first law to regulate the audit 
profession by creating the Certified Public Accountants Committee, which aimed to 
control the process of issuing licences and the supervision and development of the 
profession. 
The development of a professional accounting and auditing profession was one step in 
the process of developing a corporate governance framework in Saudi Arabia, and this is 
explored in the next section. 
2.4.3.3 Corporate Governance Aspects in Saudi Arabia 
The concept of corporate governance is relatively new in the Saudi business environment, 
its use having been confined to economics and academic writers who are concerned with 
the development of companies. Nevertheless, commentators are now writing in the Saudi 
economic press reflecting the increasingly loud call for corporations to apply standards of 
governance. Saudi companies' obligations are restricted to what appears in regulations 
that cover the business of companies and which may have some relation with corporate 
governance, such as the Companies Act (1965), the Capital Market Law (2004) and the 
corporate governance code 2006 issued by the CMA. This section highlights the major 
aspects of corporate governance in Saudi business in the light of applicable regulations. 
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2.4.3.3.1 The Companies Law (1965) 
The Companies Law which was issued by the Royal Decree in 1965 is considered to be 
the first organised attempt to regulate the operations of companies in Saudi, and is 
regarded as the legal reference for Saudi companies. Many modifications have since been 
made by royal decree to update the Companies Law (the Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry, 2007b). The following are the most important issues that appear in the 
Company Law in relation to corporate governance. 
2.4.3.3.1.1 Company Structure 
According to Article 66 of the Companies Law, each company is to be managed by a 
board of directors, which must have at least three members, who are appointed at the 
company annual general meeting for a period of office of not more than three years. Such 
boards of directors in Saudi companies take the form of unitary boards, as in the UK and 
the USA, characterized by one single board comprising both executive and non-executive 
directors (Mallin 2004). The Companies Law allows a board member to be a member of 
other boards and to be appointed many times. The Companies Law stipulates only one 
requirement for membership of a board of directors, which is holding at least ten 
thousand Saudi Riyal (equivalent to approximately 1,600 Pounds Sterling) of market 
value of the company's shares. The Law allows companies to choose appropriate methods 
to remunerate the board of directors, including salary, compensation for attendance, 
"material features 3i, or a proportion of the profits. The board of directors reports at the 
AGM and must declare to it what directors earn from the company. 
3 This is a literal translation from the Company Law (1965). 
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2.4.3.3.1.2 Shareholders' Rights 
The company Law gives shareholders who hold twenty shares or more the right to attend 
the company's AGM, which concerns itself with all issues related to the company, and 
must take place at least once per year. The Law affirms to shareholders all their rights 
related to their shares, so they have the right to obtain their proportion of the company's 
distributed profits, and to obtain their proportion upon the company's dissolution; in 
addition, they have the right to participate in conversations about the company and vote 
on the decisions, to dispose of shares and to look into the company archives. Moreover, 
Article 109 of the Company Law states that shareholders who hold at least 5% of the 
company's capital have the right to ask the Companies Settlement Authority to inspect 
the company if they have any doubt about the behaviour of the board of directors or the 
external auditors. 
2.4.3.3.1.3 The Company's Internal Control 
With regard to internal control, the Higher Economics Council approved the 
recommendations of the ministerial committee which was created by the Royal Decree 
No. 3151 in 2001 to study the situation of listed companies. The committee 
recommended that steps be taken (The Ministry of Commerce and Industry, 2007c): 
1. To highlight the importance of supporting (and boosting) the role of companies' 
internal controls and the enlightenment of shareholders about their responsible role 
in monitoring their companies' performance to reach their targets. 
2. To ensure the sufficiency of information which appears in the company financial 
statements in order to enable investors to value a company's performance and to 
assist them to make the right decisions about company's status and thus to protect 
their investments. 
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2.4.3.3.2 The Saudi Corporate Governance Code 
The Saudi corporate governance code (Corporate Governance Regulations in the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia) was issued in November 2006 by the Capital Market 
Authority. The code aims to ensure that Saudi listed companies comply with best 
governance practices that would ensure the protection of shareholders and stakeholders' 
rights. Although the code is a guideline and is not mandatory, companies are required to 
disclose in the board's report the provisions that are implemented and those not 
implemented and explain the reasons for non-compliance. The code contains three major 
topics: rights of shareholders and the General Assembly; disclosure and transparency; 
and board of directors. The full English version of the Saudi corporate governance code 
can be seen in Appendix I. 
2.4.3.3.3 Audit Committee 
A few years ago, audit committees were the only committees which emanate from boards 
of directors in Saudi companies, since no other committees, such as remuneration 
committees, nomination committees or risk committees, exist in these companies (Al- 
Moataz, 2003). As part of its efforts to develop the accounting and auditing profession, in 
2003 SOCPA created a committee to evaluate audit committees in listed companies and 
made the following major findings (SOCPA, 2007c): 
1. There is a lack of clarity concerning the tasks and field of action of audit 
committees; 
2. Some board members and committee members are unaware of the audit 
committee's purpose; 
3. The concept of the independence of members of the audit committee is not well 
known; 
4. The professional and academic qualifications of some committees members are 
insufficient; 
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S. There is a lack of sufficient control mechanisms to monitor committee 
practices. 
However, the SOCPA's committee provided a project on the basis of which to organise 
the performance of audit committees in listed companies. 
2.4.3.3.4 Disclosure and Transparency 
Article 45 of the Capital Market Law (2004) issued by the Capital Market Authority 
states that: 
a. Every issuer offering securities to the public or whose securities are traded on the 
exchange must submit to the authority quarterly and annual reports. Annual 
reports must be audited as required by the rules of the authority. These reports 
shall contain the following: 
1. The balance sheet; 
2. The profit and loss account; 
3. The cash flow statement; and 
4. Any other information as required by the rules of the authority. 
b. In addition to the information required in paragraph (a) of this article, the annual 
report must contain the following: 
1. An adequate description of the issuing company, the nature of its business 
and its activities, as required under the rules of the Authority; 
2. Information regarding the members of its board of directors, executive 
officers, senior staff and major investors or shareholders4, as required under the 
rules of the Authority; 
3. An evaluation of issuing company management of current and future 
developments and any future possibilities that may have significant effects on 
This is a literal translation from the Capital Market Law (2004). In addition the Saudi listed companies are 
required now to disclose the names of shareholders who own 5% percent or more of the company's shares. 
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the business results or financial position of the company, as required under the 
rules of the Authority; 
4. Any other information as may be required by the rules of the Authority as it 
deems necessary to assist investors and their advisers in making a decision to 
invest in the issuer's securities. 
2.4.3.3.4 Previous Research on Corporate Governance in Saudi Arabia 
A limited number of research publications in respect of corporate governance in Saudi 
Arabia have been found by the researcher as this topic does not seem to have attracted 
much researcher interest. However, this subsection highlights the results of the little 
research that has looked at corporate governance in Saudi Arabia. 
One of the main and primary studies to have considered corporate governance in Saudi 
Arabia was Al-Harkan (2005) which investigated the perceptions of four stakeholder 
groups namely: financial managers and internal auditors; academics; external auditors; 
and government officials about corporate governance in Saudi Arabia. The findings 
indicate that most large Saudi companies especially in the bank, communication, and 
industry sectors apply corporate governance systems and that they benefit from these 
systems. It also found it beneficial in adopting the two main recommendations made by 
the Cadbury Report: that a board of directors should consist of at least three non- 
executive directors, two of whom should be independent; and the separation of chairman 
and CEO roles. 
The results show that the main factors influencing the process of appointing non- 
executive directors in Saudi companies are relevant business skills and experience and 
professional qualifications. With regard to the factors that inhibit the practice of good 
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corporate governance the study identified two major factors being the lack of systems and 
procedures that govern company activates and the lack of emphasis on values and key 
principles. The study also suggests that there is a need for better disclosure and 
transparency by Saudi companies. 
Al-Ajlan (2005) examined the roles and responsibilities of the boards of directors in 
Saudi banks. Interviews and surveys of banks' directors indicate that boards of directors 
in Saudi banks play a significant role in strategic planning. The results revealed that, in 
relation to strategic planning, the board of directors in Saudi banks appeared to fulfill the 
roles of. setting the plans; guiding top management; approving strategy; defining the 
main goals and discussing the strategy submitted by the top management. However, 
regarding the role of boards in monitoring and controlling top management, the results 
indicated that there was a mix of views among the participants in relation to whether 
boards of directors in Saudi banks were actually monitoring and controlling the 
performance of top management in their banks. The banks major shareholders played a 
main role in monitoring and controlling these banks as most of them were board members 
or had a representative on the board. The study also shows that there are three popular 
committees in Saudi banks: the executive; audit; and Sharia committees. 
Al-Twaijry et al. (2002) examined the role of audit committees in Saudi Arabia and 
found that audit committees in Saudi Arabia suffered the following shortcomings: 
inadequate terms of reference and restrictions on their scope of work; a lack of 
independence; poor working relationships with external and internal auditors; and a lack 
of expertise. There appeared to be an expectation gap between what audit committees 
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were expected to do and what they actually did. Audit committees in Saudi Arabian joint 
stock companies do not have the power to control boards of directors, enhance the 
position of external and internal auditors or protect shareholders. The researchers note 
that audit committees are new to the Saudi corporate sector, which has developed within 
its own particular commercial and cultural framework, and has thus been relatively slow 
to embrace Western notions of corporate governance and accountability. 
Another study by Al-Moataz (2003), also studies the role of audit committees in Saudi 
Arabia and evaluates them regarding the best practices according to the academic and 
professional literature. The major findings showed that there was a major concern about: 
audit committees' conduct in relation to their responsibilities; audit committees' lack of 
non-executive directors; and the lack of sufficient professional qualifications held by 
audit committee members. 
These appear to be the few studies about corporate governance in , 
Saudi Arabia. In 
addition, these studies were conducted before the significant and dramatic change in the 
Saudi stock market and also before the issuance of the corporate governance code. The 
studies suggest that Saudi companies, especially major companies, are practicing some 
aspects of corporate governance but that there are some obstacles facing good corporate 
governance practice in relation to regulations. Furthermore, audit committees in Saudi 
companies, as one of the aspects of corporate governance, are considered as inefficient in 
fulfilling their roles and suffer from lack of independent and qualified members. 
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2.5 Summary 
The literature related to corporate governance has been reviewed in this chapter. Many 
aspects of corporate governance have been discussed such as corporate governance 
concepts and models, and matters related to boards of directors and ownership structure. 
Also, issues related to the practice of corporate governance in emerging markets have 
been examined, such as the importance of corporate governance in emerging markets, 
boards of directors, ownership structure, legal systems and corruption. A brief 
background about Saudi Arabia was also provided: the politics, social and economic 
environment were introduced. In addition, the auditing and accounting profession in the 
Kingdom, the corporate governance regulators and code were also highlighted. The next 
chapter outlines the theoretical framework that is used to interpret the studies' results. 
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Theoretical Framework 
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Chapter 3 
Theoretical Framework 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter reviewed the literature in relation to corporate governance in 
general and corporate governance in emerging markets in particular; in addition to that it 
provided a background about Saudi Arabia and the corporate governance framework in 
the Kingdom. This chapter outlines the theoretical framework that is adopted to interpret 
the research results. Both accountability and the Islamic notion of accountability are be 
discussed in the following subsections. 
3.2 Accountability Theoretical Framework 
The concept of accountability has been known to human beings since ancient times (Gray 
and Jenkins, 1993). For instance, legal documents have been found showing that 
Hammurabi, King of Babylonia around 2000 BC, was concerned about the accountability 
of those working on behalf of others (Bird, 1973). 
Nowadays, as a result of the complexities of the world of business with its interwoven 
relationships, in addition to the general trend of separation of ownership and control, 
agency theory has been developed to explain the relationship whereby one party, the 
owner or principal, delegates authority to another party, the management or agent (Gray 
and Jenkins, 1993; Williamson, 1985). In such cases, the latter should operate the 
organisation's resources in a way that accomplishes the former's interests. Hence, 
managers are accountable to their organisations' owners. Furthermore, the organisation 
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operates in the real world, so it has an impact on the society and community in which it 
works. The stakeholders, such as society itself, the government, the environment, 
employees, creditors, suppliers, customers and others, are affected by the firm's decisions 
and performance, although the effect may differ from one to another; the management 
should be accountable to all stakeholders and have the responsibility of providing them 
with an appropriate vision of the firm's status. 
Gray and Jenkins (1993) define accountability as: 
"An obligation to present an account of and answer for the execution of 
responsibilities to those who entrusted those responsibilities. " (p. 55). 
An alternative definition is provided by Gray et al. (1996): 
"The duty to provide an account (by no means necessarily a financial 
account) or reckoning of those actions for which one is held responsible. " 
(p. 38). 
The formulation offered by Knell (2006) is that accountability is: 
"The requirement of those in authority, and exercising responsibility, to 
justify and explain their actions to those on whose behalf they act. " (p. 32). 
It is clear that a theoretical framework for accountability must be concerned with such 
questions as: 1) who is accountable? 2) to whom? 3) how? 4) for what? (Perks, 1993). 
The above definitions agree that the general meaning of accountability requires the 
responsible party to provide an account to interested parties, so accountability is simply 
the obligation to give an account (Perks, 1993). In the business context, this account 
should explain and justify the actions which have been taken to serve the interests of 
shareholders and other stakeholders. This indicates that there are two parties to the 
accountability relationship, the accountee, who represents the principal (e. g. the board of 
directors, shareholders, other stakeholders) and who entrusts or delegates a task to the 
69 
accountor, who is responsible for informing the accountee of the status quo of the mission 
of accountability in order to discharge that accountability. These parties to an 
accountability relationship could be individuals, organisations or groups. In some cases an 
accountee may also be an a ccountor and vice versa, according to the nature of the 
relationship; for example, management is accountable to employees to provide them with 
a good and safe working environment, whereas employees are accountable to managers to 
fulfil their assignments satisfactorily (Gray et al., 1996). 
As mentioned above, a company should report to both shareholders and stakeholders 
about the condition of the work in the company. Given that the required information is 
likely to differ according to the needs of these different accountees, the accountability 
outcomes may take a variety of forms pursuant to the report's purpose and the 
beneficiary. Financial statements, corporate social reports, environmental reports and 
sustainability reports are obvious illustrations of accountability products. Such reports and 
others aim to meet shareholder and stakeholder requirements (Solomon, 2007 and 
Carnaghan, et al., 1996). Undoubtedly, they may play a crucial role in any company's 
communication processes; hence, reports provide appropriate reassurance to parties who 
deal with the company, concerning matters of interest to them. For instance, the board of 
directors will want to ensure that the company's performance has improved and need to 
know the extent to which its goals have been achieved, while from their side it is very 
important for the owners to ensure the efficient use of resources and maximise 
profitability; shareholders and investors wish to find signs indicating a raised share price; 
the financial situation of the company and its ability to discharge its debts will concern 
creditors and suppliers; employees will take account of the strength of the company and 
its ability to provide them with a safe working environment and financial security; the 
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local community will look to the services offered to it by the company and how far the 
company recognises and cares about the social aspects of its operations; and 
environmental bodies will want to ensure that the company is taking environmental issues 
into account. Any, or all, of these reports could be exploited by the company to establish a 
good reputation instead of giving accountees a full and true picture of the company. Gray 
and Bebbington (2000) argue that a company has the right to use its communication 
channels (e. g. reports) to assist its own ends, while the receiver also has the right to 
disbelieve its conclusions. 
The accountability relationship can be seen as a bond linking a party who accounts and is 
held to account to one who holds him to account; whether such parties are persons or 
institutions, it is essential for the bond to be clearly defined, in order to produce a 
disciplined accountability relationship (Stewart, 1984). Stewart goes on to state that: 
"A bond of accountability is for a field of accountability, that is, activities 
for which the account is given and which have bases that can be set out on a 
ladder of accountability according to the purposes for which the bond is 
constituted. " 
This bond of accountability constitutes a relationship of power, under which only the 
person to whom the account is given has the power to hold to account the person who 
gives the account. Stewart (1984) points out that although this framework has been 
constructed for the analysis of public accountability, it can be used for all forms, 
including managerial and commercial accountability. This may be expressed in terms of 
`fields', in this context Stewart (1984) argues that: 
"To define a bond of accountability it is not sufficient to define the person 
or institution which accounts and the person or institution which holds to 
account; the activities covered by the bond of accountability, which we will 
call the `field of accountability', must also be defined. A person who 
accounts may be subject to different bonds for different activities. " 
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Stewart-further distinguishes between the bond of accountability and `links of account', 
which are relationships that fall short of the bond of accountability in involving no power 
to hold to account; although such links of account are not considered as constituting 
bonds of accountability, they do play a significant role in supporting accountability. 
Accountability is arguably not a company choice; it is an obligation by a company to meet 
its responsibility towards the society in which it does business. Accountability can be seen 
as a contract between the company and interested parties, enforced by rule systems 
including civil law, company law, regulations, professional standards, internal rules 
(constitution, contracts, etc), ethical codes, conventions and customs. Monks and Minow 
(2004) specify two sets of laws regulating the relationship between a company and 
interested groups: the first is the public law, which is imposed by the legislature and 
provides minimum standards, permitting maximum flexibility to arrange relationships 
between the company and interested parties, while private law emerges from the 
agreements between the company and others. Gray and Jenkins (1993) distinguish 
betwee two codes of accountability: while internal codes are formulated to deal with a 
specific relationship, external codes have already been established for general categories 
of relationship and are imported into specific relationships; therefore, external codes tend 
to appear as implicit, whereas internal codes are more explicit. 
Monks and Minow (2004) call for the creation of a widely understood comprehensible 
standard to ensure corporate accountability, since there is no acceptable language of 
accountability within the company constituencies, and a deficiency in conceiving 
acceptable quantifiable standards. The authors argue that it is essential for corporations to 
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design effective systems to ensure accountability to some independent, competent and 
motivated representative, in order to preserve each company's legitimacy and credibility. 
Accountability aims to ensure that there is no misuse of, or profiteering from, the 
resources of an organisation, in addition to preventing maladministration which could 
harm others' interests (Stewart, 1984). In order to attract global capital, it is necessary for 
both countries and companies to meet the demands of transparency and accountability 
(Monks and Minow, 2004). Furthermore, a stronger focus on company accountability and 
transparency could be a good mechanism to restore current investors' confidence (Colley, 
2003). In addition to that, it is better for companies to develop their own accountability in 
ways that satisfy all interested parties in order to avoid the need for external interventions, 
especially under the increasing availability of a body of expertise among those who wish 
to do it for them (Gray and Bebbington, 2000). On the other hand, a company and its 
stakeholders could face grievous losses as a result of defective corporate accountability 
(Keasey et al., 1997). 
Gray and Bebbington (2000) claim that despite that the fact a corporation's main concern 
with respect to accountability is with issues related to economic activities which in turn 
concern finance providers, there are other stakeholders who have rights to information 
going beyond the corporation's financial affairs; consequently, reports on many other 
matters, such as social and environmental impacts, may appear and may have reciprocal 
importance. 
Voluntary initiatives are also significant in the operation of corporate accountability and 
have accomplished notable advances, but given that accountability deals with some very 
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complex matters such as environmental and social issues, there is bound to be the need for 
accountability legislation; from their side, companies should not be reluctant to accept and 
adhere by such regulations as instruments assisting them to discharge their accountability 
requirements (Gray and Bebbington, 2000). 
Beetham (1994) claims that accountability depends upon public knowledge of what a 
government or a company is up to. To a great extent, such perspectives may win a greater 
awareness within a democratic society where all parties' rights are protected. Therefore, 
he state that: 
"Democracy as the `power' of the people has to be attenuated to the `rule' of 
the people or to some rather weaker term which captures the elements we 
associate with modernity-institutionalized popular influence, procedures of 
accountability. " 
Keasey et al. (1997) affirm that some informed commentators argue that: 
"Despite the greatly increased financial reporting regulations and/or the 
supposed `independence' of the auditors of financial statements, the system 
is able to prevent effectively a determined board of executives from 
adopting reporting practices which greatly hinder accountability. " (p. 55). 
The attitude towards increasing accountability is dependent on the side of the agency 
relationship. Thus, those who represent principals would be in favour of increasing 
accountability in ways that could make agents more accountable to them, while agents' 
representatives would prefer less accountability, since accountability tends to restrict their 
freedom and increase their responsibility to others (Perks, 1993). 
According to Robinson (1971), there are three bases of accountability, the first of which is 
programme accountability, concerned "with the work carried on and whether or not it has 
met the goals set for it ; next is process accountability, which examines "whether the 
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procedures used to perform the research were adequate, say in terms of the item and effort 
spent on the work and whether experiments were carried out as promised"; finally, the 
role of fiscal accountability is to establish "whether the funds were expended as stated and 
whether items purchased were used for the project". Stewart (1984) suggests that these 
bases can be set out as a `ladder of accountability', which leads from accountability by 
standards to accountability by judgment, its rungs being: accountability for probity and 
legality; process accountability; performance accountability; programme accountability 
and policy accountability. 
3.3 The Islamic Accountability Framework 
The Islamic religion is based upon accountability relationships and offers a programme of 
life for the individual Muslim and the community (Ummah) and is concerned with 
organizing the relationship between humans and Allah (an Arabic word meaning `God' 
which cannot be pluralised). Islamic law is known as Sharia and pays particular attention 
to organising the relationships among human beings and their communities. Sharia is 
concerned with two sides of human life: worship; and `transactions'. The former, called 
Ibadat, defines the deeds that Muslims are required to perform as a part of worshipping 
their creator, such as: Iman (faith); Salah (prayer); Zakah (paying charity); Saum 
Ramadan (fasting); and Hajj (pilgrimage). On the other side, the Moa'amalat 
(transactions) are concerned with structuring all of people's dealings with each other and 
with their environment (Bahjat, 1994; Al-Qaradawi, 1995; A1-Qahtani, 2002) . An Islamic 
adage states that `religion is treatment'. These `treatments' involve all relationships, such 
as family, neighbourhood, society, environment, ethics, business, economics, politics and 
other issues which face any human society. These transactions have won great recognition 
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within Sharia, which defines and monitors these relationships and specifies the rights and 
duties of the participants. All Muslims should follow the regulations of both Ibadat and 
Moa'amalat to maintain their obligation under Sharia, for which they are answerable. 
Failure in either of the two aspects of Sharia may lead to deviancy from the road that 
Allah has ordained for man's welfare during both their worldly existence and the afterlife 
(Al-Qaradawi, 1973). Furthermore, any attempt to separate religion and treatments is 
inconceivable, because Sharia requires Muslims to adopt Islamic instructions in all 
aspects of their lives and dealings, a nd these regulations are enforced by God, who 
created humanity and all aspects of nature. As a result, Sharia is taken to cover all the 
main principles that set out the way that the different treatments should be conducted in 
the light of the framework of Islamic rules (Al-Qaradawi, 1973): 
"This day have I perfected your religion for you, completed My favour upon 
you, and have chosen for you Islam as your religion" (Quran: 5/3). 
The Islamic religion rests on certain principles which Muslims must follow. There are six 
basic elements of Islamic belief: 
1) Belief in god: Allah is the masterful creator and dominator of the universe. Everything 
is under his control and subject to his authority, and humans have been created to 
worship Allah alone; he has no partner and Muslims must not associate others with 
him. 
2) Belief in the angels: Muslims believe in the existence of angels and that God has 
created them and assigned them to undertake particular missions and tasks. 
3) Belief in god's revealed books: Muslims believe in all God's books which have been 
revealed to prophets and messengers, such as the Torah, the Bible, the Psalter and the 
Quran. 
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4) Belief in the prophets and messengers of God: Muslims believe that all prophets and 
messengers have been sent by God to teach humans and to remind them to worship 
Allah alone. This was the main function of all prophets and messengers, from Adam 
through Abraham, Israel, Moses and Jesus to the last prophet, Mohammed (PBUH). 
5) Belief in the Day of Judgment: Muslims believe that there will be a day when Allah 
will hold humans to account for what they have done in their lives, rewarding them 
with Paradise or punishing them in Hell according to their recorded actions. 
6) Belief in Al-Qadar: Ibrahim (1997) explains that: 
"Muslims believe in Al-Qadar, which is Divine Predestination, but this 
belief in Divine Predestination does not mean that human beings do not 
have free will. Rather, Muslims believe that God has given human beings 
free will. This means that they can choose right or wrong and that they are 
responsible for their choices" (p. 48). 
Islamic legislation relies on some basic sources which are considered as reference for 
regulations and rules that govern the Islamic community. There are four main sources: the 
Quran, the Sunna, Al-Ejma'a and Al-Qeas. The Quran is Allah's direct words given to the 
prophet Mohammad (PBUH); it is the major source of Islamic legislation, and all 
regulations applying to the Islamic community must be consistent with its teachings. 
However, if any matter is not dealt with in the Quran, then it can be sought in other 
legislative sources. The Sunna is the sayings and deeds of the prophet Mohammed 
(PBUH) as reported by his companions. It is recorded in tomes called Hadith, which 
include many of the prophet's speeches and actions. Al-Ejma'a (unanimity) is a source of 
legislation used in cases where there is no particular evidence found in the Quran or 
Sunna. In such situations the group of scholars or experts are allowed to legislate new 
rules or standards in any field, on condition that there is no conflict with Islamic Sharia. 
Al-Qeas means `measurement'. In some cases there is a need to issue a new regulation 
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which has not been mentioned in other sources of legislation; in such cases the regulator 
can adopt a method of measurement based on similar previous matters to issue a new 
regulation (Al-Qaradawi, 1995). Bin Hj and Ibrahim (2000) state that: 
"Allah or God, the creator and benefactor of mankind, has absolute 
sovereignty to make laws for his creation. He has given his Will and Laws 
in the Scriptures through the Messengers and Prophets throughout the ages, 
culminating in the final messenger, Muhammad (PBUH). The final 
Scripture, the Qur'an and the sayings and actions of the Prophet (the 
Sunnah) constituting the practical application of and a commentary to the 
Qur'an, contains the principles and code of life which humans have to 
follow until the day of judgement when all human beings have to render 
accounts of their actions before his Lord. " 
One of the main Islamic theoretical frameworks upon which Sharia principles are based is 
accountability, which is considered as a crucial concept in Islamic regulations. According 
to the Islamic traditional perspective of Istekhlaf (trust), humans are considered to be 
vicegerents entrusted with the stewardship of the earth. For example in the holy Quran 
Allah says: "I will create a vicegerent on earth" (Quran, 2: 30). The Istekhlaf concept has 
three parts. The entrustor is Allah, who owns everything: "To Allah belongeth all that is 
in the heavens and on earth" (Quran, 2: 284). Allah entrusts the earth to the entrustees, 
human beings; the third element is what is entrusted, the earth and everything on it, 
including nature, resources and relationships. Thus, the concept of Istekhlaf indicates that 
the relationship between God and humanity rests on a relation of delegation, since God 
(the owner) delegates the operation of the earth to humans, who are therefore responsible 
for populating and building the earth in the way that God requires (Al-Jirari, 1996). 
Consequently, man is in reality not the owner of what is under his hand; he is only a 
vicegerent appointed by God in all things, including his family, property, resources, 
wealth, business and relationships. Istekhlaf requires humans to take care of all that they 
have been entrusted with and use them beneficially to achieve their goals and at the same 
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time not damage themselves, society or the environment. In addition, man is accountable 
for that with which he is entrusted and he will be answerable for what he has done about 
what is delegated to him: "But stop them, for they must be asked" ( Quran, 37: 24). 
"Therefore, by the Lord, We will, of a surety, call them to account for all their deeds" 
(Quran, 15: 92; 93). 
Accountability is a general basis of the Islamic system, so all of Muslims lives and their 
dealings are based on accountability, both in relationships with God and in that with the 
community; all relationships within Islamic society must be conducted in the light of the 
concept of accountability (Al-Jirari, 1996). The prophet (PBUH) explained that 
accountability was the basic standard for the relationships conducted within Islamic 
society by saying: 
"You are all custodians, and you all will be questioned about the things 
under your custody. The Imam (leader) is a custodian and he shall be 
questioned about his custody. The man is a custodian of his family and he 
shall be questioned about his custody. The woman is a custodian in her 
husband's home and she will be questioned about her custody. The 
employee is a custodian of the property of his employer and he shall be 
questioned about his custody" (Albukhari: 844). 
Accountability in Islam considers two sides of the relationship, the `accountee' and the 
`accountor'. The former could be Allah, the government, the community, investors, 
shareholders or other stakeholders, who delegate tasks to others to do on their behalf. The 
accountor could be an individual human, a board of directors, a manager or any party who 
accepts a delegation on behalf of another. Thus, accountors ought to look after the work 
delegated to them and protect their delegator's interests. The accountors are required to 
discharge their accountability; for example, within the accountability relationship between 
Allah and humans, the latter, as accountors, are required to discharge their accountability, 
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so that they are accountable for their creation to their creator and therefore ought to 
worship their creator in order to discharge their accountability. In the same way, managers 
are accountable for their actions and performance to their stakeholders and they have to 
accomplish what they are charged to do. In addition, they have to report to their 
accountees about the actions that they have taken in order to discharge their accountability 
(Al-Jirari, 1996). Lewis (2006) claims that companies (or managers) (the accountors) 
could use financial reporting as an obli gation for full accountability to the Ummah. 
However, Muslim managers (accountors) believe that they are held answerable to their 
stakeholders in addition to their answerability to God in the afterlife; therefore, they ought 
to do what is necessary to discharge their accountability. In this context, Baydoun and 
Willett (2000) argue that Islamic regulations require companies to make full disclosure in 
order to discharge their accountability: 
"Private accountability and limited disclosure are insufficient criteria to 
reflect the ethical precepts of Islamic law. Consistency of disclosure 
practices with Islamic law requires application of the more all-embracing 
criteria of social accountability and full disclosure" (p. 81). 
Thus, it appears that the ownership right in Islam is not an unlimited authority which 
gives the right to humans to domineer in order to satisfy their desires, but is rather a trust 
and a function that humans exercise pursuant to Islamic regulations (Al-Sudes, 2002). 
Therefore, any Muslims who are entrusted with any mission, regardless of size or 
importance, whether individually or collectively, are accountable to whoever delegated it 
to them for their actions and performance. The obligation originates from this 
accountability, requiring the accountees to maintain the property and the resources under 
their responsibility and use them efficiently, honestly and with integrity to serve the 
accountor's interests, to ensure that there is no maladministration and to desist from going 
beyond the interests of the accountor and the community (Al-Sudes, 2002). 
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According to Sharia, there are some characteristics the accountors should have in order to 
assist them to perform in an appropriate way the work with which they are charged. In 
addition to being available to hold the responsibility and ready to be accountable, the most 
important characteristics are: Amana (honesty), Nazaha (integrity), Adil (justice), Qudra 
(ability) and Itqan (proficiency). There are many Quranic verses mentioning these 
characteristics, of which these are examples: 
"The best of men for thee to employ is the (man) who is strong and trusty". 
(Quran, 28: 26) 
"0 ye who believe! fulfil (all) obligations". (Quran, 5: 1) 
"For Allah loveth not one given to perfidy and crime". (Quran, 4: 107) 
"To those weak of understanding Make not over your property". (Quran, 4: 5) 
These characteristics provide acceptable justification to make the persons who are 
entrusted to do business on behalf of others accountable for their actions and the decisions 
they have made. For instance, honesty requires that the accountors should safeguard that 
for which they are responsible and avoid any misuse or negligence (Bin Hj and Ibrahim, 
2000). According to Sharia rules, the accountors are accountable for all their actions and 
can be questioned if there is any negligence or depravation (Al-Jirari, 1996). 
From the above it is clear that Sharia requires the agents (e. g. managers) to ensure that all 
their actions and performances are in favour of the different parties who are affected by 
their business. In order to activate the mechanisms of accountability within Islamic 
society, Sharia adopts two significant concepts, Shura (consultation) and Hisba 
(verification), which provide a legal framework to monitor and hold to account the agent. 
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Shura is a governance system within Islam ensuring that there is no solitary management 
and that the procedures for making decisions rest on the participation principle, which 
gives all interested parties the opportunity to be part of the process. "... who (conduct) 
their affairs by mutual Consultation". (Quran, 42: 38) "... and consult them in affairs" 
(Quran, 3: 159). 
The concept of Shura assumes that each firm will establish a consultation board whose 
function is to advise, supervise, monitor, control and account. Such a system provides a 
broader basis for corporate governance, strengthens a firm's decisions and increases its 
objectivity, upholding the accountability principle and ensuring the protection of all 
stakeholders, since all a firm's actions and activities are to be subjected to consultation 
and review by the consultation board. This board should represent different stakeholders 
(including shareholders, owners, employees, the government and the community) and 
ensure that all their interests are taken into account in all of a firm's actions, in addition to 
their role in holding to account (questioning) managers. Lewis (2006) states that: 
"Shuratic decision-making procedures provide a vehicle for ensuring that 
corporate activities and strategies are fully discussed and that a consensus- 
seeking consultative process is applied within the firm and across 
shareholders, employees, suppliers, customers and other interested parties" 
(p. 8). 
Hence, Shura is an important aspect of Islamic management which all organisations and 
institutions within Islamic society should adopt. In addition, it is considered as an 
obligatory ordinance which all Muslims should implement in all their business dealings. 
Shura, from the Islamic perspective, is regarded asa humanistic, social and ethical 
principle, since it ensures for the community (Ummah) the rights of participation, choice 
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and decision-making, allowing people to shoulder their responsibility to ensure that the 
concept of accountability is put into practice (Azraq, 2004; Abdulkhalik, 2008) 
Sharia also stipulates that consultants should have certain skills and features: they should 
be honest, capable, qualified and expert, in addition to undertaking their responsibility to 
perform their functions in an appropriate way in order to discharge their duties. The 
prophet Mohammed said: "the consultant is entrusted" (Mosnad Ahmed, 1995: 21983). 
Sharia gives each society the right to choose the style and configuration of the Shura 
system in a way that fits in with its evolution and requirements, so there is no certain form 
of Shura suitable for all societies and all times; rather, Sharia defines and highlights the 
general framework and standards of the Shura system and lets each society design its own 
system of Shura, relying on its development and degree of civilisation. Therefore, the 
employment of professional standards and modem control and supervision methods 
within the Shura system does not conflict with Sharia; indeed, such acts represent a clear 
understanding of the purposes of Sharia. 
Hisba is another Islamic concept which offers a legal framework to monitor community 
actions, ensuring that they are consistent with Sharia and take into consideration the 
public interest. Hisba is a necessary adherence which Islamic society rests on to carry out 
the concept of accountability within the social organisations. Allah said: "Let there arise 
out of you a band of people inviting to all that is good, enjoining what is right, and 
forbidding what is wrong: They are the ones to attain felicity" (Quran, 3: 104). 
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According to Sharia, the Islamic community should implement Hisba because it is a 
mandatory duty by celestial decree, and it is impossible to imagine Islamic society 
without the concept of Hisba (Alhawal, 2007). Allah describes the members of Islamic 
society as: "enjoining what is right, forbidding what is wrong" (Quran, 3: 110). In another 
place He says: "The Believers, men and women, are protectors one of another: they enjoin 
what is just, and forbid what is evil" (Quran, 9: 71). 
Hisba can be executed individually, or by organisations or professional bodies, to ensure 
that firms respect their obligations under Sharia and the other regulations and standards. 
Furthermore, such organisational systems would be able to introduce directly appropriate 
mechanisms to control and account for each firm's actions and behaviour, to ensure their 
submission to professional regulations and standards and that all stakeholders' interests 
are protected. Consequently, Hisba confers on individuals and the Ummah the right to 
hold to account all those in positions of responsibility, and to be confident that their 
individual and communal rights are inviolable. Therefore, Hisba in the Islamic 
management system provides a developed accountability environment which allows all 
stakeholders to oversee their interests and subjugate those who hold power to be 
accountable for their actions. Lewis (2006) states: 
"The institution of Hisba offers a framework of social ethics, relevant to 
monitor the corporation, with the objective to obligate the correct ethical 
behaviour in the wider social context. It also empowers individual Muslims 
to act as `private prosecutors' in the case of better governance by giving 
them a platform for social action" (p. 8). 
As noted above in respect of Shura, the concept of Hisba can be developed in the light of 
the latest developments of regulations and standards in the way that corresponds most 
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closely with the state of social progress at any period of human evolution, on condition 
that there is neither any deviation from the concept of Hisba nor a conflict with Sharia. 
3.4 Summary 
It is very clear from the previous that accountability requires the accountor who is doing 
business on behalf of the accountee to give an account about the accountability mission in 
order to discharge the accountability relationship. The concept of accountability in Islam 
also leads to the same meaning and extends the accountability relationship to include 
Allah in addition to accountee. 
This research adopts an accountability theoretical framework to study corporate 
governance in Saudi Arabia by investigating the perception of wider stakeholders in the 
local business. As a result, the current study aims to explore accountability and the extent 
of its practice by Saudi companies in regard to corporate governance issues in the light of 
the Islamic accountability concept and the regulation requirements as they appear in the 
Company Law. The next chapter will identify the research methodology and methods. 
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Chapter 4 
Research Methodology and Methods 
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Chapter 4 
Research Methodology and Methods 
4.1 Introduction 
After reviewing the literature in relation to the study in Chapter 2, and outlining the 
research theoretical framework in Chapter 3, this chapter addresses the methodology 
used in this thesis and the methods of collecting the primary research data. Regarding 
the research methodology approach, section 4.2 identifies the assumptions about the 
nature of social science, assumptions about the nature of society and the research 
paradigms. Both the qualitative and quantitative research methods of semi-structured 
interviews and questionnaire survey that are employed in this thesis will be clarified in 
section 4.3. Section 4.4 concludes the chapter. 
4.2 Research Methodology 
The next section highlights the Burrell and Morgan (1979) assumptions about the nature 
of social science and their different philosophical positions. It is also concerned about 
the assumptions in relation to the nature of society and discusses their different 
approaches. The four paradigms of Burrell and Morgan (1979) will also be considered 
and the paradigm that is used in this thesis will be presented. 
4.2.1 Assumptions about the Nature of Social Science 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) identify four assumptions relating to the nature of social 
science: ontology; epistemology; human nature; and methodology. Each of these 
assumptions represents two philosophical positions regarding their subjective-objective 
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dimension. The subjective dimension contains the nominalist, anti-positivist, voluntarist 
and ideographic perspectives, whereas the objective subsumes realism, positivism, 
determinism and the nomothetic approach (See Figure 4.1). This subsection explores 
these assumptions and specifies their current academic status. 
4.2.1.1 The Subjective-Objective Dimension 
Objectivism reflects the perspective whereby social entities exist in a reality external to 
social actors (Saunders et al, 2007). Bryman (2004) clarifies this meaning by stating that: 
"Objectivism is an ontological position that asserts that social phenomena 
and their meanings have an existence that is independent of social actors. It 
implies that social phenomena and the categories that we use in everyday 
discourse have an existence that is independent or separate from actors" (p. 
16). 
By contrast, according to subjectivism (also constructionism), social phenomena are 
nothing other than the results of social actors' actions and they are in a constant state of 
revision (Saunders et al., 2007). The subjectivist believes in free will: people are free to 
make decisions that alter the course of their lives (May, 2005). Objectivists look at 
social entities as objective entities having a reality external to social actors, while the 
subjectivists see them as social constructions built up from the social actors' perceptions 
and actions (Bryman, 2004). 
Ontology can be defined, according to Maedche (2002) as "a philosophical discipline, a 
branch of philosophy that deals with the nature and the organization of being" (p. 11). 
Ontology is concerned with researchers' assumptions about the world, its operation and 
the commitments leading to such views (Saunders et al., 2007). In order to distinguish 
between ontology and epistemology, ontology concentrates on understanding `what is', 
while epistemology seeks an understanding of `what it means to know'; furthermore, it 
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assists in the process of choosing "what kinds of knowledge are legitimate and 
adequate" (Gray, 2004). Ontology raises the question of whether social phenomena are 
things in their own right or representations of things (Corbetta, 2003). Accordingly, 
ontology can be divided into two positions, realism and nominalism. 
Figure 4.1 Assumptions about the Nature of Social Science 
The Subjective Approach The Objective Approach 
Nominalism Ontology 
f 
Realism 
Anti-Positivism Epistemology_ f 
Positivism 
Voluntarism Human Nature_ 
0 
Determinism 
Ideographic 
f 
Methodology Nomothetic 
Source: Burrell and Morgan (1979) (p. 3). 
Realism is the ontological position that what the senses show us as reality is the truth; 
furthermore, objects have an existence independent of the human mind (Saunders et al., 
2007). Realism appears to be similar to positivism in two respects: a) adopting a 
scientific approach to developing knowledge that underpins the collection and 
understanding of data (Bryman, 2004; Saunders et al, 2007); b) both realism and 
positivism hold that there is an external reality to which scientists address their attention 
(Bryman, 2004). Realism has two types: direct (empirical) realism and critical realism. 
Direct realism can be described as `what you see is what you get'; in other words, the 
experience of the senses reproduces the world accurately, whereas experiences are mere 
sensations within critical realism: what we see is not everything because we see just that 
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which our senses can provide us (Saunders et al., 2007). Critical realists point to two 
important steps to experience the world: the first is the thing itself and the sensations it 
conveys, while the mental processing which goes on after the sensation to meet the 
senses is the second step. In the view of direct realists, the first step is enough (Saunders 
et al., 2007). Applying these basic concepts and distinctions to the business context, 
Saunders et al. (2007) state that: 
"The first relates to the capacity of research to change the world which it 
studies. The direct realist perspective would suggest that the world is 
relatively unchanging: that it operates, in the business context, at one level 
(the individual, the group or the organization). The critical realist, on the 
other hand, would recognize the importance of multi-level study (for 
example, at the level of the individual, the group and the organization). 
Each of these levels has the capacity to change the researcher's 
understanding of that which is being studied. This would be the 
consequence of the existence of a greater variety of structures, procedures 
and the capacity that these structures and procedures have to interact with 
one another. " (p. 105). 
On the other hand, the nominalist perspective presupposes that the social world is unreal 
and has no real structure; it is nothing more than names, concepts and labels which are 
used to structure reality, because what is known about reality is generated from 
individual consciousness and cognition (Burrell and Morgan 1979). 
This study assumes that the business world in Saudi Arabia is real, so that corporate 
governance in Saudi Arabia, which is an aspect of the business environment, is 
operating within the real world, since it deals with real regulators, regulations, 
companies and people, all of whom have an existence independent of the human mind. 
Epistemological assumptions are correlated to knowledge. Epistemology is especially 
concerned with identifying the constituents of knowledge (Saunders et al., 2007) and 
asking what is or what should be known (Bryman, 2004). It is also concerned with the 
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ways of collecting and obtaining knowledge. Thus, Ryan et at. (2002) have defined 
epistemology as justified true belief or the study of the nature of belief, the basis of truth 
and the problem of justification. Epistemology's aims are: 
a) understanding such concepts as belief, memory, certainty, doubt, justification, 
evidence and knowledge; 
b) enquiring into the criteria for the application of such terms and so, in particular, the 
criteria for identifying "the scope and limits" of human knowledge (Cooper, 1999). 
Further, Cooper (1999) argues that: 
"Many people have the impression that epistemology is the most central 
area of philosophy, or even that philosophy should really be identified with 
epistemology. Certainly there is a popular image of philosophers as people 
obsessively and almost solely concerned with determining whether we 
really know the things we ordinarily think we do. " (p. 3). 
Positivism reflects the philosophical stance of the natural scientist dealing with the 
observation of social reality, whose final product can be law-like generalisations similar 
to the products of the physical and natural sciences (Saunders et al., 2007). Bryman 
(2004) defines positivism as "an epistemological position that advocates the application 
of the methods of the natural sciences to the study of social reality and beyond" (p. 11). 
A true belief in the positivist perspective is dependent on our perception, which is a 
result of a value-free, independent reality (Ryan et al., 2002). 
From an anti-positivist perspective, the social world is relativistic and the only way for 
individuals to understand it is to be involved in the activities that are to be studied 
(Burrell and Morgan, 1979). Kuhn (1962) argues that a study of the social world cannot 
be a science, as sociologists do not agree on one accepted paradigm. Furthermore, anti- 
positivist researchers are not looking for laws or underlying regularities of social affairs 
as in science (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). While positivism typically uses methods such 
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as experiments, anti-positivism typically adopts other methods, such as participant 
observation and interviews. A questionnaire survey of perceptions is used in this 
research but arguably such a survey and its analysis is not inconsistent with an anti- 
positivist approach. The current work does not aim to produce law-like generalisations 
or predict what happens in the social world; nor is it searching for regularities or causal 
relationships between the constituent elements of the social world. As a result, this study 
adopts an anti-positivist approach which rejects the standpoint of the observer for 
understanding human activities and occupies instead the frame of reference of the 
participant in action to understand them from inside rather than outside. 
The third assumption about the nature of social science concerns human nature, which 
considers the relationship between human beings and their environment. It is necessary 
for a social science that aims to understand human activities to be predicated upon an 
assumption about human nature, given the fact that human life is essentially the subject 
and object of enquiry (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). There are two extreme perspectives 
concerning the role of human beings in social life: determinism and voluntarism. From 
the determinist perspective, human beings and their experiences are products of the 
environment conditioned by their external circumstances. In contrast, voluntarism 
claims that man is completely autonomous and free-willed (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). 
This thesis aims to investigate the stakeholders' perceptions of the current practice of 
corporate governance within the Saudi business environment; these stakeholders are a 
part of the business environment and are undoubtedly influenced by this environment 
and by their experiences and activities, but not to the extent that they are completely 
determined, as determinists might view them. At the same time, they are not completely 
autonomous and free-willed. Consequently, this study will reject the extreme positions 
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of determinism and voluntarism and adopt a moderate standpoint between the two 
human nature perspectives. According to Burrell and Morgan (1979), this will allow 
consideration of the influence of both situational and voluntary factors in accounting for 
the activities of human beings. 
Methodology is a term used to refer to the way of conducting and undertaking research, 
including its theoretical and philosophical assumptions and their implications for the 
research methods (Saunders et al., 2007). The standpoints considered above on ontology, 
epistemology and human nature have a direct impact on the research methodology, since 
they affect the ways of investigating and obtaining knowledge within the social world 
(Burrell and Morgan, 1979). 
Ideographic methodology rests on the belief that the social world can only be understood 
by obtaining first-hand knowledge of the subject under investigation, while nomothetic 
methodology means conducting research based upon systematic protocols and 
techniques. The ideographic approach utilizes the analysis of subjective accounts by 
`getting inside' situations and involving oneself in the everyday flow of life; in contrast, 
the nomothetic approach adopts canons of scientific rigour to test research hypotheses 
and uses quantitative techniques of data analysis to achieve its goals. This research 
follows an ideographic methodology. In order to understand corporate governance in 
Saudi Arabia this study investigates the current practice within Saudi firms by 
examining aspects of corporate governance in the Saudi business environment and 
exploring the perceptions of the participant parties concerning the status quo. 
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4.2.2 Assumptions about the Nature of Society 
Dahrendorf (1959) and Lockwood (1956) distinguish between two types of approach to 
sociology, the first of which concentrates upon explaining the nature of social order and 
equilibrium, while the other approach is more concerned with problems of change, 
conflict and coercion in social structures. This distinction has been called the `order- 
conflict debate' and is illustrated as Burrell and Morgan (1979) depict it in Table 4.1. 
Stability Change 
Integration Conflict 
Functional co-ordination Disintegration 
Consensus Coercion 
Source: Burrell and Morgan (1979) (p. 13) 
However, Cohen (1968) criticises the order-conflict distinction, arguing that it is a 
mistake to treat order and conflict as being entirely separate. Cohen suggests that 
theories should involve elements of order and conflict in their models and that one need 
not necessarily incline to one or the other. In addition, the subjectivist movements (e. g. 
phenomenology, ethnomethodology and action theory) became much more attractive; 
consequently, the order-conflict debate has subsided under the influence of issues 
relating to the philosophy and methods of social science (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). 
Thus, Burrell and Morgan (1979) argue that the order-conflict distinction is a 
problematic one and suggest `regulation' and `radical change' as replacement notions. 
The regulation-radical change model (see Table 4.2) has two dimensions. The sociology 
Table 4.1 The Order-Conflict Theories 
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of regulation is concerned with the explanations of a society that emphasise its 
underlying unity and cohesiveness. Burrell and Morgan (1979) state that: 
"[Sociology of regulation] is a sociology which is essentially concerned 
with the need for regulation in human affairs; the basic questions which it 
asks tend to focus upon the need to understand why society is maintained as 
an entity. It attempts to explain why society tends to hold together rather 
than fall apart. " (p. 17). 
Table 4.2The Dimension 
(a) The status quo (a) Radical change 
(b) Social order (b) Structural conflict 
(c) Consensus (c) Modes of domination 
(d) Social integration and cohesion (d) contradiction 
(e) Solidarity (e) Emancipation 
(f) Need satisfaction (f) Deprivation 
(g) Actuality (g) Potentiality 
Source: Burrell and Morgan (1979) (p. 18). 
The sociology of radical change, on the other hand, looks for explanations for radical 
change, deep-seated structural conflict, modes of domination and structural 
contradiction. Burrell and Morgan (1979) define it as: 
"... a sociology which is essentially concerned with man's emancipation 
from the structures which limit and stunt his potential for development. The 
basic questions which it asks focus upon the deprivation of man, both 
material and psychic. " (p. 17). 
4.2.3 Research Paradigms 
The term `paradigm' has been used in social sciences since the 1960s and refers to the 
perspective adopted by researchers to inspire and direct a given science (Corbetta, 2003). 
Saunders et al. (2007) give this definition: "A paradigm! is a way of examining social 
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phenomena from which a particular understanding of these phenomena can be gained 
and explanations attempted. ". Corbetta (2003) emphasizes the importance of paradigms 
for the sciences and that any science without a paradigm lacks orientation and criteria of 
choice, so that all problems, methods and techniques are equally legitimate. 
There is no doubt that Burrell and Morgan (1979) have made a significant contribution 
to social science research by providing their four paradigms model (Jackson and Carter, 
1991). Their book, Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis, was a 
considerable instrumental guide in summarising and clarifying the epistemological and 
ontological positions (Saunders et al., 2007). Burrell and Morgan (1979) affirm that a 
paradigm serves to help in clarifying the research assumptions regarding researchers' 
views of the nature of science and society; to provide a good understanding of how other 
researchers approach their work; to help in designing and planning the research in order 
to assist researchers to be aware of where they stand and to map out further directions in 
relation to their attitudes and conceptions. 
Bryman (1988) states that a paradigm is "a cluster of beliefs and dictates which for 
scientists in a particular discipline influence what should be studied, how research 
should be done, [and] how results should be interpreted. " 
For Burrell and Morgan, paradigms have four dimensions (see Figure 4.2): radical 
change and regulation (vertical axis), subjectivist and objectivist (horizontal axis). The 
radical change perspective concerns critical attitudes when studying an organisation; 
radical change is concerned to give an opinion about the procedures that should be 
undertaken in the organisation's affairs and provides suggestions to make a significant 
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change to the usual situation. In contrast, the regulation position is intended to describe 
current practice and how an organisation's affairs are regulated and then provide 
suggestions for improvement consonant with the present situation. It is clear that the 
radical change stance is much more judgmental and critical than the regulation position 
(Saunders et al, 2007). 
Figure 4.2 Social Research Paradigms 
THE SOCIOLOGY OF RADICAL CHANGE 
C 
to 
to 
Radical 
Humanist 
Radical 
Structuralist 
Interpretive Functionalist 
THE SOCIOLOGY OF REGULATION 
Source: Burrell and Morgan (1979) (p. 22). 
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As a result of Burrell and Morgan's (1979) division, there are four paradigms: radical 
humanist, radical structuralist, functionalist and interpretive. The subjectivist and radical 
change dimensions represent the radical humanist paradigm, which has the radical 
change perspective; it seeks to change, emancipate and potentiate the status quo and to 
overcome all barriers facing this emancipation (such as ideology, power, psychological 
compulsions and social constraints). This includes awareness of the roles which different 
97 
social and organizational forces play in understanding the change (Goles and 
Hirschheim, 2000). 
The radical structuralist paradigm takes a different ontological position: it is objectivist, 
it aims to achieve fundamental change, it focuses on organisational structure and it 
analyses organisational phenomena as power relationships and patterns of conflict 
(Saunders et at, 2007). 
The other objectivist dimension is functionalism, which adopts the regulation 
perspective. The functionalist paradigm provides an explanation of why a particular 
organisational problem occurs and develops recommendations set within the current 
structure of the organisational situation (Saunders et al., 2007). The explanation reflects 
the interaction of individual elements of the social system to form an integrated whole 
(Goles and Hirschheim, 2000). The interpretive paradigm represents the subjectivist and 
regulation dimensions. In order to achieve its objectives, this thesis will adopt the 
interpretive approach, which seeks to explain and understand the fundamental meanings 
of the social world. Burrell and Morgan state that 
"The interpretive paradigm is informed by a concern to understand the 
world as it is, to understand the fundamental nature of the social world at 
the level of subjective experience. It seeks explanation within the realm of 
individual consciousness and subjectivity, within the frame of reference of 
the participant as opposed to the observer of action. " (p. 28). 
Pursuant to interpretivism, the researcher should understand the differences between 
human beings in their roles as social actors. This emphasises the differences between 
studying people and objects; the researchers not only interprets their own social roles in 
accordance with the meanings they give to these roles, but also interpret the social roles 
of others in accordance with their own set of meanings (Saunders et al., 2007). 
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Interpretivism arose from two intellectual traditions, the first being phenomenology, 
which is defined by Bryman (2004) as "a philosophy that is concerned with the question 
of how individuals make sense of the world around them and how in particular the 
philosopher should bracket out preconceptions in his or her grasp of that world". The 
second intellectual tradition is symbolic interactionism; Saunders et al. (2007) state that 
this involves "a continual process of interpreting the social world around us in that we 
interpret the actions of others with whom we interact and this interpretation leads to 
adjustment of our own meaning and actions". Saunders et al. (2007) explain that an 
interpretivist researcher has to adopt an empathetic stance, adding that the researcher 
will face serious challenges entering the social world of the research subjects, in addition 
to understanding this world from their perspective. 
Although Burrell and Morgan's framework has won general acceptance among social 
science researchers, there has been some criticism. For instance, Chua (1986) suggests 
that a drawback of Burrell and Morgan's framework arises from their use of mutually 
exclusive dichotomies; their misreading of Kuhn as advocating irrational paradigm 
choice; the latent relativism of truth and reason which their framework encourages; and 
the dubious nature of differences between the radical structuralist and humanist 
paradigms. 
4.3 Methods 
In order to achieve the research objectives and in the light of the research methodology 
standpoint this research adopts the qualitative method of semi-structured interviews and 
a more quantitative method of a questionnaire survey as the methods of collecting the 
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primary research data. This section highlights the different issues in relation to the 
research methods. 
4.3.1 Semi-Structured Interviews 
The first research method employed in this research is a semi-structured interview, 
which is one type of interview method in social sciences research; other interview 
methods are structured, unstructured and focus group interviews. Interviews are 
considered to be useful methods to enable interviewers to obtain a rich insight into 
interviewees' biographies, experiences, opinions, values, aspirations, attitudes, and 
feelings (May, 2005). The differences between structured and semi-structured types of 
interviews are noted by May (2005): 
"In moving from the structured interview to the unstructured interview, 
researchers shift from a situation in which they attempt to control the 
interview through predetermining questions and thus `teach' the respondent 
to reply in accordance with the interview schedule (standardization), to one 
in which the respondent is encouraged to answer a question in their own 
terms". (p. 121). 
Bryman (2004) describe the process of semi-structured interview as: 
"The researcher has a list of questions or fairly specific topics to be covered, 
often referred to as an interview guide, but the interviewee has a great deal 
of leeway in how to reply. Questions may not follow on exactly in the way 
outlined on schedule. Questions that are not include in the guide may be 
asked as the interviewer picks up on things said by interviewees. But, by 
and large, all of the questions will be asked and a similar wording will be 
used from interviewee to interviewee. " (p. 321). 
A semi-structured interview is the most appropriate method consistent with the purpose 
of this study. One of the main reasons for choosing a semi-structured interview as the 
primary method in gathering data in this research is the flexibility of this method. The 
interview's flexibility depends on the extent of freedom that the interviewer has to raise 
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questions that are generated from the issues being investigated through the interview, 
whereas the interview can be inflexible if the interviewer strictly has to follow ordered 
questions (Kumar, 2005). Furthermore, such style of interview allows the interviewees 
to respond to the questions more on their own terms than a standardized interview 
permits, but at the same time it maintains a structure which allows the possibility of 
analysing and comparing interviews (May, 2005). In a semi-structured interview there 
are a number of predetermined questions and specific topics, and all of the interviewees 
are asked all questions systematically and in a consistent order, but they have the 
freedom to digress (Berg, 2007). A semi-structured interview allows the interviewer to 
ask new questions which arise through the interview and allow the interviewee to 
digress, giving the interviewees an opportunity to freely express their knowledge, 
experience, and opinions in specific interest areas and provide the opportunity to the 
interviewer to discover uncovered issues in prearranged questions or to gain rich 
information in a particular field. 
Semi-structured interviews can be both flexible and comparable, in addition to which 
using such a method does not lead to a loss of concentration on the main objective of the 
interview since the interviewer can make sure that all the questions are being covered, 
consequently a semi-structured interview is the most popular method for qualitative 
research when looking for flexible, rich, detailed answers (Bryman, 2004) and at the 
same time comparable data. 
Accordingly, the research adopts a semi-structured interview method in order to study 
the corporate governance issues within Saudi companies by interviewing different 
stakeholders since this method is expected to allow those stakeholders to freely express 
their experiences, opinions, and attitudes in regards to different topics and questions in 
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the interview guide in addition to any others issues that they want to be considered. For 
the purpose of the study the researcher has developed an interview guide which contains 
a list of topics followed by some questions (see Appendix II) that need to be covered 
during the interviews. The topics and questions are mainly generated from the literature 
on corporate governance in general and corporate governance in developing countries as 
well as the literature of the Saudi business environment and Islamic Sharia as an attempt 
to cover the most significant issues related to corporate governance practices in Saudi 
since there is a lack of resources in this field both in the published literature and in 
official reports. The interview guide has six main topics and covers some important 
aspects of corporate governance; the definition of corporate governance; board structure, 
responsibility, disclosure and transparency; stakeholders, accountability and 
accountability in Islam; and regulatory bodies and the legal system. Four interview 
guides were designed according to the interviewees' roles (User; Companies; Regulators; 
and Auditors) these guides are in the same topic orders but the questions are slightly 
different consistent with the interviewees' backgrounds and knowledge. 
After piloting the interview guide with some staff and PhD students in the School of 
Accounting & Finance at the University of Dundee for both English and Arabic versions, 
a cross-section of stakeholders in the Saudi business environment were interviewed, and 
except for one interviewee who preferred to speak in English, all other interviews were 
conducted in Arabic, and all the interviewees are Saudi Arabian. Twenty two face-to- 
face interviews were conducted between May 2007 and July 2007 in four major cities in 
Saudi Arabia. Table 4.3 shows that the majority of interviews occurred in the capital of 
Riyadh, the largest Saudi city and where the government and business institutions and 
supervision and regulatory bodies are concentrated. Seven interviews were in Jeddah 
UPJýJEC 
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whereas only one interview took place in each of Mecca and Dammam. Since Saudi 
Arabia is a country with a vast area the researcher had to travel from one city to another 
many times, sometimes twice a week, it was time consuming and expensive since the 
only way to travel was to fly. 
The interview sample was chosen to cover regulators such as: Consultancy Board, 
Ministry of Commerce, Capital Market Authority, Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, 
SOCPA, and Chambers of Commerce, and in relation to government institutional 
investor, the Public Investment Fund in Ministry of Finance, the General Organization 
for Social Insurance, and the Public Pension Agency. Each was faxed, telephoned or 
personally visited as there are only these three government institutional investors. The 
other parties for interview were picked using a method of picking one and then leaving 
two by setting the sample in Excel sheet in alphabetical order. These parties include: 
companies, audit partners, fund managers, financial consultants and academics. The 
sources of information were different, the companies information was obtained from 
Tadawul (Saudi Stock Exchange) and Ministry of Commerce, and other information was 
obtained from the different parties official internet websites. 
Seven groups of stakeholders of regulators, companies, audit partners, government 
institutional investors, fund managers, financial consultants, and academics were 
interviewed and they represent the significant sectors of stakeholders. However, there 
were a huge number of stakeholders who refused to be interviewed as they did not have 
time or they were not familiar with the subject of corporate governance. 
Two of the interviewees preferred to meet in their houses and another two decided to be 
interviewed in public coffee shops, these four interviews were more comfortable, less 
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formal, and lasted longer. Further, these interviews were more in depth and detailed. The 
other interviews took place in the interviewees business' offices. The duration of all 
interviews ranged from between one and two hours, there was only one which took up 
three hours. Twenty of the interviews were recorded as two government institutional 
investors refused to have their interviews recorded. 
Table 4.3 Categories of Interviewees 
.. --"ý . ý-; _ 
Regulators 
Rl Member of Consultancy Board 
Chairman of listed Company 
Boards member of three listed companies 
R2 Board member of the Capital Market Authority 
R3 General Secretary of SOCPA 
Riyadh 
Riyadh 
Riyadh 
, Companies : 
Administrative Consultant & responsible of corporate governance Riyadh Cl. development in a listed company 
C2 Boards member at some listed companies Jeddah 
C3 Boards member at some listed companies Jeddah 
C4 Boards member at some listed companies Riyadh 
C5 Group corporate Governance Manager in a listed company Jeddah 
C6 CEO of unlisted company Riyadh 
C7 Chairman of unlisted company Riyadh 
ºudit Partners .: a,. ý Audit Partner Riyadh Al Ex-chairman of listed company 
12 Audit Partner Jeddah A2 Board member of SOCPA 
AGovernment Institutional Investors 
13 11 Economic counsellor & vice-secretary general of Public Investment Fund Riyadh 
14 Director General of Financial Investment Department Riyadh 12 General Organization For Social Insurance 
15 Director General of financial investment Department of Public Pension Riyadh 13 Agency 
,. ý±*mvx+*awws'*"ý°*ýn+"r-n+.. smrr+ýr, ýn*ý+re.. ^wm +*+++^ý'Mrseý++^*°*'e+an+aýhýnrnt -ýq, r., +F. * , 
J'ündMangers. 
16 Senior Vice President Riyadh FMI Head of Asset Management 
17 FM2 Fund manager Dammam 
18 FC I CEO of Financial Consultants Firm Jeddah 
19 FC2 Chairman of Financial Consultants Firm Riyadh 
20 FC3 A well-known financial commentator Jeddah 
I 
Academics,.. 
AC1 
Academic Jeddah 
Member of Quality Review Programme Committee at SOCPA 
AC2 Academic Mecca 
Note: The Table shows the seven categories of interviewees and their roles and the cities where interviews 
conducted. 
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4.3.2 Questionnaire Survey 
Distributing a questionnaire survey was the second method of collecting the primary 
data. A questionnaire survey is one of the most popular research tools for gathering 
information. This meth od is inexpensive compared with other methods such as an 
interviews, and questionnaires can provide a wide geographical coverage for the 
research sample. In addition, the anonymity helps the respondents to feel free to express 
their opinion without concern about their identity. There are three types of questionnaire, 
a self-completion questionnaire that enables respondents to answer the questions by 
themselves, a telephone questionnaire survey where respondents have to give their 
answers over the telephone, and a face-to-face questionnaire where the researcher has to 
be with the respondents when completing the questionnaire to provide any assistance or 
explanation about the questions. For the purpose of this study, a self-completing 
questionnaire has been adopted. This type of questionnaire has many advantages, it is 
cheaper than other questionnaire methods, and the anonymity helps to encourage 
respondents to complete the questionnaire and increase the response rate; it is easer to 
distribute it over different cities, and easier for respondents to complete it in since they 
only need to tick the right answers; it is more convenient for them since they can do it at 
their preferred time and send it back when they have finished. Furthermore, the absence 
of the interviewer eliminates the interviewer impact. However, using this method has 
some disadvantages. Sometimes respondents do not understand how to answer the 
questions or may not be sure about the meaning of some questions as a result of their 
literacy level or they are not familiar with the questionnaire topic. In these where cases 
the absence of the interviewer might mean that the respondents would either not 
complete the questionnaire or answer it incorrectly and in some cases they may leave 
some questions unanswered. A questionnaire also does not allow respondents to 
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elaborate on the topics that draw their attention. Moreover, the subject is sometimes not 
interested which reduces the possibility of response. The respondents have the right to 
read the whole questionnaire before they start answering questions and this to some 
extent will affect the independence of questions and the answers. It is also very difficult 
to ask a lot of questions and to go into more depth in questionnaires since the 
respondents will not answer if it is a very long questionnaire. In addition to this, there is 
no way of knowing if the right person has answered the questionnaire or not. Finally, the 
response rate in self-completion questionnaires may be low which could result in a 
biased sample (Bryman, 2004 and May, 2005). 
In order to avoid some difficulties that are related to open-ended questions the 
questionnaire in this thesis uses almost all closed-ended questions. Kumar (2005) 
considered the advantages and disadvantages of using closed-ended questions, and 
mentions that close-ended questions enable the researcher to obtain needed information 
since the respondents answer particular questions; in addition to the easiness of analysis 
as the information has already been categorized. The disadvantage of this method is that 
the gathered information lacks depth and variety, the findings may reflect the research 
bias by just focusing on the result that the researcher is interested in, the respondents' 
answers may not reflect their opinions since they follow particular choices by ticking 
answers that may lead to the respondents ticking categories without thinking about the 
issues. 
After analysing the interviews in chapter 5, and in conjunction with the literature review 
and in the light of research questions, the most important issues related to corporate 
governance in Saudi Arabia were included in a self-completion questionnaire survey. 
Two questionnaires were developed to be appropriate for two different groups of 
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respondents: one for companies and another one for other stakeholders. Although both 
of them are similar the company questionnaire has more questions since the companies' 
respondents were asked about the actual practices of these issues in their own companies 
(see the questionnaires in both languages in Appendices III, IV, V and VI). All the 
questions used a five point Likert scale and the respondents expressed the extent of their 
agreement by ticking the appropriate answers as 1= not at all and 5= to a great extent. 
However, a few open-ended questions were asked, and there was also free space at the 
end of the questionnaire for those who wanted to add any information that they thought 
was related to practices of corporate governance in Saudi Arabia. One of the main 
obstacles facing self-completion of the questionnaire as mentioned previously is the low 
response rate where lower response rates mean a greater risk of biased findings (Bryman, 
2004). To avoid such a problem, the researcher adopted some procedures to improve the 
questionnaire and increase the response rate in order to achieve the research objectives. 
One of the major steps was to ensure that the questionnaire was well written and easy for 
respondents to go through and answer it; clear instruction and attractive layout improves 
the response rate (Dillman, 1983). The questionnaire was piloted with some academic 
staff and PhD students in the School of Accounting & Finance at the University of 
Dundee in both English and Arabic. The questionnaire included a covering letter 
introducing the researcher and his school, outlining the objective of the research, 
ensuring the confidentiality when dealing with the information that was given in the 
questionnaire, explaining the method of answering the questions, providing the contact 
numbers of the researcher and highlighting the methods for returning the completed 
questionnaire. At the end the researcher's appreciation for the respondents' participation 
was noted. The questionnaire was professionally printed in a booklet with a glossy cover 
and accompanied by a prepaid addressed envelope. Although it was an additional cost, 
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the researcher recognised that the respondents admired it and mentioned this as the first 
time that they had seen such an attractive questionnaire including the free-post envelope; 
the researcher believes that this appreciation encouraged the respondents to reply to the 
questionnaire. 
The samples were chosen using various sources of information in order to cover as many 
different stakeholder groups as possible. For example, data of prospective research 
candidates was collected form sources such as Tadawul (Saudi Stock Exchange) and the 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry, for companies and stock brokers data. Other 
information was obtained from the different parties' official internet websites and from 
the experience that the researcher had from the interviews. Different methods were 
adopted to choose the samples, so if there were a variety of choices, an Excel sheet was 
used to list the data in order and use the method of picking one and leaving the next two. 
In the cases of a limited choice of respondents the researcher considered all the parties 
such as the government institutional investors where everyone was communicated with. 
Different methods were also used for board members and private investors since it was 
very difficult to contact them due to the fact that there is no specific place to find them, 
especially if they are non-executives who do not have offices in the companies; also, the 
investors who can be a large number of disparate people to try and contact. The 
researcher, therefore, decided to attend the companies' AGMs which provided a good 
opportunity for the researcher to meet managers, board members, investors and different 
groups of stakeholders and in addition to acquaint himself with what happens at 
companies' AGMs. As only twenty shares of a company are required to attend a 
company's AGM, shares were purchased and then many questionnaires were distributed 
at AGMs. In addition to the excellent chance to be aware of what actually happens at 
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AGMs, the participation with different parties of corporate governance over related 
issues at the AGMs significantly contributed to understanding the specialties of different 
parties and their concerns and interest matters and the nature of the relationships 
between them. Interestingly, at one of these AGMs that the researcher attended, the 
number of attendance was very small and this was the second time for the AGM so it 
has to convene regardless of the number of attendance. The board members had chosen 
a company employee to be the convener of the AGM which make the researcher protest 
as he was not independent. The AGM then decided to chose the researcher himself to be 
the convener of the AGM. This opportunity was a really good experience for the 
researcher to be aware of how AGMs were administered and the process of making and 
calculating the votes on the decisions. 
The other method for investors was to distribute the questionnaires in exchange halls at 
banks where investors come to buy and sell their shares. As they are popular in Saudi, 
the researcher can wait while the respondent completes in the questionnaire and can 
assist some of them to understand and answer the questions. Almost all prospective 
respondents who were met at AGMs and exchange halls agreed to take the questionnaire 
and completed it then returned it by hand. As approximately 95% of the questionnaires 
were distributed by hand this meant a lot of time and cost was spent. Nevertheless this 
situation provides a lot of opportunities for the researcher to meet face to face with large 
groups of stakeholders since two to five minutes were spent with the respondents when 
delivering the questionnaire. 
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Takle 4.4 Categories of Ouestionnaire Resnondents 
Other Stakeholders (0) 
Academic 47 13 27% 
Private Investor 112 26 23% 54 (27%) 
Company Employee 39 15 38% 
Regulators (R) ;.., 
aiuaQu. n. .... sdn,. n»4ý f.. n. xsy'+tn;. Artr,... k5a...,:. 
ia{;.. ud..... z.: A: 
Lr, 
...,. ý. ý. whu. v ýJ-m. .... u. +oam.. rxkwwnoý.,. u"a: ", ,: 2ý 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as<».. Ai. na »,. c. 5-&.. _wo.. 
Auditors 55 15 27% 
26 (26%) Regulators 43 11 25% 
Institutional Stakeholders (I) 
Government Institutional Investors 45 17 37% 
Fund Managers 48 14 29% 
58 (32%) 
Consultant 32 12 37% 
Stock Broker 58 15 25% 
Non- Executive Directors (N) 
ýv>ýý.. ýý.. ý., ý, ýýaýý"7_., ý>amp. ýý. ý.: ý.. ý. <ý,. ý. a.,, ý...,. ý.: ý;. ... hý-.. -.,.,; ý.. ý. ., Y, ý. >a. r: ý-:,.... Aý..,. ý; ý ., ý.;; ý: ý . ýr, ýýý.. 
ý.. 
., '.., ýk. ý,:.;; ý-_ý:. Non-Executive Company Chairman 22 6 27% 
Non-Executive Director 45 8 17% 19 (19%) 
Independent Non-Executive Director 31 5 16% 
Management (M) . ýr 
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Chief Executive officer 16 5 31% 
Executive Director 46 6 13% 19 (20%) 
Company Manager 32 8 25% 
Other* 89 0 0% 0 
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Note: The Table shows the live categories of questionnaire respondents, the sub-categories respondents, 
the number of distributed questionnaires, number of returned questionnaires and the response rate. 
* The other questionnaires were sent to companies and the researcher is not sure which stakeholders 
within the companies were asked to complete them. 
All the respondents were asked to choose the preferred method to return the completed 
questionnaire; surprisingly the majority of the sample preferred that the researcher came 
back to pick the questionnaire by himself rather than post, although it had a free-post 
envelope. About two thirds of the completed questionnaires were collected by the 
researcher, others were received by mail, fax, and Email. It was very important to 
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remind the respondents to respond within two weeks in order to encourage them to 
answer the questionnaire. Many of respondents expressed their interest in the research 
topic and provided their support; they expressed admiration about the layout of the 
questionnaire. However, some prospective respondents mentioned that they lacked 
knowledge regarding corporate governance issues and there were some complaints about 
the length of the questionnaire which took a long time to complete. 
Seven hundred and sixty questionnaires were distributed to different stakeholders 
groups' between April and June 2008 in the two major cities of Saudi Arabia: Riyadh 
and Jeddah. As can be seen in Table 4.4, there were 15 groups who responded to the 
questionnaire and the total response rate was 23% (176 out of 760). And these were 
grouped into five sets of stakeholders. 
4.4 Summary 
Different philosophical standpoints in relation to the assumptions about the nature of 
social science and the assumptions about the nature of society according to Burrell and 
Morgan (1979) have been outlined in this chapter. In addition, the research paradigms 
were discussed and the interpretive paradigm adopted by the current study was identified. 
The chapter also focuses on the two research methods that have been chosen to conduct 
the study. Semi-structured interviews and a questionnaire survey are discussed. The next 
two chapters contain the empirical work of the study. 
1 The questionnaires were not sent to those who participated in the interviews. 
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Chapter 5 
Semi-Structured Interviews 
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Chapter 5 
Semi-Structured Interviews 
5.1 Introduction 
As described in the previous chapter, the first research method adopted by this thesis to 
collect the primary data is semi-structured interviews. This method seeks to investigate 
different stakeholder groups about corporate governance issues in Saudi Arabia. This 
chapter will present the results and highlight the main issues generated from the twenty two 
interviews that were conducted with Saudi stakeholders between May 2007 and July 2007 
regarding understanding of corporate governance; the current practices; the legal system; 
the accountability framework and other factors influencing corporate governance in Saudi 
Arabia. 
5.2 The Understanding of the Concept of Corporate Governance in Saudi 
Arabia 
In order to examine the Saudi stakeholders' understanding of corporate governance the 
interviewees were asked to outline their definition of corporate governance and how 
important they regarded the topic of corporate governance; the following sections present 
the Saudi stakeholders' responses to these questions. 
5.2.1 Definition of Corporate Governance 
Many of the interviewees stated that corporate governance was a new concept within the 
Saudi business environment and it had only recently been used. A few years ago, there had 
been no mention of corporate governance. It has been suggested that serious debate about 
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corporate governance had not been in evidence before the Saudi stock market collapse' in 
February 2006. Before the crash, there had been a lack of interest in companies' corporate 
governance. Furthermore, there was a lack of awareness about the importance of corporate 
governance for the environment since there was a general feeling that the national 
economy was strong, and that companies were performing efficiently and had a high level 
of productivity. People thought that companies were in a good condition and well 
managed, isolated from scandals, frauds and corruption which were suffered by companies 
in other countries. Despite the fact that many companies were experiencing difficulties and 
had been making losses for several years, the increase in share prices for all companies, 
regardless of their financial position, led to a situation in which investors passed over these 
facts. However, a significant change happened after the Saudi stock market crash in 
February 2006, which encouraged all those who dealt with companies to review, revise and 
re-valuate companies and their boards. The crash was considered to be a turning point in 
the awareness of the issues which had arisen and now attracted attention, especially, areas 
such as corporate governance and company accountability. It is very clear that there was an 
enhanced recognition of corporate governance issues within the Saudi business 
environment, as many conferences and seminars were convened, and several articles were 
written in the national newspapers defining corporate governance and clarifying its 
importance and the need for corporate governance in Saudi companies, both to protect 
companies and the national economy (see Figure 5.1). The CMA started to play a 
significant role in increasing corporate governance awareness in the business environment. 
1 The stock market index had risen from approximately 4,000 in February 2002 to over 21,000 in January 
2006 before falling to almost 6,000 in February 2006. 
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Figure 5.1 Cartons in Relation to Practice of Corporate Governance in Saudi Arabia 
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However, other interviewees claimed that corporate governance is not new in Saudi 
companies but that they practised corporate governance in different ways. An audit partner 
and company ex-chairman (Al) states that company law, which was published in 1965, 
comprises 80% of the latest corporate governance requirements. He gave two instances to 
support his viewpoint. First, the law has required the separation between the roles of 
chairman and the CEO. The second requirement is that the external auditor is prevented 
from combining audit services and consultation services with the same clients. The 
interviewee regarded both of them as pointing to a high level of corporate governance, but 
he mentioned that the problem was not part of the existing corporate governance 
requirements as far as it was related to companies' compliance. A Member of the 
Consultancy Board and a company chairman (RI) agreed with this view and stated that: 
"Corporate governance principles are not new for the Saudi business 
environment and the only new thing is that these principles are now being 
issued separately, and have been named the corporate governance code by 
an official body, the Capital Market Authority, which is also responsible for 
supervision and monitoring of companies' compliance" 
Some interviewees affirm that there is confusion relating to the term "corporate 
governance", since the term has only recently been translated into the Arabic language, as 
Hawkama, it has been widely used to refer to the English term "corporate governance", but 
there are other terms still in use in such as Hakemea, Aledarah alrashedah, and Edarat wa 
Ttandheem Alsharekah. For example, a company consultant (Cl) states that: 
"The translation of corporate governance to Arabic is inadequate and 
provides an incorrect concept for the English concept of corporate 
governance. " 
A non-executive director (C3) agreed and added that Hawkama is a limited term in that: 
"Hawkama is a recent translation of corporate governance and does not 
provide the same meaning as that of the English concept of corporate 
governance. " 
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Those who raised the issue relating to the Arabic term of corporate governance appeared 
dissatisfied with the translation and mentioned that using the term Hawkama caused a kind 
of vagueness which led to a misunderstanding of the original concept. Furthermore, the 
interviewees argued that, in addition to the fact that the conception of corporate governance 
was new within the business environment, the translation of the term had led to a more 
ambiguous and indefinite perception of the corporate governance concept, as the translation 
failed to explain and interpret the English concept. One of the main misunderstandings that 
is caused by using the term Hawkama is that, in the public sector, it means 
"nationalization" and more government restrictions and control among companies. 
A company ex-chairman (Al) also said that they had used a different term as a translation 
for corporate governance when they had established and set the first corporate governance 
code for Saudi Arabian companies, and they named it "Directing and controlling the 
company", translated as Edarat wa Ttandheem Alsharekah, which corresponds with 
Cadbury's definition of corporate governance. However, the researcher mentioned t hat 
visiting the company's website in April 2009, it shows that the company has recently 
changed its corporate governance code translation to use Hawkama. 
The interviewees suggested various definitions for the concept of corporate governance. A 
regulator (R2), who is a board member of CMA, the major body responsible for regulating 
and supervising corporate governance in Saudi, defined corporate governance according to 
a wide stakeholder's perspective when he stated that: 
"Corporate governance is concerned with setting the best practice of 
directing companies in the way that ensures the protection of stakeholder's 
rights. " 
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From his side, a regulator and company chairman (RI) considered corporate governance 
from an agent-principal and legitimacy standpoint, when he defined corporate governance 
as: 
"The group of rules, principles and values which should control the 
behaviours and ethics of a company, its board and its employees by an 
official body such as the CMA. " 
A non-executive director (C3) had a narrow view of corporate governance and believed that 
corporate governance came from inside the company as an internal function, defining it 
thus: 
"Corporate governance is what the board agrees how to conduct business 
among themselves. " 
However, the interviewees considered several aspects of the definition of corporate 
governance, as illustrated by Table 5.1, which shows all those factors mentioned by the 
interviewees. The two most important aspects mentioned by the interviewees (55%) were 
directing the company, and appointing authorities and responsibilities, which reflects the 
narrow viewpoint on corporate governance of Saudi stakeholders. The stakeholder 
perspective came latterly, as protecting stakeholder rights came third (41% of the 
interviewees), while promoting disclosure and transparency and protecting shareholders' 
rights including minorities, came fourth and fifth scoring 27% and 23% respectively. The 
breakdown of the interviewees regarding these corporate governance concepts by 
categories in the Table 5.1 shows that regulators, fund managers, financial consultants and 
auditors consider corporate governance from both an agency and stakeholder perspective. 
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Table 5.1 Factors of Governance Definition 
Number in each category 3 7 2 3 2 3 2 22 
Directing the company 3 2 2 1 1 1 2 12 55% 
Appointing authorities and responsibilities 2 5 0 1 1 3 0 12 55% 
Protecting stakeholder rights 2 I 2 0 I 3 0 9 41% 
Promoting disclosure and transparency 0 1 0 2 0 2 1 6 27% 
Protecting shareholders right including 1 3 0 0 I 0 0 5 23% 
minorities 
Protecting company from corruption, fraud, 0 2 1 0 0 0 I 4 18% inside trading and conflict of interests 
Promoting fairness and objectivism 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 4 18% 
Controlling company 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 3 14% 
Implementing company targets 1 0 0 0 0 1 2 4 18% 
Accountability 0 1 0 0 0 1 I 3 14% 
Social responsibility 1 I 1 0 0 0 0 3 14% 
Organising and setting ethics for company's I I 0 0 0 0 0 2 9% 
members 
Compliance with laws and requirements 0 0 1 0 0 0 I 2 9% 
Decreasing risk 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 5% 
Note: This 'f'able shows factors of corporate governance definition that mentioned by the categories of 
interviewees. R= Regulators, C= Companies, A= Audit Partners, I= Government Institutional Investors, F= 
Fund Managers, FC= Financial Consultants and AC= Academics. 
Auditors seemed to have the most coordinated definition of corporate governance, as they 
all agreed that corporate governance was about directing the company, protecting 
stakeholder' rights and promoting fairness and objectivism. The company interviewees' 
standpoints were based on an agency perspective and to some extent considered the 
shareholders' perspective; the academics adopted an agency perspective, with a financially- 
oriented definition was considered by institutional investors; finally, financial consultants 
saw corporate governance as promoting disclosure and transparency. According to the 
interviewees' definitions of corporate governance, Saudi stakeholders, see a limited 
accountability relationship; it is an internal relationship from a narrow agency perspective, 
although there are some considerations of a wider perspective of accountability 
relationships which include wider groups of company stakeholders. 
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5.2.2 The Importance of Corporate Governance 
All the groups of stakeholders interviewed in this study agreed about the importance of 
corporate governance for Saudi companies, and that it was essential for all companies, 
regardless of their nature and nationality. This was a surprising finding, since many voices 
have been heard in the media against implementing corporate governance among Saudi 
companies, claiming that there is no need for more regulations to restrict companies, that 
company law is adequate and that all companies comply with it. An audit partner and a 
company ex-chairman (Al) explained that the attitudes of some companies' officers 
indicate that they are unaware of corporate governance. The interviewee, who led the first 
initiative for a corporate governance code in Saudi companies2 , stressed the 
importance of 
corporate governance and stated that: 
"Due to the separation of ownership and management, there are a lot of 
issues and matters overlapping with shareholders and even among board 
members sometimes, since the lack of bases which can be considered as 
reliable tools to assess the extent that board members are fulfilling their 
duties and responsibilities. Consequently this depends upon personal 
evaluation and for that reason problems are raised, on account of that 
corporate governance is one of the most important factors that could assist 
in evaluating board members and discharging their responsibilities. The 
experience has proved that the lack of generally accepted, viable and 
measurable principles such as corporate governance principles lead to an 
uncontrolled situation. The clear example for this is the scandals and 
collapse in the business world such as Enron and other companies" 
An interviewee (C3) argued that: 
"The importance of corporate governance is to find the roles of everybody 
in terms of the legal rights of all stakeholders. As well as in putting fairness 
in the whole system so everyone who owns share or wants to own shares 
has an equal understanding of the company and equal access to the news" 
'When he was the chairman of Saudi Telecom Company (STC) 
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Tahic 5.2 The Importance of Corporate Governance 
No Reasons n 
Appointing authorities and responsibilities 8 36% 
Protecting shareholders rights including minorities 6 27% 
Protecting company and increasing its trustworthy 6 27% 
Increasing company's sufficiency 6 27% 
Strengthening the national economy 5 23% 
Protecting stakeholder rights 4 18% 
Equitable treatment of all shareholders 4 18% 
Improve discloser and transparency 4 18% 
Protecting company from corruption and inside trading 4 18% 
Setting bases for accountability 2 9% 
Assist company to implement the best practices 2 9% 
Align the relationships between owners, board members and managers 2 9% 
Assist company to adhere to laws and standards 1 5% 
Implementing company's targets 1 5% 
Discharge board responsibility 1 5% 
Decrease risk 1 5% 
Note: This Table shows the number and percentage of interviewees who mentioned each reason for the 
importance of corporate governance 
However, some reasons were mentioned by the interviewees that make corporate 
governance important. Table 5.2 presents these reasons and reflects the fact that, although 
stakeholders have indicated the significance of corporate governance for Saudi companies, 
there is no clear unanimity about these reasons. The most common reason was the role of 
corporate governance in appointing authorities and responsibilities (36% of the 
interviewees). Next, 27% of stakeholders state that the importance of corporate governance 
is to: protect shareholders rights including minorities; protect a company and increase its 
trustworthiness; and improve the company's efficiency. The interviewees collectively 
agreed about the crucial importance of corporate governance, Saudi companies as company 
manager (C5) asserted: 
"Corporate governance is very important for our companies; its role to 
prevent any economic crisis could be the result of weak corporate 
governance, especially if this happened in large companies which would 
have a direct impact on the national economy. Therefore, it protects the 
company and its stakeholder's interests, in addition to preventing any fraud, 
cheating and benefiting from inside information to serve personal interests. 
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Corporate governance presents equitable treatment and fairness for all 
parties which promote public trust on the company" 
However, the interviewees indicate that Saudi stakeholders mainly consider the importance 
of corporate governance from narrow agency perspective which limits the accountability 
relationship internally, and to shareholders, but not to other stakeholders. 
5.3 The Current Practice of Corporate Governance in Saudi Arabia 
This section focuses on the interviewees' thoughts about existing corporate governance 
practices in the Saudi business environment, and the extent to which Saudi companies 
implement good corporate governance principles; in addition it examines their opinions 
about the developments that have happened in this f ield. 
There was general agreement among the interviewees that no single Saudi company had 
adopted and complied with all the corporate governance principles. An ex-non executive 
director (C4) claims that although the CMA requires listed companies to issue their own 
corporate governance code3, a large proportion of companies have not yet even issued their 
codes, let alone carried them out and complied with them. Further, an audit partner (A2) 
argues that Saudi companies are still in the early stages of compliance with corporate 
governance, and that many things need to be done. An institutional investor interviewee 
(13) believes that companies are delaying their compliance with corporate governance. A 
financial consultant (FC2) observes that companies have started to comply with corporate 
governance, but that they are still in their "honeymoon" period, so they implement what 
3 An explanation for that might be the CMA wants to encourage companies to issue their own code according 
to their circumstances and do not require all companies to adopt one particular code 
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they like and ignore what they dislike. Another financial consultant (FC3) agrees with the 
observation and confirms that some companies have made good progress by way of 
compliance with corporate governance, whereas others have done nothing and are still far 
from any corporate governance implementation. 
Thus, the corporate governance situation differs from one company to another, where some 
companies appear to be concerned about the application of corporate governance, and have 
set up preparations to adopt corporate governance principles, even before becoming 
mandatory by the CMA, and other companies have not even started to think about 
corporate governance (a company NED (C3)). The regulator from the CMA (R1) adds that 
some companies have set up their own initiatives to establish a corporate governance code, 
before the CMA issued its code, which reflects the intention of these companies to invest in 
developing corporate governance within their companies and implementing best practice. 
Nevertheless, an interviewee from SOCPA (R3), who is also an independent member of an 
audit committee in a listed company, states that, based on his experience in one of these 
"initiative" companies: 
"Even for those companies who began to set a corporate governance code, 
there is no application for these codes, and if there were any, it is limited or 
only narrow in places. Some companies introduced good codes but have not 
implemented them, which makes them useless, because of the unwillingness 
of company officers to put more restrictions and control over them, in 
addition to the lack of mechanisms that ensure and monitor the company's 
adherence with corporate governance". 
An audit partner interviewee (A2) agrees with the above and argues that: 
"Since there is a lack of implementation measurements, the board's report is 
no more than a shining report. A company may mention that it complies 
with some aspects. But who will make sure of that compliance? " 
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From their side, the company representatives mentioned that they were concerned with 
corporate governance issues before the CMA released its code project in June 2006 and 
revised in November 2006. A company consultant (Cl) added that his company's code 
includes issues which the CMA code does not include, such as appointing authorities and 
responsibilities and functional succession. The chairman of a listed company (RI) stressed 
that his company had implemented 80% of the corporate governance code requirements 
even before code was released. In addition his company is looking forward to improving its 
corporate governance. Regarding other company attitudes towards corporate governance, a 
company manager (C5) states that: 
"We started caring about corporate governance in the company in 2003. As 
a result of that, we have designed and implemented our own code, which 
has been updated to conform to the CMA code and international 
developments in this field. Our purpose is to adopt international best 
practice standards and systems, and go beyond the local framework, in view 
of the company's worldwide business and its continuous desire to branch out 
and enlarge overseas, as well as ensuring that we can strengthen and 
improve the company's reputation and plant the trust among shareholders. 
Also, the company believes that its role as a distinct and successful leader 
company is to adopt such an initiative and transfer it to the local 
environment and assist other companies with their implementation". 
A company consultant (Cl) states that: 
"Our company was a state-owned company before it was privatised. The 
government still holds 70% of the company's shares. The existence of 
corporate governance has helped the company deal with this huge 
government inheritance, and in particular, to change the company culture 
from a state-owned company to a private one. In addition to that, corporate 
governance gives the company a competitive feature, especially in the case 
of international transactions, for example, mergers or takeovers" 
However, the companies' interviewees admit that some principles still need implementing 
and that there are some difficulties which are preventing the implementation of some 
principles. For example, a company chairman interviewee (RI) points out that his company 
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does not comply with the policy on independent NEDs, as they are still unconvinced about 
the role of independent NEDs in his company. 
According to the interviews, there are some factors which could have a direct affect on the 
existence and implementation of corporate governance in Saudi companies. For instance, a 
company non-executive director (C3) notes that the extent of a company chairman's 
awareness and conviction about the need for corporate governance, and a wide experience 
of company boards, will help corporate governance to be implemented. He suggests that it 
will take a long time for those people who do not understand and are not aware of the 
essence of corporate governance to understand and appreciate the value of corporate 
governance and to change from existing practices to new practices. It may also depend on 
the maturity of a company and how early it started to deal with corporate governance. 
A company consultant and a company manager (Cl and C5) both give an example of what 
happened in their companies. In both companies the initiative to adopt corporate 
governance arose from the chairman's personal desire. Cl notes that the chairman's 
satisfaction with corporate governance has been a major factor in the adoption of corporate 
governance, because of the chairman's power to control and influence the company, and as 
a key part of the culture of the company. 
Ex-company chairman (Al) argues that this could be a dangerous situation, if the board has 
the decision whether to adopt and to supervise a company's corporate governance, as it is 
in a strong position, compared with the weak role of shareholders at the AGM, where a 
board discharges its responsibility to shareholders; the only way to encourage a board to 
accept corporate governance is to make it aware of the benefits of corporate governance. 
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Interestingly, company non-executive director (C2) raised the question of whether 
corporate governance controlled the company or whether the company controls corporate 
governance. If the latter, companies may issue only nominal corporate governance codes 
and will not really implement them. The interviewee stresses that for good implementation 
of corporate governance there should be a strong belief within the culture of the company, 
of the importance of corporate governance originating from inside the company. However, 
a regulator interviewee (R2) states that: 
"For a good corporate governance implementation environment, the desire 
for corporate governance should originate from the companies' owners, not 
from directors, nor the regulator. Consequently, the owners should play their 
role to encourage and enforce companies in which they invest to adopt good 
corporate governance and ensure that companies, boards of directors, and 
executive directors are holding their responsibilities in an appropriate way. 
Unfortunately, such a role is missing in the domestic environment" 
The interviewees mentioned other factors that could affect the implementation of 
companies' corporate governance, such as the level of board members' knowledge and a 
company's size. They also point out that there is an increasing pressure on companies from 
the CMA and at AGMs to adopt corporate governance principles. There is a general belief 
that the CMA at some stage will force companies to adopt a corporate governance code. 
Shareholders also seek to play a significant role in AGMs, especially during the current 
period, since in a limited number of cases they have refused to discharge their boards' 
responsibilities and it has been considered as a turning point in shareholders' behaviour. 
Some hold the view that implementing corporate governance is a matter of time for Saudi 
companies. A financial consultant (FC3) claims that most companies are heading towards 
carrying out corporate governance principles and that some of them have already received 
help from consultants and expert offices. 
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However, although the interviewees from the unlisted companies (C6 and C7) appeared to 
have respect for corporate governance principles and showed an awareness of its 
importance, they thought it would be more suitable and necessary for listed companies 
where the ownership is distributed and there is the possibility of conflicts of interest. 
Thus, these results show that, although some Saudi companies have started seriously to deal 
with corporate governance, the interviewees generally think that Saudi companies are not 
discharging their accountability by practicing good corporate governance. 
5.3.1 Corporate Governance Improvements 
Although corporate governance practices are new within Saudi companies, some of the 
interviewees have noticed changes recently in companies' practices. The following are the 
most important improvements mentioned by the interviewees in companies. 
According to the interviews the majority of companies have started to implement corporate 
governance principles and to deal with corporate governance as an internal commitment. 
This can be seen in the companies' published annual reports, and those other companies 
which have not yet started are in the process of removing the obstacles which impede their 
compliance with corporate governance principles, since there is no longer any choice for 
companies other than to adopt corporate governance to meet the CMA requirements and 
satisfy their stakeholders. 
Moreover, the interviewees indicated that some companies have established an internal 
corporate governance code as required by the CMA, but the majority of companies are still 
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in the process of establishing their codes. The interviewees also mentioned improvements 
relating to companies' boards. For example, board members are now much more concerned 
about corporate governance issues and support corporate governance. Further, the number 
of executive directors on boards has been reduced, while there has been an increase of 
independent NEDs. Indeed, there has been a remarkable phenomenon in board members' 
resignations, which are explained by some of the interviewees as a corrective action as a 
consequence of corporate governance. In addition to that, there are now definitions of board 
members and managers' authorities and responsibilities. The most significant 
improvements in companies' corporate governance practices has been companies' 
disclosure and transparency. Companies are now paying more attention to promoting 
disclosure and transparency practices, with more specific disclosure policies. Furthermore, 
the annual reports are more in-depth and more detailed, as companies begin to disclose 
more information about the company, regulations, board members, ownership in other 
companies, independent NEDs, in addition to disclosing what has been implemented in 
relation to corporate governance. Thus, accountability in this area appears to be improving. 
5.3.2 Board Members 
This section focuses on the interviewees' perceptions on the current practices of appointing 
board members in Saudi companies. The interviewees identified three factors that they 
considered played significant roles in influencing the process of selection of board 
members in Saudi companies: ownership; personal relationships; and favouritism. 
There was wide spread agreement among the interviewees that ownership was the most 
important factor influencing board selection, since it is very common in Saudi companies 
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that ownership of a certain proportion of shares entitles someone to sit on the board, or to 
have a representative on it. However, the interviewees also stated that the selection of board 
members at AGMs was no more than a nominal legal procedure, since the majority of 
shareholders had already agreed on the choice of board members. Thus, alliances of 
shareholders as a matter of fact have the power to select board members, regardless of the 
extent of the posed board members' personal qualifications or suitability to hold these 
positions. The interviewees explained that the method of voting which is now in use gives 
majority shareholders the opportunity to dominate the board, and some shareholders go so 
far as to establish coalitions which enable them to extend this control by participating with 
like-minded owners to ensure that they select whom they want and to block the candidature 
of strangers by interchanging their votes. One interviewee, is an owner board chairman 
(RI) stated: 
"Ownership is regarded as the key factor in selected board members. As a 
result, many companies have their boards dominated by major shareholders 
or their representatives, regardless of their qualifications, abilities and 
capabilities. What's more, it is difficult for any supervisory or monitoring 
body to rule that any member is ineligible. " 
Some interviewees think that companies benefit from the existence of these major owners 
on the board as they have the experience; one of them (F2) was of the opinion that: 
"In many cases owner board members have huge experience and are well 
qualified, especially in large companies. Some of them are people who 
established a private company and then turned it into a public company, and 
have wide awareness of all issues relating to the company and its industry. 
Such members are beneficial for the company. " 
However, the interviewees emphasised another crucial impact on the process of nomination 
and appointment of board members that of the influence of relationships and favouritism. 
They agreed that such practices are widespread in the Saudi business environment, because 
of the strong family-ties and social relationships that characterise wider society, in addition 
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to the dominance of a favouritism culture. One of the interviewees (AC2) expressed this 
position thus: 
"The nature of thought in Saudi society is dominated by a culture of 
favouritism and tribalism, which affect the methods of selection of board 
members in companies. The owners play a significant role by appointing 
board members from among their relatives and friends. However, for some 
of these people, there is no reasonable justification for joining the board. 
Worse than this, when they are appointed to board subcommittees which are 
responsible for monitoring the company, this is a real risk for the company. " 
Some interviewees mentioned that board membership is regarded as a measure of prestige 
for some directors and so is very important for them. One interviewee (C4) raised another 
problem related to favouritism, which is that some board members cannot be dismissed, but 
maintain their positions for life. The important question of nepotism was also mentioned by 
one participant: 
"An owner will often have many businesses and not enough time to give to 
each company, so when he wants to have a representative on the board, he 
will simply appoint his brother or son as a director. " 
However, the interviewees distinguished between three types of company in Saudi Arabia 
in respect of their ownership structure which impact the methods of selection of board 
members in these companies. In companies where a majority of shares are held by the 
government, selection decisions are made by the government and so depend upon the 
government's viewpoint and plans, which might, for instance, be in favour of developing 
the community, reducing unemployment or supporting the company. Such decisions 
usually rely on relationships and favouritism. In companies whose ownerships are entirely 
within, or dominated by, one family, selection depends upon family relationships; 
consequently, it is often the case that one board will contain five or six brothers, or a father 
and his sons. One of the interviewees went so far as to state that in one sector there is a 
particular family which has at least one member on the board of every company in the 
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sector. Finally, in companies with distributed ownership, the selection of directors depends 
on coalitions of shareholders. Such boards are usually inefficient and lack expert members. 
They are also likely to take a short-term view of investment because of the frequent 
changes in board membership, which leads to the companies concerned suffering many 
difficulties. 
The interviews indicated that the methods and standards of appointing executive directors 
and managers are not different from other directors, but they stated that these methods 
differ from one company to another, depending on factors such as the composition of the 
board of directors and the company's size. The board of director level of experience and 
qualification plays a significant role in the appointment of executive directors, with specific 
characteristics coordinated with their positions. Some interviewees also observed that the 
size of the company is an important factor, since larger and more successful companies 
tend to appoint more professional and better qualified executive directors. However, one of 
the interviewees (FC2) argued that: 
"In some companies the appointment of executives is reliant on ability and 
qualifications, whereas in others it relies on relationships. The problem is 
that in some companies the executives are more qualified and more 
committed than the other board members. " 
Many interviewees indicated that although some board members have useful experience 
and a high level of qualifications, there are others who do not deserve to be in their 
positions, but are there because of their wealth or relationships, as noted above. Companies 
often appear not to consider it important to appoint independent, qualified and expert 
directors. A former director of a number of companies (C4) criticised the poor 
qualifications of many directors: 
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"The boards lack integration and variety. They should contain a group of 
experts and specialists in different fields related to the company's business. 
Unfortunately, there are some board members in many companies who lack 
efficiency and qualifications. Consequently, they are unable to read the 
financial statements. In addition, minority shareholders are not represented 
on the board, so even if someone is an expert and qualified, he cannot join 
the board without support from the majority shareholders. However, it is 
worth mentioning that it is difficult for companies to find appropriate 
experts and qualified people in the specific areas that they need to add value 
to their boards. " 
The interview results clearly indicate that the process of selection of board members in 
Saudi companies still falls far short of modem corporate governance requirements, since 
the selection decisions are effectively taken by the majority shareholders in companies 
having all types of ownership structure. The selection methods depend on the wishes of the 
majority of shareholders and on their judgment of the extent of a candidate's 
appropriateness or otherwise, since there is a lack of requirements which a company should 
observe in the nomination and appointment of board members. 
Even in those companies which have a corporate governance code, the practices in this area 
do not appear to follow modern standards. It is notable that this applies in the case 
mentioned by an interviewee of a company with defined nomination standards which are 
put into practice. 
This is evidenced by my personal attendance at a general meeting of this company, which 
was held in order to form a new board of directors. All successful candidates received at 
least 97% of votes, in line with the expectations of the nominators, who were very 
confident and did not appear in any way concerned about the results. Furthermore, for their 
part, the minority shareholders also appeared unconcerned about the election, because they 
knew that they would be unable to make any changes. Thus, instead of discussing the 
nominations, they asked whether there was to be any new profit distribution; surprisingly, 
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the board of directors announced that the company had decided to distribute profits 
resulting from capital sales. The shareholders then enjoyed a lovely meal in a five-star 
hotel. This is an example of how board members are appointed in Saudi companies. 
When asked about the proportion of executives in Saudi boardrooms, the interviewees 
stated that companies' boards usually do not contain executive directors, other than the 
CEO, as boards are commonly composed of NEDs. This result indicates that Saudi 
companies' adhere with Saudi corporate governance which recommends that the majority 
of directors on the board should be NEDs. 
Having discussed the current practice of the selection of board members in Saudi 
companies, the interviewees were asked to give their opinions about the requirements that 
board members should have, and for their suggestions to improve the process of the 
selection board members. The interviewees suggested the following requirements that 
should be considered by Saudi companies when appointing board members: 
" Having experience in the company's field; 
" Being a specialist or having a background in economics, management, finance or 
auditing; 
" Being qualified; 
" Contributing to the variety of board members; 
" Having a good reputation; 
" Having enough time to give to the company. 
The interviewees distinguished between large and small companies, considering the former 
to be much more concerned about appointing appropriate members than the latter. This 
may be related to the desire of larger companies to succeed, in addition to their ability to 
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pay for such members, whereas it would be more difficult for smaller companies to pay 
directors large fees. 
In relation to their suggestions to improve the process of selecting board members, the 
interviewees made some recommendations in response to this question. Some contributors 
stressed that the supervisory and regulatory bodies should play a much stronger role in 
setting defined standards for board nomination and enforce compliance with these 
standards. They should encourage each company to appoint a nomination committee that 
should play an active role in monitoring their companies' compliance. A NED of several 
companies (C2) stated that accumulative voting4 had become a necessary counterweight to 
the domination of boards by majority shareholder coalitions. He added that companies 
should be obligated to adopt such methods to improve the selection of board members and 
to give the minority the opportunity to participate, which would provide a greater 
likelihood of independent members being appointed. 
Another issue raised by the interviewees in relation to improving selection methods was 
that of compensation for board members. Some of the interviewees argued that directors' 
compensation was considered inappropriate and that companies should increase it to suit 
the duties, responsibilities and the accountability of each position, in addition to 
4 The Saudi corporate governance code defines an accumulative voting system as a method of voting for 
electing directors, which gives each shareholder a voting rights equivalent to the number of shares he/she 
holds. He/she has the right to use them all for one nominee or to divide them between his/her selected 
nominees without any duplication of these votes. This method increases the chances of the minority 
shareholders to appoint their representatives in the board through the right to accumulate votes for one 
nominee (p. 4). The current voting system allows shareholders to use their share percentages to nominate a set 
of board members according to their share percentages. For example, shareholder A who owns 60% of the 
company is able to give all his vote to a separate set of nominated directors a, b, c, d and f, so that each one of 
these nominations has 60% of the votes. i. e. a 300% vote is used for directors instead of allocating the 60% to 
a, b, c, d and e, such as a- 10%, b= 20%, c= 5%, d=15% and e=10%. 
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encouraging the appointment of expert and qualified members to the board. It has been 
suggested by one of the interviewee (Al) that the small remuneration had discouraged 
young and successful managers from looking for positions on boards; therefore, the 
regulators should consider reversing this decision. 
Some of the interviewees drew attention to what, in their opinion, would be an important 
method to improve the performance of board members, by training them. To this end, the 
interviewees suggested establishing a body equivalent to the Institute of Directors in the 
UK and other countries, to shoulder the responsibility of training board members, regularly 
providing them with updated knowledge of corporate governance best practices around the 
world, and assisting them to deal with and adopt these practices. Another issue raised was 
the need for defined procedures to evaluate board members, which was considered a very 
important criterion to ensure an improvement in the performance of boards. One of the 
interviewees stressed the importance of such evaluation and hinted at the difficulties faced 
in this area: 
"The evaluation of board members is a silent issue in our local environment. 
I have heard some board members boasting that no one would dare to 
evaluate them, since they are government ministers and billionaires. " 
5.3.3 Independent Non-Executive Directors 
In relation to the importance and appearance of independent NEDs on company boards, the 
interviewees indicated that this was a critical point and there were many obstacles facing 
companies in adopting one of the most important aspects of corporate governance 
principles, which is the existence of independent NEDs. 
A regulator interviewee (R2) gave this account of their importance: 
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"According to best practices, independent NEDs perform free from 
pressures exerted by owners and executive management. In addition, their 
role is to represent the minority shareholders. For instance, an independent 
NED has complete independence when he/she participates in an audit 
committee to audit and review the executive management's performance. 
Furthermore, the independent NEDs create a balance on the board, besides 
contributing new ideas to the board from an independent perspective. " 
There was general agreement among the interviewees on the importance of independent 
NEDs and their crucial role on the board. One interviewee (C3) stated that the importance 
of an independent NED is felt particularly in cases of making important decisions which 
serve the majority of shareholders. Here, the appearance of independent NEDs is 
considered to ensure that such decisions are taken in consideration of the interests of the 
minority shareholders and that the majority do not use the board to fulfil their personal or 
sectional interests. 
The interviewees agreed that there were independent NEDs in some companies, but some 
expressed doubts about the extent of their real independence in Saudi companies. They 
questioned the appointment of these allegedly independent NEDs to the boards, since 
minority shareholders do not have any power to influence the voting process. It was felt 
that the appointment of independent NEDs in Saudi companies was in fact made by the 
majority shareholders according to their relationships and favouritism. One of the 
interviewees (AC2) expressed a commonly held view: 
"The idea of an independent NED is important, but when a company states 
that this or that member is independent without any mention of his/her CV 
and experience and why he/she is considered independent, this is not 
enough, nor is the judgment of the company itself on the question of 
independence good enough on its own. Unfortunately, the culture of 
favouritism and relationship is the major factor in the appointment of 
independent NEDs, and the company should provide an explanation that the 
independent NEDs do not have any relationship or interests with the 
company, its board members and its directors. " 
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Other issues were also raised in relation to the independent NEDs. Some interviewees 
argued that the legal requirements of independent NEDs were weak and should be more 
specific to ensure their real independence in practice and to guarantee the benefits of the 
existence of a truly independent NED. One of the interviewees (FM1) conceded that it was 
difficult for companies to find independent and qualified directors; in general, if directors 
are qualified, they are likely to work for competitors or to have an interest in the company, 
since the country as a whole has a shortage of experts and qualified directors. The same 
interviewee suggested that companies should therefore use foreign experts. 
However, some interviewees argued that companies were unaware of the purpose and value 
of independent NEDs, and believed that their presence would affect their domination of the 
board; in respect to this point, a company chairman (R1) stated that: 
"The independent NED in Saudi companies is a complimentary member as a 
result of the culture of favouritism which affects companies; therefore, I 
have doubts about the possibility of implementing the principles of the 
independent NED practically and effectively in Saudi companies, which will 
appoint independent NEDs according to relationships. " 
5.3.4 Board Duties 
Regarding the subject of directors' authority and responsibility, there was an obvious 
division in the viewpoints expressed, since some of the interviewees argued that these 
conditions are defined in the companies' regulations and in their practices. However, the 
majority of interviewees claimed that companies were suffering from a failure to clearly 
define the authority and responsibilities of the board and its committees. 
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The interviewees mentioned some matters related to the authority and responsibilities of 
directors in the Saudi business environment. One of them (C3) noted that although these 
conditions are defined in the regulations, board members needed time to understand them 
and put them into practice, since they had no experience of them. Another issue raised by 
an interviewee (Al) was that the balance of power within a board could affect the definition 
of duties, authority and responsibilities, since some members had positions of wealth or 
power which made it difficult for others to oppose their opinions. Indeed, (FC2) claimed 
that: 
"Half of board members are not aware of their authorities and 
responsibilities. They also lack the ability, suitable qualifications and 
enough background to even read a balance sheet. " 
Although some interviewees claimed that some boards do indeed discharge their 
responsibilities and duties perfectly, especially those of large and successful companies, 
there was also wide agreement among the interviewees that many boards are far from doing 
so. Some interviewees stated that boards of directors tend to be dominated by company 
chairmen, who usually own the majority of shares and have the right to exercise control 
over the other directors, whose role is limited to endorsing the chairman's decisions. As a 
result, according to one interviewee (A2): 
"Many boards of directors are not practicing their roles in planning, 
directing, controlling and analysing. Board membership is honorary and 
there are many directors who attend the board meetings without bothering to 
read the agenda. " 
A company chairman and member of a number of boards of directors (R1) claimed that 
some board members do not give enough time and effort to the board's duties: 
"The majority of directors of Saudi companies, especially the government 
representatives, just read the meeting agenda on their way to the board 
meeting. " 
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Thus, the interviews indicate that the extent to which the board of directors fulfils its 
responsibilities in Saudi companies depends on certain factors, the most important of which 
are the chairman, and the size of the company. Also, the existence of the CMA was 
mentioned too, since there has been increasing concern among boards to discharge their 
responsibilities since the appearance of the CMA as an active supervisory body. 
In relation to the question whether boards of directors monitor the performance of a 
company's executive managers, two different viewpoints were expressed by the 
interviewees. A small group argued that boards accomplish their role of monitoring and 
evaluating the performance of executive managers and ensure they follow the relevant 
plans and targets. They considered this as one of the main roles that any board should aim 
to fulfil. However, the majority of the interviewees argued that boards of directors were not 
fulfilling their responsibilities in regard to monitoring executive managers because board 
members did not have enough time, enough information or the ability to exercise control 
over executive management's performance and actions, as a result of being busy and 
having other engagements. A former chairman (Al) expressed it thus: 
"This is a very important issue which I personally faced in many places. 
Ability is not an issue of legal authority, but it is a practical issue, since the 
fact is that the board lacks efficient resources of ability, understanding and 
information which would enable it to monitor the executives. " 
Another interviewee (FC2) declared: 
"The role of the board of directors in monitoring the executive management 
is weak, because board members are engaged with other businesses, and 
they delegate the company's work to the executive management. But this 
delegation does not include any monitoring procedures, nor balancing 
between authority and responsibilities. " 
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With regard to obtaining information, there was a general agreement among the 
interviewees that the board of directors has the right to obtain the information it needs, on a 
timely based, to assist the board to monitor the company and that this right is legally 
protected. However, the interviewees stressed that there were problems in obtaining such 
information and some board members had no desire to seek further information, but were 
content with whatever reports were provided by the executive management. As a result, 
they spend little time or effort in exploring, studying and discussing issues, due to their 
other commitments. In addition, the engagements of executive management may 
sometimes prevent or delay the provision of adequate information to board members. A 
further reason might be the executive management's discontent with board members' 
requests, or simply that there is a long period of time between meetings, so that directors 
may forget previous concerns. 
Board members have the legal right to obtain adequate and timely information as a tool to 
assist them in discharging their functions; however, the exercise of this right varies among 
companies and their board members. While there are some directors who in reality practice 
their rights professionally to obtain and use information to fulfil their duties, there are 
others who fail to do so, for their own reasons or those of executive management. Either, or 
both, of these parties may have limited time because of other engagements or simply be 
uninterested in asking for, or providing, such information. 
With reference to board meetings, the company interviewees were asked about their own 
companies' board of directors meetings. The majority of company interviewees stated that 
their boards convened six times per year, while a company consultant, surprisingly, claimed 
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that the board of his company convened thirteen times annually, and that the board had 
convened thirty three5 times one year. 
Thus, according to the interviews, boards of directors in Saudi companies are not seen as 
discharging their accountability relationships by fulfilling their responsibilities and roles 
possibly because of their lack of abilities, experience, qualifications and time, or due tothe 
fact that they are unable to obtain the needed information to assist them to make their 
decisions, even though they have this right. 
5.3.5 Board of Directors Sub-Committees 
The interviewees emphasised the fundamental role that subcommittees can play if they 
fulfil the functions for which they have been established. In respect of their assessment of 
the role of these subcommittees within Saudi companies, the interviewees generally 
indicated that they were dissatisfied with their performance and raised a number of issues. 
One of the interviewees (AC2) opined that companies should give more attention to 
developing such committees since they are the most important monitoring tools, assisting 
the board of directors and shareholders to control the company. The interviewees were 
asked which board subcommittees existed in Saudi companies and they stated that the most 
common subcommittee was the audit committee, followed by the executive committee, and 
then the nomination and remuneration committees; very few companies have corporate 
governance, investment, social responsibility, or Sharia committees. Indeed, the Saudi 
s The interviewee mentioned that the board of directors convened this huge number of meetings because the 
company was recently privatized and the board of directors found it very difficult to deal with the significant 
changes in the company. 
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corporate governance code recommends that companies set up audit, nomination and 
remuneration committees. 
Interviewees mentioned that the method of selection of subcommittee members is not very 
different from those used in selecting the members of the board itself; ownership, personal 
relationships and favouritism again exert a strong influence on the process. An auditing 
committee member (R3) claimed that: 
"The companies begin to appoint specialists to the board's subcommittees, 
for instance, specialists in accounting and finance to the audit committee, 
not because they are satisfied with their role, but as a way to discharge the 
regulation requirements, since the companies are unwilling to reveal their 
secrets to outsiders. " 
Furthermore, some interviewees mentioned that some subcommittee members were 
executive directors, which they considered likely to diminish the expected role of these 
committees. In addition, no justification is given by companies when appointing 
committees members; even when they state that a member is a specialist, they do not 
provide any details. 
However, other interviewees, especially those representing companies, disagreed with the 
above and indicated that there are in fact different levels of board subcommittees in Saudi 
companies. They stated that their companies were careful to appoint experts and specialists 
onto board subcommittees and that the majority of their board subcommittees were 
comprised of NEDs. 
Regarding the number of subcommittee meetings convened each year in Saudi companies, 
the interview data shows that there is no particular pattern of committee meetings, but that 
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the situation varies from one committee to another and from company to company. Also it 
appears that committee meetings are related to board meetings, since in Saudi companies 
the two usually occur at the same time. Thus, when the companies were asked about 
numbers of meetings held by their board subcommittees, their answers varied, since 
committees in some companies were said to meet monthly and others every six months. 
However, if the responses of the interviewees represent the average position, it can be taken 
that the majority of Saudi companies convene between two and seven meetings yearly for 
each board subcommittee. 
Some of the company interviewees stated that subcommittee authority and responsibilities 
were clearly defined and that members were aware of these and practised them according to 
the internal company codes and regulations. In particular, it appears that the definition of 
the authority and responsibilities of subcommittees are defined in such a way as to avoid 
any conflict with either the board or the executive management. On the other hand, some of 
the interviewees claimed that the extent of the committees' authority and responsibilities 
depends on the whim of the board of directors, since the board itself delegates decision- 
making to the committees. While committees will normally defer to the board, such 
practices will differ from one company to another, depending on its board. Another 
viewpoint expressed by the interviewees was that, excluding some cases where the 
authorities and responsibilities of subcommittees are defined under initiatives by the 
companies themselves, which may go beyond the requirements of the regulations, in the 
majority of companies, the committees' authority and responsibilities are undefined. 
143 
However, the interviews show that Saudi companies are not discharging their 
accountability in terms of setting up efficient board sub-committees to fulfil their essential 
roles of monitoring management. The interviews indicated that many of the problems and 
obstacles facing the practices of the different committees in the Saudi business 
environment; the following are the most important, which prevent board subcommittees 
from fulfilling their roles: 
" The weakness of the regulations in relation to defining the committees' 
composition, roles, authority and responsibilities; 
" The lack of monitoring systems providing control over these committees by the 
supervisory bodies, in addition to the lack of punishment procedures for offending 
committees; 
" The unequal time and effort that the members of these committees dedicate to their 
duties; 
" The lack of a majority of experts and specialists in the relevant fields on 
committees; 
" The fact that the majority of committee members are not independent; and 
" The lack of awareness among some board members of the importance of the 
subcommittees. 
5.3.6 Disclosure and Transparency 
This section presents the interviewees' responses to questions about their evaluation of the 
level of disclosure and transparency practices within Saudi companies and the most 
important developments and obstacles in this field. In addition it explores their attitudes 
concerning the extent of the required standards of adequacy for disclosure and transparency 
and the extent of companies' obligations under these requirements. 
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Although some interviewees mentioned remarkable improvements in companies' 
disclosure and transparency practices recently, there was unanimous agreement amongst 
them that the level of disclosure and transparency among Saudi companies remained 
inadequate and that they were dissatisfied with current practices. The interviewees pointed 
to particular issues related to disclosure and transparency in Saudi companies, the following 
being typical observations: 
" There is a lack of continuous disclosure of company information and news. 
" There is an obvious weakness in companies' transparency, since board members 
are the only parties who have the right to be informed about the company's 
important information due to their position. 
" Some companies do not have a clear understanding of disclosure and 
transparency, since there are some which release very important news in the 
newspapers before it appears in the official exchange stock market website 
"Tadawal", which indicates their ignorance of the importance of the timing of 
information. 
" There has been no improvement in the quality of disclosure, only a change in 
the ways of presenting information. 
" There is a remarkable divergence in disclosure and transparency practices 
among companies: while some practice what is considered to be good disclosure 
and are reasonably transparent, there are others with poor policies in this regard. 
In many cases, companies of both types are in the same market and sometimes 
in same sector as well; thus they are subject to identical regulations, which 
indicates the weakness of monitoring and punishment procedures by the 
supervisory and monitoring bodies. 
" The weakest areas of disclosure and transparency in Saudi companies concern 
future predictions and their prospective projects and strategy plans. There is also 
a need for financial reports to be more detailed, especially in relation to 
operational profits and sectoral sources. 
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However, there were two different viewpoints among the interviewees about the adequacy 
of the supervisory bodies in relation to disclosure and transparency. Some claimed that the 
regulations were adequate, especially the regulations issued by the CMA, while others 
argued that the existing requirements were inadequate, falling far short of those of 
developed markets. 
However, if there was some disagreement among the interviewees over the adequacy of the 
disclosure and transparency regulations, there was virtual unanimity concerning the 
weakness of companies' compliance and application, as well as the deficiency in the 
monitoring of this compliance and the failure to enforce penalties. The interviews showed 
that many companies are still far from adopting acceptable disclosure and transparency 
requirements. Some interviewees pointed out that, although the companies' adherence to 
disclosure and transparency requirements were inadequate in general, there were some 
cases of remarkable improvements in compliance. In addition, the role of the CMA was 
making a positive impact in improving the disclosure and transparency within companies. 
For his part, a regulator from the CMA expressed this view: 
"I hope that we will have unofficial bodies to assess companies' 
performance and compliance with disclosure and transparency. 
Unfortunately, these do not exist at present, so the CMA has shouldered the 
burden. There is a continuous disclosure committee, which reviews 
company reports and studies the forms filled in by companies to make sure 
that they are correct. In cases of noncompliant companies there are legal 
penalties. " 
Overall, according to the interviews, Saudi companies generally are not discharging their 
accountability in relation to disclosure and transparency as the interviewees were 
dissatisfied with the level of disclosure and transparency made by these companies and that 
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the regulatory and monitoring bodies should make much more effort to ensure that 
companies comply with the disclosure and transparency requirements. 
5.3.7 Stakeholders and Shareholders 
This section presents the results from asking the interviewees about the identity of the 
companies' stakeholders and their representatives on boards, in addition to their role in, and 
influence on, companies. The interviewees were questioned about how companies protect 
stakeholders' rights and to what extent stakeholders are satisfied with their current position. 
All the interviewees were asked to state who they regarded as company stakeholders. Many 
of them gave a general answer that everybody dealing with a company were stakeholders 
and a company should deal with them professionally and not infringe their rights. The 
interviewees did not define particular parties as company stakeholders, but included all 
those who dealt with the company at any level. However, half of the interviewees (11 of 
22), specified some particular parties whom they regarded as stakeholders. The groups 
most widely identified as comprising stakeholders were company shareholders and society, 
both of whom were identified by 9 of the 11 responding interviewees. A second group, 
whose members were mentioned by between 4 and 7 of the interviewees, comprised the 
government, employees, creditors, customers and suppliers. The final group of stakeholders 
consisted of the environment and competitors, each of which were mentioned by only a few 
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interviewees. These results were quite surprisingb, especially, that of considering society as 
a significant stakeholder. In respect to this, interviewee RI stated: 
"Society is very important, therefore the company has a significant social 
role to play, such as paying charity or employing members of society. Its 
social responsibility is a crucial principle for the company. We are 
concerned to build on the human values in society and we have taken some 
initiatives and made donations to educate and train members of society. " 
Other interviewees agreed with this and stated that companies' concern with society had 
developed in recent years, as a result of which some companies had begun to take seriously 
their social responsibility and to participate in social development projects. 
The interviewees unanimously agreed that, excluding shareholders, stakeholders did not 
usually have representatives on companies' boards. They claimed that it was uncommon in 
Saudi companies to appoint representatives of stakeholders. 
The interviewees stated that the most important stakeholders that companies considered 
when making decisions were their own employees and the government. They pointed out 
that some stakeholders have the power to protect their interests even though they do not 
have board representatives. For example, although the government does not have 
representatives on companies' boards, the government supervisory and monitoring bodies 
have the ability to ensure that companies adhere to national regulations and systems. 
Another example was suppliers who also have a significant influence over any company 
and who can protect their interests. 
6 Arguably although the Islamic teachings give a significant attention to society (Ummah) the current 
practices within Islamic societies are far away from following these teachings. 
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However, some interviewees expressed their concerns about the extent of companies' real 
concern for stakeholders' interests, especially those of stakeholders who are unable to 
protect their interests and to ensure that company decisions do not threaten their interests. 
These stakeholders including society as a whole, employees, customers and the 
environment, who do not have representatives on companies' boards to look after their 
interests. The interviewees saw these stakeholders' roles and their influence over 
companies' activities as weak, as a consequence of the weakness of society's awareness of 
the role of stakeholders, in addition to the weakness of the regulations which explain and 
define the importance and the role of stakeholders. 
The fifteen interviewees who were not from companies were dissatisfied about 
stakeholders' rights in Saudi companies. In contrast with the company interviewees, these 
stakeholders indicated an awareness of their rights and a real concern to see them upheld. 
They expressed their dissatisfaction with a number of issues; for example, not having 
representatives on companies' boards, not enough information about companies' current 
situations and future plans, the low level of disclosure and transparency and the 
deficiencies in regulations being upheld. This confirms that although stakeholders are 
aware of their rights, Saudi companies seem to limit their accountability relationships to 
companies shareholders as they do not give appropriate consideration to other stakeholders. 
5.3.8 Ownership Structure 
This section considers the responses of interviewees to questions about who owns Saudi 
companies. The results reveal that there are three types of ownership structure in listed 
Saudi companies: those with concentrated government ownership; those with concentrated 
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family ownership; and those with distributed ownership. The majority of Saudi companies 
have a high concentration of ownership either by the government or families; only a few 
have a distributed ownership. 
The interview data suggest that most large and successful companies in the Saudi market 
are largely owned by the government or families, which together own about 70% of 
companies' shares. Companies are often started and then listed and the family keeps 70% 
of the shares, after floating 30% in an IPO, so that they have an appropriate proportion to 
maintain control over their companies. Some of these companies are state-owned 
companies and have been privatised by the government; others are private family 
companies which have been transferred to partial public ownership. 
The interviewees indicated that this concentration of ownership was widespread in Saudi 
companies. The government has investments in companies which have recently been 
privatised, or newly established companies that provide public services. The interviewees 
stated that government investment existed to support and encourage these companies in 
such a way as to promote development projects in the country and to provide appropriate 
funding to empower these companies to cover new kinds of business for the local 
environment or to introduce services to the community. Consequently, the maximisation of 
wealth was not a main aim of government investment; rather it aimed to support the 
national economy. The Public Investment Fund (PIF), in the Ministry of Finance, is 
charged with managing government investment in these companies. An economic 
counsellor at PIF (II) did not wish to specify the amount of government investment in 
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listed companies, but he stated that it ranged between 10% and 70% of a company's capital 
share, adding that: 
"The system dictates that the government invests in profitable commercial 
projects; consequently, our investments are based on economic feasibility 
studies and the advice of expert investment bodies. Nevertheless, the Public 
Investment Fund has a development role and aims to realise the national 
economic interest. " 
The counsellor also sits on company boards as a representative of the government and as an 
investor, and stressed that there was an inequity in the rights of investors unde r this 
strategy, since it could not be represented in proportion to its holdings of companies shares; 
therefore, as a government investor, he was dissatisfied with the level of representation the 
PIF had. The government sometimes owned 10% of a company's shares but did not have 
representatives on the board, while in other cases it might own 70% of a company and yet 
have only one representative. The same interviewee claimed that the current voting system 
enabled coalitions of interests in companies to prevent the government from appointing its 
representatives, especially where it had a lower percentage holding. He suggested that there 
should be a reappraisal of the current system of voting and that investors should be 
empowered to appoint board representatives according to their share of ownership. He 
argued that adopting an accumulative voting system would promote their right to appoint 
representatives to company boards and protect them from internal coalitions. 
Some interviewees, however, praised the government's role as an investor and argued that 
the government played an important role in maintaining rights and protecting interests, as 
well as encouraging good corporate governance by using its power as a majority 
shareholder in companies. However, the interviewees identified some obstacles facing the 
government investor in shouldering these roles, as follows: 
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" The method of appointing government representatives were based on favouritism 
and relationships; 
" Most government representatives are state employees who do not have the 
appropriate knowledge and experience in companies' areas of business; 
" The nature of work in a company environment is different from that in the 
government sector; 
" Government representatives give inadequate time and effort to their board 
assignments and are often silent parties at board meetings; 
" The coalitions on boards play a significant role in isolating the government 
representatives and limiting their influence; 
" There is a lot of repetition in the names of government investor representatives on 
company boards. 
The second type of concentrated ownership structure is that of family-owned companies, 
which the interviewees also stated was widespread in the Saudi economy, where business 
has traditionally been based on family units. Thus, family ownership sometimes reaches 
70% of a company's capital. The interviewees indicate that there are sometimes coalitions 
between groups of families to concentrate the ownership of some companies and that there 
are agreements among them about who will direct the companies and about their corporate 
strategies. Some interviewees revealed that, in reality, there is a group of families among 
whom company ownership is strongly concentrated. A former board member of such a 
company (C4) stated that: 
"The ownership of Saudi companies is highly concentrated in a group of 
families. There are a few names which are repeated again and again. The 
founders of company A are the same in B and in C, which is a very 
dangerous situation. " 
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Companies with such a concentration of family ownership are affected directly by this 
ownership structure, since the families keep a sufficiently high proportion of ownership to 
enable them to dominate and control the companies. They usually appoint themselves or 
their representatives to the boards; their voting power and the current voting system allow 
them to influence the nomination process, so that they have the authority to influence the 
appointment of other board members. The interviewees also stated that, in these companies, 
the owner families have the right to appoint and fire the executive directors. In regard to 
this, an interviewee (FC2) made the following claim: 
"The families affect the appointment of executives. From their side, the 
executives devote themselves to serving these large owners, not only against 
the minority of shareholders but also the other board members, because it is 
common in Saudi companies that families can appoint and fire the 
executives. " 
Having the right to structure companies' boards and appoint executive directors indicates 
the significant role that families are playing in companies, affecting their activities, plans, 
policies and decisions. Indeed, some interviewees expressed their concerns about the risks 
that the concentration of family ownership could cause, suggesting that certain families 
currently dominated some of the most important market sectors due to their concentrated 
ownerships. Two examples given of such domination were the banking and cement sectors; 
the concerns expressed at this situation were about the risk of monopoly and the conflict of 
interests which could threaten the rights of some parties, such as minority shareholders, 
competitors and customers. 
Another risk which faced family-owned companies, according to the interviewees, was the 
transmission of ownership down the generations of one family, so that a company's 
strategy might change as its owners changed from generation to generation. In this context, 
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the chairman of a family-owned company (R1) was concerned about the situation of 
companies with concentrated family ownership: 
"There is always concern about the transition of the ownership in family- 
owned companies from the founder's generation to the next generation. The 
family members may be divergent and have differences in culture and 
interests, in addition to the weakness of relationships between the family 
members, which would have an impact on the companies". 
While the interview evidence indicates that there are some companies with a distributed 
ownership, these are a small percentage compared to those with concentrated ownership 
structures. In the majority of distributed ownership companies, moreover, the ownership 
structure changes rapidly, as a significant proportion of owners are investors with short- 
term strategies who switch from one company to another according to changes in the share 
price. Some interviewees stated that companies with widely distributed ownership 
structures often suffered poor management and instability in their performance. One 
interviewee gave an example of one such company where a few investors held the majority 
of the shares and controlled the board; later, another group of investors obtained a majority 
holding and at the next general meeting tried to change the board of directors; this case 
indicated how bad the situation could be in distributed companies and that such a situation 
could lead to frequent changes in the membership of boards of directors. 
Thus, the majority of the interviewees argued that companies with a concentrated 
ownership structure, especially the family-owned ones, were more professional and made 
better progress. The opinion of one NED interviewee (C2) is typical: 
"In most companies with concentrated ownership, the fundamental owners 
are their spiritual fathers, whereas distributed ownership companies lack a 
spiritual father. As a result of that they are lost and unsuccessful. " 
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However, the interviews illustrate that with concentrated ownership structure that enables 
major shareholders to dominate the companies' board of directors, there is a real concern 
that Saudi companies are confining their accountability relationship to the major 
shareholders and do not consider minority of shareholder interests or any other 
stakeholders. 
5.3.9 Institutional Investors 
There are four categories of institutional investors in the Saudi market: the government, 
represented by the Public Investment Fund (PIF) ; the Public Pension Agency (PPA); the 
General Organisation for Social Insurance (GOSI); and fund managers. The first three are 
government bodies, whereas fund managers are commercial organisations. 
The Ministry of Finance is charged with managing government investments in the market 
through the PIF, and is regarded as the main shareholder in the Saudi market, as its 
investments reaches 70% in some large listed companies. According to the interviewees, 
PIF investment decisions are made by the government and these investments support its 
investee companies and provide their capital. The PIF has as many as four representatives 
on the boards of some companies, but none in other cases7. These representatives are 
selected by the government and are sometimes government employees or from PIF, while 
some are representatives who are not government employees. 
7 The PIF large share percentage in some companies allows them to appoint a large number of board members 
but in other companies where they own a low percentage of company shares collaboration between other 
major shareholders prevent them from appointing their representative on the board. 
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The PPA and GOSI are also government institutional investors, but, according to the 
interviewees, they are secondary to PIF as institutional investors, since the investments of 
each of them only reach 10% of the capital of some Saudi companies and although PPA 
and GOSI should play an important role in influencing companies and protecting their own 
interests, in practice they often have little impact, for reasons including the following: 
" The lack of experts and qualified people that PPA and GOSI appoint as 
representatives on the boards of companies, as a result of which they sometimes 
own 10% of a company but do not have any representatives on its board; 
" Favouritism and relationships influence the appointment of PPA and GOSI 
representatives; 
" The concentration of family ownership and the current voting system allow other 
coalitions of shareholders to dominate the boards of companies; 
" PPA and GOSI do not have the ability to influence the companies, because they 
8 lack the authority to make the decision to exit from them. 
The general manager of PPA and general director of the Financial Investment Department 
at GOSI (12 and 13) stated that they had investments in many Saudi listed companies, 
ranging between 5% and 10% of the companies' shares. Both interviewees indicated that 
their organisations adopt a long-term investment strategy and have the flexibility to invest 
in or exit from companies; these investment decisions are sometimes made by the Council 
of Ministers, which is a way that the government can support these companies by investing 
money in important sectors of society. The interviewees reported that they have 
representatives in almost 50% of the companies in which they invest and are able to 
The investment decisions are sometimes made by the Council of Ministers. 
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monitor what happens inside the companies through these representatives, who discuss any 
issue of concern to them. But they complained that coalitions on some boards made it very 
difficult to exert an influence over them, and argued that an accumulative voting system 
will allow them to participate much more and protect their own interests. 
The fourth institutional investor group is the fund management sector of Saudi commercial 
banks. The two fund managers interviewed drew attention to some important aspects of 
their role as institutional investors, stressing that they have long-term investment policies, 
although they also trade a small proportion of their capital in short-term investments. Both 
of them argued that, according to the regulations, fund managers cannot invest in more than 
5% of a company's capital and no more than 10% of the fund's value can be in any one 
company. Consequently they sometimes hold 5% of a company's shares but the regulations 
prevent them from appointing representatives to the board. They argued that it might be 
because of their relation to the banks. 
However, a lot of interviewees criticised the fund managers and their role in participation 
and influence over companies, particularly their failure to encourage improvements in 
corporate governance. The claim often made was that the fund managers had the ability to 
use their large resources, their expert and qualified personnel and their flexibility and 
freedom in making investment decisions to play a significant role as powerful institutions 
in improving the implementation by companies of good corporate governance but many of 
the interviewees accused fund managers of failing to make enough effort to become 
involved in companies' businesses, and preferred to focus on their own interests and used 
short-term investment strategies. 
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Generally, the interviewees were not satisfied with the role of government or private 
institutional investors in Saudi companies. Although collectively they own a large 
proportion of many companies, the institutional investors do not have adequate 
representation on the company boards, and even they use favouritism and relationships for 
appointing their institutional investor representatives, leading to a weakening of the role of 
these representatives. Other complaints included their representatives' lack of expertise and 
qualifications, as well as the role of coalitions in company boards. Some interviewees 
argued that institutional investors do not attempt to put pressure on companies to improve 
their implementation of good corporate governance practice, and that, despite being long- 
term investors, they do not seem to have any strategic plans about the companies they 
invest in. Some institutional investors appear to invest in companies when they are being 
formed and then trade t hese shares. The decision to enter or exit from companies is 
complicated by the fact that it is often more than an investment decision, given that the 
majority of institutional investors are government bodies. 
5.3.10 Shareholders' Rights 
There was almost unanimous agreement among the interviewees that the legal requirements 
in respect of the protection of stakeholders' rights are adequate and for shareholders they 
include all the main rights to enable them to look after their interests in the companies. 
However, the practice of these rights was a problem. In relation to the companies, the 
interviewees argued that there is inside trading in some companies, which breaks the rules 
designed to protect shareholders; there is also a low level of disclosure and transparency on 
the part of the companies, which leads to an unfair situation, since owner-managers have 
the ability to obtain company information, whereas other shareholders are denied 
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information about the companies they invest in. This also contravenes the regulations that 
require companies to treat all shareholders equitably. The interviewees also claimed that 
any delay by companies in adopting the accumulative voting system will make the situation 
worse in relation to the protection of shareholders' rights and will allow the vested interests 
on companies' boards to dominate the other members. In this context, a member of three 
company boards (C2) complained that: 
"The shareholders' rights are equal in all matters, except voting, which 
disallows them from forming coalitions to appoint their representatives to 
the boards. " 
On the other hand, the interviewees saw the shareholders as partly responsible for the 
weakness of implementation of their rights and for not ensuring that the relevant 
regulations were applied in Saudi companies. One of the most common criticisms that the 
interviewees addressed was that the majority of shareholders, especially private 
shareholders, were unaware of their rights and responsibilities. Another criticism of 
shareholders was that very few attended the companies' AGMs, while those that did often 
did not play a useful role. 
However, some interviewees considered the reasons why shareholders might be unable to 
attend the AGMs and participate effectively. For example, sometimes the small percentage 
of shares that they owned would lead them to feel that it was not worth the burden of 
attending the AGM. In addition, the majority of shareholders in the Saudi market are short- 
term investors. Furthermore, the concentration of ownership in some companies is a major 
factor which makes it difficult for shareholders to have an opportunity to influence the 
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conduct of the AGM. However, some interviewees suggested that AGMs should take place 
in different regions at the same time using video conferencing technology9. 
These results indicate that, although the interviewees are satisfied with legal requirements 
regarding protection of shareholders' rights, they expressed their dissatisfaction with the 
current practice of Saudi companies which means that Saudi companies do not seem to 
practice their accountability relationships with their major shareholders or other 
stakeholders. The next section focuses on the legal system and regulation of corporate 
governance in Saudi Arabia. 
5.4 The Legal System and Regulation of Corporate Governance in SA 
The perceptions of stakeholders with regard to the legal system in Saudi Arabia are 
presented in the following section as well as stakeholders' opinions in relation to corporate 
governance regulatory and monitoring bodies and their evaluation of these bodies. 
5.4.1 The Legal System in Saudi Arabia 
The majority of the interviewees appeared dissatisfied with the legal system in Saudi 
Arabia. A number of issues raised by the interviewees related to the Saudi legal system in 
general and to the commercial legal system in particular. For example, one of the 
interviewees (AC 1) argued that: 
"There is an undoubted risk around commercial activities and business 
transactions. It's impossible to speak about an obvious, systematic and 
clearly defined legal environment where the rights, duties and obligations 
are determined. We are still far from this status. " 
9 The researcher did not see any woman attending the AGMs 
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Some interviewees stated that the legal system was weak. Some interviewees were 
concerned about the slow pace of legal procedures and delays in deciding cases; they 
claimed that some cases take a very long time or even remain unresolved. The inadequate 
number of judges in the courts was also considered by the interviewees to be an obstacle to 
the effectiveness of the Saudi legal system. They argued that the courts were suffering a 
shortage of judges, leading to a backlog of legal cases and lengthening the time taken for 
litigation, which in turn caused an unwelcome delay for the parties and damaged their 
interests. 
Furthermore, some respondents raised the problematic issue of the lack of adequately 
qualified specialists among the judiciary. They emphasised the need for well qualified 
experts in commercial law, who had an appropriate awareness, knowledge and experience 
of the business environment, as only such judges would be able to make the right decisions 
and provide an assurance of justice to the various parties concerned. Some of the 
interviewees also brought up the issue of the weakness of judicial training programmes, 
especially in relation to commercial matters, arguing that judges should have continuous 
programmes of training and qualification in order to prepare them for the changing 
environment and update their knowledge. 
Some interviewees even expressed concerns about indiscipline among judges, stating that 
there were some who were careless and uncommitted, in addition to their lack of 
appropriate qualifications, which had a direct impact on the legal processes and judicial 
decisions. 
The majority of interviewees (20 out of 22) declared themselves dissatisfied with the Saudi 
legal system and argued that there was a real desire to develop the legal system in general 
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and the commercial legal system in particular. They claimed that developments in the 
business environment and the rapid growth in companies, as well as the complexity of 
relationships and their ramifications, have raised many interrelated problems so that, in 
response, the commercial legal system should be developed in order to be able to deal with 
changes in the business environment. They also felt that the commercial courts should be 
detached and should specialise by examining only commercial matters, which would 
provide a specialist commercial court system with well trained, well qualified and expert 
judges, thus reducing the time spent in litigation. 
5.4.2 Corporate Governance Regulatory and Monitoring Bodies 
The interviewees regarded the CMA and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry as being 
responsible for regulating and monitoring corporate governance in Saudi companies. The 
interviewees considered the CMA as the main body charged with the introduction of 
corporate governance regulations. These interviewees pointed out that there had been little 
mention of corporate governance in the local environment before the establishment of the 
CMA, adding, that since its fundamental role is to regulate and develop the stock market, it 
should be the main body in charge of regulating and monitoring corporate governance for 
Saudi companies; indeed, the CMA has already assumed this role by issuing the first Saudi 
code of corporate governance in November 2006. 
Unsurprisingly, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry was identified by many 
respondents as an important regulator and monitor of corporate governance. Companies are 
obliged to follow its regulations, one of the main ones of which is the Companies Law that 
covers many aspects of corporate governance. 
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Other bodies mentioned by the interviewees were the Consultation Board, the Saudi 
Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) and the Saudi Organization of Chartered Public 
Accountants (SOCPA), which were considered by some interviewees as playing a role in 
regulating corporate governance. 
Some interviewees mentioned that a body such as SAMA had a significant role in 
regulating and monitoring corporate governance for the banking and insurance sectors. 
According to some interviewees, the monitoring role of SAMA has an obvious impact in 
improving the application of corporate governance standards in these sectors. However, it 
has been argued that other bodies and parties, such as SOCPA, academic researchers and 
financial analysts, should playa role in monitoring the corporate governance of commercial 
companies. 
However, the majority of respondents referred to discrepancies between the roles of the 
CMA and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. One interviewee (R3) argued that: 
"There is a discrepancy between the regulating bodies, since some of 
corporate governance regulations are combined between them, so it is 
unclear who should monitor and track the companies' compliance. In 
addition to that is the question of which form of punishment will be adopted, 
given that each of them has a different punishment system. " 
Some interviewees stressed that there should be more coordination between the CMA and 
the Ministry of Commerce and Industry in order to ensure that this discrepancy in their 
functions was minimised and to assist in developing their roles in regulating and 
monitoring companies' compliance with corporate governance standards. However, a CMA 
regulator countered this opinion with the following claim: 
"There is no discrepancy between the CMA and the Ministry of Commerce 
and Industry, although there might be more stringency on one side than the 
other as a result of some circumstances. " 
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The interviewees appeared generally dissatisfied with the regulatory and monitoring roles 
of the official bodies, with the exception of the CMA; all other bodies are completely 
failing to fulfil their responsibilities. It was clear that the CMA had won the respect of the 
majority of the interviewees, who regarded it as a professional body which has contributed 
to the improvement and development of the stock market in general. It was also seen as the 
only body concerned with developing and monitoring corporate governance issues among 
Saudi companies; its flexible authority and strengthened punishment procedures were 
perceived as having made its role particularly effective, despite its relatively recent 
establishment. In respect of this, a CMA regulator (R2) stated: 
"The CMA has passed some regulations in order to develop the stock market 
to the level of a trusted market and these have been adopted stringently, 
which has sent a new message to the business environment that the CMA is 
serious in relation to setting and adopting such regulations. Consequently, 
the issuing of the Corporate Governance Code by the CMA gave the code 
much strength, although some of its articles were already in the Companies 
Law. " 
Some interviewees expressed the view that other regulatory and monitoring bodies were far 
from having accomplished their roles, because of a lack of professionalism, which is a 
general characteristic of government bodies, in addition to the lack of qualified employees 
to do these jobs and many other tasks with which these bodies are charged. 
Nevertheless, while they showed their admiration of the CMA, some interviewees also 
made some criticisms of its performance, arguing that although the CMA is considered a 
professional body with a significant role and influence over companies, it also suffers a 
lack of adequately qualified specialists to fulfil its responsibilities. As a result, it has been 
suggested that the CMA, which has very considerable resources, should attract highly 
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qualified specialists as employees and should have more ambitious plans to train its staff, in 
addition to employing foreign experts when necessary. 
Thus, there remains much work to be done by the CMA; it should pay more attention to 
education and increase the general awareness of the importance of corporate governance, 
provide appropriate explanations and justifications of the regulations and the benefits to 
companies and their stakeholders of compliance. There was also a feeling that the CMA 
should support and encourage companies to implement good corporate governance 
principles by providing appropriate inducements, so that those companies with good 
corporate governance would be identified and rewarded. The CMA should also support 
companies in their internal corporate governance initiatives and assist them to develop their 
corporate governance codes. It should develop its own performance continually, especially 
in relation to its company monitoring function; required resources should be in place to 
ensure that it is able to fulfil this role; and its internal controls also should be developed to 
prevent companies from gaining unauthorised access to information from inside the CMA. 
The interviewees further suggested that there was a need to establish an independent 
organisation to be charged with corporate governance issues in Saudi Arabia. This 
organisation should be responsible directly to the Council of Ministers, in view of the major 
importance of corporate governance in protecting the commercial sector and avoiding any 
crises, collapses and scandals which might otherwise damage the economy. 
Thus, the interviewees point to a weak legal system in relation to the business environment 
in Saudi Arabia that has a negative impact over the practice of corporate accountability 
regarding corporate governance. Furthermore, the regulatory and monitoring function were 
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also considered to have a negative impact over accountability although there was some 
appreciation for the role of the CMA as a more active body in improving accountability. 
5.4.3 The Saudi Corporate Governance Code 
The majority of interviewees reported that they had looked at the Saudi Corporate 
Governance Code, issued by the CMA; nineteen out of 22 interviewees stated that they 
were aware of its contents. Two of those who had not read the code were a company 
chairman and the CEO of another company, both of unlisted companies1°, who claimed that 
the code was only relevant for listed companies. Almost half of the interviewees stated that 
they are concerned about the development of corporate governance around the world, 
whereas the other interviewees appeared uninterested in the implementation of international 
corporate governance standards. 
On the whole, however, the interviewees emphasised the importance of the issuance of the 
corporate governance code by the CMA in February 2006; they considered it a significant 
step in developing corporate governance within Saudi companies. Although there was some 
debate, the interviewees in general were satisfied with the code and appreciated the value of 
this step taken by the recently formed body. Some of the respondents stated that the local 
code reflects worldwide best practice of corporate governance. This was perceived as 
allowing companies the leeway to design their individual corporate governance codes and 
to set different policies and requirements according to each company's situation, and that 
the code was seen as very flexible in its appreciation of the differences between companies 
such as: ownership structure; board structure; reputation; size; and economic sector. It was 
10 Only two directors were from unlisted companies and all the other five were directors of listed companies 
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considered reasonable that some companies would adopt all of the code requirements or 
would add more requirements, whereas others would face difficulties in adopting all of its 
recommendations. 
However, while opinions varied among the interviewees as to some aspects of corporate 
governance covered by the code, the majority identified the accumulative voting system as 
its most important contribution. This was considered as a very active mechanism, playing a 
crucial role in reducing the impact of coalitions inside companies and their control over 
boards, thus giving minority shareholders an opportunity to select representatives on boards 
and increase the chance of appointing more independent NEDs. 
Although some admired, and were pleased, about the release of the first national corporate 
governance code, some interviewees criticised it and claimed that it could have been better 
designed and implemented. They indicated their disappointment that the code appeared 
weaker than they had expected, suggesting that the CMA should have requested assistance 
from international bodies specialising in corporate governance and from foreign expert 
consultants in the field, in order to start from a baseline of best international practice. 
Many interviewees argued that the code should be more specific. Despite their importance, 
they felt that issues such as the independence of NEDs, the authority and responsibilities of 
the board of directors, board accountability, board nomination requirements, board 
evaluation standards, methods of informing against corruption, and questions of disclosure 
and transparency were not clearly defined in the code. These interviewees argued that the 
code should be worded more explicitly and that such important questions of corporate 
governance should not be allowed to remain ambiguous, providing opportunities to 
companies which did not choose to comply with corporate governance standards to profit 
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from such gaps and boost their image by stating that they had adopted good corporate 
governance standards, whereas in reality they had not. In addition, the vague code would 
make it very difficult for the public, and monitoring bodies, to be able to judge companies' 
compliance since the code explanations could be loosely interpreted. 
One interviewee (AC2) raised an issue related to the independence of NEDs; one of the 
independence requirements of the code is that a board member will be considered as 
independent unless there is a relationship at the first level (e. g. father, mother, son, 
daughter, brother or sister), this condition was illogical in a society characterised by a great 
depth of family and tribal relationships. 
It was also argued that the CMA should establish a system of punishment for non- 
compliance with the code and that the code should distinguish between large and small 
companies in the implementation of corporate governance; there should be a differentiation 
between companies with huge resources and a wide spectrum of shareholders, and small 
companies, since the assumptions of professionalism and resources are not the same. An 
interviewee (C5) from a large company gave an example of such a distinction, citing that 
there should not be a limitation of the number of board members to eleven, since some very 
large companies had a number of tasks and committees and they needed more board 
members. However, such a limitation would be good for smaller companies which had no 
need for such a large board of directors. 
Some respondents mentioned that there were many issues dealt with by the code which 
were already covered in the Companies Law, arguing that this repetition might weaken the 
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code and give the impression that it was no more than a collection of regulations already in 
existence. 
However, although there are some criticisms directed to the Saudi corporate governance 
code, the interviewees generally are satisfied with the code and appreciated the step taking 
by the CMA. As a result, this code will improve the practice of accountability and assist 
Saudi companies to discharge their accountability by implementing the corporate 
governance code. The following section highlights the accountability framework in the 
Kingdom. 
5.5 The Accountability Framework in Saudi Arabia 
The accountability framework in Saudi Arabia according to the perspective of stakeholders 
and the Islamic concept of accountability are now outlined in the next sections. The issues 
related to how Saudi stakeholders consider accountability and the role of Sharia in the 
business environment, in addition to Islamic accountability, will be defined to assist in 
understanding the accountability framework in the Kingdom. 
All the interviewees had a similar perception of the concept of accountability, which they 
defined as meaning that everyone was given particular tasks in the light of certain 
authorities and responsibilities and that everyone should be accountable for their actions, 
individuals and bodies. All the interviewees considered accountability to be very important 
for the business environment and played a substantial role in protecting companies, 
preventing any infringements and providing a sound business environment. For example, it 
was often stated that it was very important that there should be an assurance that the person 
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in charge of any task had the appropriate ability and required skills. However, eighteen out 
of 22 interviewees, argued that the practice of such accountability was absent from the 
Saudi business environment, since companies and their directors were far from being held 
accountable for their decisions and actions. Because the "compliment culture" is dominant 
in the society in general and in business transactions and relationships, this is a major 
obstacle to implementing accountability. 
According to the interviewees, any company, its board or managers are accountable to all 
concerned parties, such as the company itself, the board, shareholders, wider stakeholder 
groups, regulatory and monitoring bodies and the media. They claimed that a company 
should be accountable to all these parties and was required to discharge its accountability 
by providing them with appropriate information about the company, such as financial 
statements, which would enable them to have an overall perception of the company's 
situation. 
The interviewees indicated that some of these parties to whom the company is accountable 
are able to practise this right, whereas others either cannot or choose not to practise 
accountability. For instance, the company's managers are accountable to the board, and 
regulatory and monitoring bodies have the authority to enforce the rules obliging 
companies to discharge their duties vis-ä-vis accountability; on the other hand, while 
shareholders are allowed to practice accountability at company AGMs, for example, by 
asking questions, they often find, especially if they are minority shareholders, that either 
because they do not have an influential holding or because they are not aware of their 
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rights, they do not challenge the domination of the main shareholders, so that there is an 
inefficient practice of accountability at AGMs. 
Overall, the interviewees generally agreed that there was a weakness in the practice of 
demanding accountability by the companies' stakeholders, except for main shareholders, 
who already have representatives on boards, and the various government bodies that have 
the power to hold companies to account. Indeed, even where these two parties are 
concerned, the fact that they have the ability to practise accountability does not mean that 
that they actually do so. The interviewees stressed the impact of a dominant culture over 
the practising of accountability; there was perceived to be an absence of accountability in 
the wider society. On this subject, an interviewee (A2) expressed the following opinion: 
"The trust culture is predominant and accountability does not exist. We 
never hear of board members who have been questioned, jailed, fined or 
made to pay compensation, nor do we ever hear of a minister who has been 
fired because of corruption or any such problem. Actually, I have never 
heard of a public accountant being sentenced for any wrongdoing. " 
Another interviewee (AC2) raised the question of whether the directors of all Saudi 
companies can be relied upon to maintain a high level of honesty and integrity: 
"We lack methods of discovering fraud as well as punishing them. In 
addition to that there is the impact of the culture of mercy towards a person 
whose honour is compromised. " 
While the respondents unanimously declared that the mechanism for accountability exists 
in the relevant regulations, especially in the Companies Law, the majority of them 
nevertheless indicated that, where such regulations mention accountability, they either fail 
to specify its nature clearly, or they need to be updated. These interviewees stressed the 
considerable importance of defining accountability and of having stronger regulations so 
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that companies and their stakeholders are aware of the extent of accountability, the parties 
to whom it applies and the methods of putting it into practice. 
All of the interviewees stressed that the concept of accountability required companies to 
adopt good corporate governance principles, arguing that good corporate governance will 
provide an appropriate environment for company directors and high-level management to 
be accountable, since a good corporate governance structure allows the clear definition of 
authority and responsibilities necessary for accountability to be accomplished. 
5.5.1 The Role of Sharia in the Business Environment 
The interviewees broadly agreed that the influence of Sharia on business transactions has 
been limited to dealing with Riba (interest), and while some Saudi companies have 
established Sharia committees to monitor the extent to which their transactions are made 
according to Sharia; it is worth mentioning that the only measures on which the Sharia 
committees are called to judge are those dealing with Riba. Thus, a company will be 
considered as doing business according to Sharia if it has no Riba loans, even though it 
may not consider any other Sharia principles or concepts. In this context, an interviewee 
(A2) stated that: 
"The scope of Sharia is still restricted in many companies to Riba. They do 
not consider Sharia in dealing with other issues, such as deception, fraud, 
cheating, corruption or damaging the environment. All of these issues 
should be considered by the companies according to Sharia. " 
Many interviewees reported that strong pressure had been put on companies by society and 
investors to avoid dealing with Riba, since it is forbidden according to Sharia. As a result, 
there has been a remarkable change in the way that companies do business and many have 
converted their loans to conform with Sharia, in addition to adopting the increasingly 
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common practice of establishing Sharia committees to report on the extent of the 
companies' conformance with Sharia. A company consultant (Cl) conceded the existence 
of this pressure: 
"Society requires compliance with Sharia. As a result we are concerned to 
conform with Sharia and all our loans are transacted according to Sharia 
following this social pressure. " 
Moreover, the interviews show that Saudi companies have a general framework preventing 
their activities from contradicting Sharia. Consequently, there are some activities in which 
companies cannot become involved, such as trading in goods forbidden under Sharia, 
including for example alcohol, drugs and pork. However, this does not mean that all Saudi 
companies are strict in their compliance with Sharia, since some use Riba, for example, 
despite its status as a practice banned under Islamic law. 
Some interviewees emphasised the importance of accepting all the obligations of Sharia in 
all commercial activities, rather than restricting such compliance to avoidance of Riba. 
They argued that Sharia, by its breadth of scope and the comprehensive nature of its 
regulations concerning the acts and relations of human beings, is able to cover all the 
transactions and activities of any company. 
However, the interviews found that there is a distinction between what people profess to 
believe in terms of the concepts of Sharia on the one hand and their practices with regard to 
these concepts on the other. According to this view of society, while Muslims accept all 
regulations and obligations required by Sharia and believe that they should cover all their 
activities, they are nevertheless weak in following the requirements of Sharia in all its 
social aspects. One of these is the business environment, which suffers a reduced level of 
Sharia observance in practice. The interviews indicate that, although companies in general 
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are not run in opposition to Sharia, it does not have a significant impact on their activities. 
The suggestion appeared to be that the absence of a crucial role for Sharia in the regulation 
of business affairs was no more than a reflection of the overall status of respect for Sharia 
in the wider society and of the obvious distinction between people's beliefs and their 
practices. Moreover, the awareness of Sharia depends on the extent of each individual's 
understanding of its regulations and requirements. It should be noted that one interviewee 
(C5) gave a good example of how his company had tried to reconcile respect for the Sharia 
regulations and values with successful business practice by integrating them into the 
company's principles. 
5.5.2 Islamic Accountability 
All of the interviewees emphasised the importance of the Islamic concept of accountability, 
whereby Sharia considers accountability as one of the underlying principles of the Islamic 
society. Many phrases from the Holy Quran and Hadith (the sayings of Prophet 
Mohammed (PBUH)) were mentioned by the interviewees to signify the existence and 
importance of accountability in the Islamic context; they argued that according to Sharia, a 
company, its board and managers are accountable for their actions to Allah as well as to all 
the company's stakeholders. Thus, a board member (C2) declared: 
"I believe I am accountable to Allah first, then to my conscience and to 
shareholders, to maximise their wealth and comply with regulations. " 
Some interviewees argued that although accountability is clearly defined in Sharia, it seems 
to be absent from all of society's practices, including the commercial environment. As one 
interviewee (A2) put it: 
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"The Muslim is accountable for all her/his steps and actions. Accountability 
is more important in Islam than in any other system, but the problem is in 
the application. " 
Other interviewees agreed that the current business practice is far from what accountability 
means in Sharia, since there is an imperfect implementation of Sharia in society as a 
whole. In response to a question about the impact on Saudi companies of the Islamic 
concept of accountability, the interviewees indicated that they perceived no tangible 
influence on companies' regulations and practices; or if there were any, they would be 
individually dependent on the extent of each person's beliefs and understanding of Sharia. 
One interviewee (FC1) stated that the extent to which the Islamic view of accountability is 
adopted depends on the extent of society's compliance with Sharia and its beliefs. Some 
interviewees mentioned that companies are subject to legal requirements and do not tend to 
adopt other regulations, even those of Sharia. Thus, to the extent that companies conform 
with particular requirements of Sharia this does not happen because of a decision to adopt 
Sharia for its own sake, but in reality because these are required by formal state 
regulations. Examples offered included the situation with respect to the adoption by 
companies of the Islamic principles of Shura and Hisba, which the interviews shows not to 
be applied according to the Islamic perspective among most companies. While some 
companies have adopted at least some aspects of these Islamic practices, this appears to be 
either because they happen to be requirements of general legal regulations or as part of the 
adoption of best practices. For example, some interviewees argued that the process of 
selecting board members and the making of decisions by the board amount to the practising 
of Shura, while some directors pointed to the frequent recourse by boards to advice from 
experts and consultants, which is a Shura practice; but the interviewees agreed that these 
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practices were not in place as a result of the adoption of Sharia and that companies have 
never claimed that they were adopting such Islamic principles. 
Nevertheless, the interviewees unanimously stated that there need be no conflict between 
Sharia regulations and the principles of good corporate governance; quite the contrary, they 
argued that Sharia stands in support of all principles that aim to protect the rights and 
consider the interests of all parties, so that it provides an appropriate foundation for the 
application of good corporate governance. A CMA regulator (R2) stated that: 
"There is no conflict between Sharia and corporate governance, but we as a 
society are very far from adopting Sharia concepts in all our dealings. " 
The interviewees expressed a clear consensus that Sharia encourages companies to adopt a 
regulatory system which helps to control and improve their performance and preserve the 
rights of those who deal with them. This is in line with the purpose of Sharia, which does 
not in general prohibit any effort to serve the public interest, on condition that there is no 
conflict with any of the regulations or principles of Sharia. Moreover, there was general 
agreement among the interviewees that Sharia could play a significant role in improving 
the implementation of good corporate governance within Saudi companies by linking the 
principles of corporate governance to Sharia concepts, such as consolidation. Establishing 
the origins of corporate governance principles would enhance the importance of adopting 
them and increase accountability with Saudi business. 
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5.6 Other Factors Influencing the Implementation of Corporate 
Governance 
This section highlights other important issues that were considered by the interviewees to 
have a significant influence over the practicing of corporate governance within Saudi 
companies; these factors are related to the social and economic environment and appear to 
have an obvious effect on aspects of corporate governance. 
Social factors seem to be the most influential on the exercise of corporate governance. Most 
of the interviewees agree that society has a clear impact on companies and upon their 
implementation of corporate governance principles. Socio-cultural factors such as family- 
ties, tribalism and favouritism directly influence corporate governance. One interviewee 
(Al) stated that society will often be favourable to people with power who have unlimited 
authority and who use their position to benefit their tribe and family; such people are highly 
regarded in Saudi society. However, someone who holds a powerful position but does not 
behave in the interests of their family and tribe are regarded as a useless member of the 
family and tribe. 
Many interviewees mentioned other influential social factors such as the fact that 
membership of a board of directors is considered by some within the companies and by 
members of society at large as a notable achievement and that as a consequence, there is 
sometimes fierce competition for board membership. Those who see board membership 
from this perspective, without giving any consideration to its responsibilities and duties, or 
their suitability for such positions, are perceived to burden the boards and impede the 
development of corporate governance standards in their companies. 
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Furthermore, there is a general social culture which has a negative attitude to the legal 
system and to discipline, with a social tendency to distrust and avoid being monitored, all 
of which was considered by some interviewees as a challenge to corporate governance 
practices. 
Certain economic factors were identified by the interviewees as exerting an influence on 
the implementation of corporate governance in the domestic environment. For example, 
cost was said by some interviewees to interfere with the adoption of a good corporate 
governance system by some companies, especially small ones. Such costs include obtaining 
the advice of consultants about the company's existing corporate governance system and 
the changes required for it to conform to the new requirements of the corporate governance 
code. Other problems were said to be the paucity of qualified and specialised people in the 
field of corporate governance and the difficulty of importing foreign professional staff, 
following the government's imposition of tight restrictions on the employment of 
foreigners in the light of policies in support of employment for Saudi nationals. This was 
seen to compromise the implementation by companies of improved corporate governance 
standards. 
In regard to Saudi Arabia joining the WTO, the majority of the interviewees argued that 
there was no direct relationship between this and the issuing of the corporate governance 
code, which they nevertheless considered as one of the general steps in re-evaluating and 
developing the systems and regulations in the Kingdom as a consequence of joining the 
global trading system. Overall, these factors all appeared to be impediments to the practice 
of accountability. 
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5.7 Summary 
This chapter reports the results obtained from the twenty two interviews using semi- 
structured interviews. Face to face, individual, interviews were conducted between May 
2007 and July 2007 in four major cities of Saudi Arabia using a sample of stakeholder 
groups compinsing: regulators; companies' directors; audit partners; institutional investors; 
fund managers; financial consultants; and academics, in order to explore their opinions 
about corporate governance issues. The main issues that been covered in these interviews 
were: the understanding of corporate governance; the current practices of corporate 
governance; the legal system and regulatory bodies; the accountability framework; Islamic 
accountability; and other factors influencing corporate governance in Saudi Arabia. 
The interviews findings indicate that corporate governance is a new phenomenon in the 
Saudi business environment and the concern about corporate governance issues only 
appeared after the Saudi stock market crash in February 2006. Before that period, the 
situation was very peaceful, and companies shares' prices were going up regardless of the 
companies' actual performances, so everyone was happy. 
The interviews draw attention to that fact that the Arabic translations of the English term of 
corporate governance might cause misunderstanding or be misleading, and although 
Hawkama is the most acceptable Arabic term to refer to corporate governance in English, it 
may be understood as nationalisation or more governmental control over a company. The 
interviewees, who considered corporate governance as very important for Saudi companies, 
tended to perceive corporate governance from an agent-principal perspective and at a lower 
level they considered the stakeholder perspective. This indicates the narrow perspective 
that Saudi stakeholders have in regard to corporate governance as they look at corporate 
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governance as directing a company and appointing authorities and responsibilities more 
than about protecting stakeholders' rights and practicing accountability. 
The interviewees were dissatisfied with the current practices of corporate governance in the 
Saudi business environment, some companies have not establish their own code, although 
required by the local code of corporate governance. On the other hand, some companies 
have done well in establishing, developing and complying with their own corporate 
governance codes. The level of awareness and conviction of corporate governance that the 
company chairman and board of directors have, as well as the company experience in 
dealing with corporate governance, plays a significant role in influencing company practice 
in corporate governance. The interviewees mentioned some improvements made by Saudi 
companies in relation to corporate governance such in disclosure and transparency and a 
decrease in the number of executive directors on boards and an increase in the appearance 
of independent NEDs. 
The interviews show that the processes of selecting board members in Saudi companies are 
influenced by three factors of ownership, personal relationships and favouritism; Saudi 
stakeholders strongly believe in the importance of the role of independent NEDs but they 
doubted the reality of the independence of those directors. There was also agreement that 
an accumulative voting system would play a significant role in enabling minority 
shareholders to appoint independent NEDs as their representatives on the board. 
The interviewees regarded all those who dealt with the company at any level as company 
stakeholders and that companies should consider their interests when making decisions. 
There was a concern about the level of which companies actually consider the interests of 
stakeholders, especially those who are unable to look after their interests in companies. 
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The results show that there is a highly concentrated ownership structure in the Saudi 
companies and the two major shareholders are the government and families. These major 
shareholders have a direct impact over companies' activities. The interviews agreed that the 
rights of stakeholders including minority shareholders are not well respected. 
The interviews confirm that there is dissatisfaction among the interviewees in relation to 
the legal system in Saudi Arabia in general and the legal system in the business 
environment in particular; moreover, there was also dissatisfaction with corporate 
governance regulatory and monitoring bodies. 
However, accountability was thought of as important by the interviewees; everyone gave 
examples of certain authorities and responsibilities and that everyone should be accountable 
for their actions. They defined the Islamic conception of accountability as that a company, 
its board and managers are accountable for their actions to Allah as well as to all the 
company's stakeholders. However, the interviewees mentioned that accountability and 
Islamic accountability are both absent from companies' practices. The interviews suggested 
that socio-cultural factors such as family- ties, tribalism and favouritism as well as 
economic factors such as the cost of corporate governance and the lack of expert people in 
corporate governance fields have a direct impact over corporate governance and the lack of 
accountability in Saudi Arabia. 
Overall, the interviews findings suggest that there is a weak accountability framework in 
the Saudi business environment and accountability does not exist in practice in Saudi 
companies, which make it very difficult for adopting good corporate governance principles. 
The next chapter presents the results obtained from the questionnaire survey regarding 
corporate governance in Saudi Arabia. 
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Chapter 6 
Questionnaire Survey 
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Chapter 6 
Questionnaire Survey 
6.1 Introduction 
After dealing with the results of the interviews in the previous chapter, this chapter 
details the results obtained from the second method of data collection, the questionnaire 
survey, which was distributed among various stakeholders groups in Saudi Arabia 
between April and June 2008. The questionnaire covered the most significant issues in 
regard to corporate governance practices in the local Saudi business environment to 
investigate the perspective of Saudi stakeholders about these issues. The questionnaire 
contained two sections: the first section covered demographical information of the 
respondents, and the second section asked the respondents to express the extent of their 
agreement with a number of statements given in different questions by ticking the 
appropriate boxes on seven main sections. These sections were split into: definition of 
corporate governance; board of directors; disclosure and transparency; stakeholders; 
accountability and accountability in Islam; and the regulatory and legal system and the 
corporate governance framework. 
For analytical purposes, the respondents have been merged into five groups according to 
their roles and backgrounds (see Figure 6.1). The first group contains academics, private 
investors and companies' employees, and is named "Other Stakeholders" (group 0) as 
they work individually and have limited access to information compared to other groups 
so they have in common a limited information set and, although they are concerned about 
companies, they do not consider themselves as experts about what happens in companies. 
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The second group is "Regulators" (group R), which includes auditors and respondents 
from different regulatory bodies. The respondents in this group have the right or ability to 
monitor and supervise companies. The third group is "Institutional Stakeholders" (group 
I) and covers government institutional investors, fund managers, consultants and stock 
brokers as they work institutionally and professionally and have the tools and resources 
to look after their interests in companies. Company's directors have been divided into 
two groups according to their position in the companies. The fourth group "Non- 
Executive Directors" (group N) is made up of independent and non-executive directors, 
and the last group comprises executive directors and managers "Management" (group 
M). 
Figure 6.1 The Respondents Groups 
Group O GroupR Group I Group N Group M 
30% 15% 33% 11% 11% 
Government 
(13) Auditors (15) nstitut onal NE chairmen (6) CLOs (5) 
investors(17) 
Private Regulators (11) 
Fund Managers 
NEDS (8) 
ICI 
Investors P6) (14) 
Companies' ( ompanles 
emplyees (15) 
Consultan[s(12) IN[ Dt (S) 
managers (8) 
Stock Brokers 
(15) 
Note: 0- Other stakeholders, R° Regulators, I= Institutional stakeholders, N NF Ds, M Management The I igure 
shows the live main groups that the respondents have been merged into, and the percentages related to each group as 
well as the number of respondents of each stakeholders parties. 
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In order to analyse the data obtained from questionnaire survey, Statistical Package for 
the Social Sciences (SPSS) was used. Since almost the questions were based on a5 point 
Likert scale, the descriptive statistical mean is used to measure the responses, and the 
standard deviation is used to reveal the variance of the responses. In addition, to help to 
understand the stakeholder attitudes for different questions, the group means have also 
been used. Since the responses comprised ordinal rather than parametric data, the non 
parametric tests, Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney (see appendix VIII) were used. 
However, in keeping with common practice, means and standard deviations were 
reported as descriptive statistics due to medians having little information content when 
comparing differences between different stakeholder groups' responses. The Mann- 
Whitney is used to test the differences between each pair of groups, The Kruskal-Wallis 
test is used to test the differences between all five stakeholder groups. Factor analysis 
was also used in some cases as a data reduction method to explain the pattern of 
correlations within a set of questions. The confidence levels for all tests are shown at the 
99% and 95% confidence level. 
The first section of the questionnaire provides a brief background about the questionnaire 
survey respondents' characteristics. As mentioned previously, 176 respondents replied to 
the questionnaire; 33% of them were group I, 30% were group 0,15% group R, and 11% 
for each of groups N and M. Saudi nationals comprised 88% of those who completed and 
returned the questionnaire, other Arabs comprised 11%, and there was one Asian 
respondent. Seventy two percent of those who participated are between 31 and 50 years 
old. The respondents are well educated as 91% of them have at least a first degree, 12% 
of them are PhD holders and 24% have masters degree. Over half of those surveyed 
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reported that they have only studied in Saudi, while 20% have studied in United States 
universities and 12% in United Kingdom universities. 
6.2 The Understanding of Corporate Governance in Saudi Arabia 
The first section on corporate governance covers different issues regarding the 
understanding of corporate governance in Saudi Arabia such as: definitions; codes; 
importance; translation difficulties; and practices of corporate governance in the Saudi 
business environment. 
6.2.1 Definition of Corporate Governance 
The first question in the survey, Q1, explored the definition of corporate governance 
among company stakeholders in the Saudi business environment. Table 6.1 presents the 
five definitions of corporate governance that were given in the questionnaire. The results 
indicate that there were no significant distinctions among the respondents' answers, since 
the lowest mean value for all definitions was 3.62 and the highest was 3.91, which shows 
that the respondents agreed with all of the proposed definitions of corporate governance, 
although there was some spread of opinion among the respondents as indicated by the 
standard deviations. The table shows that Cadbury's definition of corporate governance 
as "the system by which companies are directed and controlled" achieved the highest 
agreement among the Saudi stakeholders, phrase (b), which refers to the narrow agency 
perspective by defining corporate governance as "organising the relationship between the 
company and its shareholders", came second. The definition (c) of corporate governance 
according to the stakeholders' view as `organising the relationship between the company 
and all the stakeholders who are affected by, or who affect, the company's decisions and 
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activities" came third. Statements (d) and (e) received mean responses of 3.69 and 3.62 
respectively. The former, which is given by Keasey and Wright (1993), defined corporate 
governance from the perspective of corporate success and provides a wider view than the 
principal-agent perspective on corporate governance. Group mean values shown in Table 
6.1 indicate that there were three groups who preferred Cadbury's definition of corporate 
governance to any of the others: 0, R and M. These groups, who represent 56% of 
respondents, considered corporate governance to be a matter of directing and controlling 
the company. On the other hand, group I looked at corporate governance more from an 
agency perspective as organising the relationship between the agent (the company) and 
the principal (shareholders). This is not surprising because this group is mainly 
comprised of institutional shareholders who would naturally consider the principal-agent 
perspective. Finally, group N took a much wider stakeholder perspective on corporate 
governance, extending the relationship to include all stakeholders who are affected by, or 
who affect, a company's decisions and activities. This is interesting because it shows that 
non-executive directors consider their company's wider stakeholder groups as they are 
assumed (especially independent NEDs although I did not) to represent them on the 
board and look after their interests. 
Table 6.1 shows that there were obvious differences in the respondents' views in relation 
to the definition of corporate governance: the P-value of the Kruskal-Wallis (K-W) test is 
very significant (. 00) for (b), which presents a narrow view of the agency perspective, 
and very significant for (e), which presents a wider agency perspective. In order to 
specify further the differences between the stakeholders groups, the Mann-Whitney (M- 
W) test was conducted between each pair of stakeholders, and these results reveal a 
t- 
00 
4) 
CIO 
C 
el 
O 
V 
Opý 
O 
0 
O 
v 
V 
E0 
b 
,ý 
N 
y 
" 
z 
Ö 
O\ 
M 
N 
Ö 
n 
M 
N 
c 
r 
M 
N 
ÖO 
ýý0, 
b 
MM 
NN 
N-< 
Vl 0ý0 
"_ 
MN 
NN 
V 
ed O 
O i 
ö 
). ö a 
Ici w 
v ou 
ö 
' O, 
u 
.L 
e: 
y z2 -0 N C0' 
"0 um 
la Jc: 
t) 
N 
C, u 
2 
W 
f- EW 
y Cý UV ý 
.. 
O 
10 C 
E > Io 
IL) 
E E 3 
V 3 in O 
ö : 
b 
Ü 
b -5 
* , Cp bO 
3 3 °' v' E 
.r 
' 0 0y ?' 
C ý 
a . a _0. A 
y U C1, f; e 
E 
. ±r 
y y ma=r 33 
y° s ö ö 
ý " öö U c` b td p > 
3 :: a eßä 
"y "y "y 
y 
v 
0 "d D an 
y ý 
4ý 
0J3 33 41 
6 F Ö Ö xx 
12 1 d iý UE U NN N 
CO Ü a 
. 
aa aa 
O 
.r 
a 
a 
ö °q 
o 
0 
Ci 
ö5 3 
i- 
y5 
ID 
Vl 
w 
0yO 
.G 
I! d 
8ä 
3uu 
yO 
lV 
O 
Qu0N 
"C ~' 
92. ÜN 
'E4 
II G CD 
NU 
a$ N 
pyN 
MO 
pýq 
CbO 
II 
äF 
tn 
U ¢ 
Ny 
aU 
ÜO 
pU y 
ö~' O 
V eýi 
Zy 
ý 
00 NM 00 M O Oý 
Z Oý O liO Cý M - 00 
ý''' NMO NM 
j O V'I P NM 
`z" NO vA OO OO 
eY O Cý NO OM 
ooIn 000O+ MI M 
N r"'i ýO Oý O Oý 
Z oo. "CD CD a 00In NOM v1 C d: O 
ä ý' N V1 O o0 Oý oO 
ýD NNNN ý C' 
r- NN 110 'O O vi O O 
0 ö 
0.7 =Ö 
ÖÖ 
~ NONO O eT 
O ýOQr! O ýO 
O> O., OO kA OO 
O OM o0 ýO O OO 
ýý 
00 O lý OQ 
MOr! Vl O 
OD 
CO 
00 N oo e4 - 
Vi 19 Vi N 
MMM e+1 M 
eh V) 
00 O 
MM 
Z 
d' O 'V' N 00 
oo O O; 41 o0 
ýD O 
MO 
MMMf, 
1 N M 
S MN- '/1 I/1 OO ^' 
a ft ! 1' MM mal' MN 
O 
v)CD r- O 09 ov 
r 
'11: ýMMMM ý0' M 
v1 NNNM OO O" 
Q N ýO V1 ýO ý ýO M 
en mM en en NN 
2 IM U 'O N M 
. 
N 
CO ä ä ä ä ä a 31 r 
C 
c i 
C 
ä 
ä 
R C 
a 
N 
U[ 
I- N 
G{ý 4. i 
G fý 
N 
U 
NN 
36 
-G 
rN 
3 'Co 
Ia 
yä 
ü 
_ 
.C 
VN 
Ny 
33 
$. o 
wo y 
W'r 
aU 
Ir 
w° 
ßn ä 
N r^ 
O "ý D9 
Ny 
U N(y 
F. 0 
o 4" 
pa o$ 
Z. r= U 
188 
remarkable variation between groups I and N, as discussed above, and between groups I 
and M. 
I are more likely to see corporate governance from an agency perspective, while groups N 
and M agree far less strongly with that view. The results also indicate significant 
differences between groups N and 0 and groups N and R. N see corporate governance 
from a stakeholder standpoint rather than an agency one as mentioned above. Thus, each 
group of stakeholders considers corporate governance according to their own position and 
interests. 
6.2.2 Familiarity with the Local Corporate Governance Code and International 
Developments 
To investigate the level of awareness of the national corporate governance code and 
universal developments in corporate governance, respondents were asked in Q2(a) about 
their familiarity with the Saudi corporate governance code, issued in November 2006 by 
the CMA. Table 6.1 shows that the overall mean for Q2(a) was 3.51, which suggests that 
the respondents were familiar to some extent with the Saudi corporate governance code. 
As was expected, the group mean values in Table 6.1 show that group R were the group 
of stakeholders most familiar with the Saudi corporate governance code, their high mean 
value of 4.46 indicates that they were very aware of the code. Group N also appeared to 
have an appropriate knowledge of the local code, while groups M and I were quite less 
familiar with the code. The lowest level of awareness, as might have been expected, was 
among group 0 with a mean of just 2.68. 
Question 2(b) explored the respondents' familiarity with international developments in 
corporate governance among Saudi stakeholders. The overall mean response to this 
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question (2.84) reflects a weakness amongst Saudi stakeholders in following the global 
progress in corporate governance. As with results for other questions, group R are the 
group that appears to be most knowledgeable about international developments, whereas 
group 0 were the least aware. As before, the second least interested group was I, with 
more knowledge shown by groups of M and N. The results obtained from Q2 suggest that 
not all stakeholders in Saudi Arabia are appropriately informed about either domestic or 
international codes and developments in regard to corporate governance. The most 
striking result is that group M, who arguably should be quite knowledgeable about such 
matters, indicate awareness of the local corporate governance codes but are not so 
knowledgeable about international developments. 
6.2.3 The Importance, Current Practices and Awareness of Corporate Governance 
Questions 3(a), 3(h), and 3(g) explored Saudi stakeholders' perceptions of the 
importance, current practices and awareness of corporate governance systems. The results 
in Table 6.2 show that stakeholders strongly believe in the importance of corporate 
governance for Saudi companies, with a mean of 4.74; group N were the group of 
stakeholders who completely believed in the importance of corporate governance for 
Saudi companies with a mean of 5.00. Group R expressed the second highest appreciation 
of the need to adopt corporate governance in the Kingdom (4.96), while groups 0 and I 
came next, with means of 4.68 and 4.67 respectively. 
The K-W and M-W tests for Q3(a) and Figure 6.2 reveal a dissimilarity between the 
groups of respondents when they answered this question; with groups R and N having a 
much stronger belief in the importance of corporate governance than the other three 
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groups. The attitude of some managers and directors can be understood as they may not 
want to shoulder the responsibility for corporate governance more than they have to do 
so. What is surprising is the attitude of groups 0 and I who do not have as strong views 
as groups R and N. Although an executive director pronounced in the questionnaire that: 
"Practicing of corporate governance in Saudi Arabia is a serious step 
towards promoting trust and encouraging investment, and protecting the 
rights of investors which will assist in contributing to the national economy" 
6.2 The Importance of Corporate Governance for Saudi 
M 
N 
R 
O 
  Not at all   To a minor extent To some extent   To a moderate extent   To a great extent 
Note: The Figure shows the perception of the five stakeholders groups about the extent of the importance 
of corporate governance for Saudi companies. In relation to the Other stakeholders (group 0) further 
crosstab analysis indicates that there were not any significant differences between academics, private 
investors and company employees in regard to this question. 
However, respondents were unsatisfied with the actual current practices of corporate 
governance within Saudi companies; the overall mean for Q3(h) of 2.25 indicates that 
Saudi companies are not doing enough to adopt good corporate governance standards. All 
stakeholder groups agree that Saudi companies are not doing enough. Group means 
shows that group I particularly thought this and group N find the exercise of corporate 
governance by Saudi corporations to be lacking. Thus the two groups of I and N are least 
satisfied with corporate governance practice and possibly relates to the importance they 
attach to their roles. The M-W tests show a difference between groups I and M, managers 
and directors do not think that their practices are as bad as other groups view them to be. 
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The responses also confirm that there is an inadequate awareness in the Saudi business 
environment of issues related to corporate governance. The mean response to Q3(g) was 
2.26. The K-W and M-W tests show no differences between the respondent groups, 
which suggests broad dissatisfaction among the survey sample with the level of 
awareness of corporate governance in Saudi Arabia. The group means in Table 6.2 show 
that group M again disagreed the least that there was an adequate awareness of corporate 
governance matters among local businesses, with a mean of 2.52, while group N, were 
the most dissatisfied, with a mean just of 2.10. Interestingly, this result may indicate that 
an inadequate awareness of corporate governance issues has a negative impact over 
companies' practices of corporate governance since the lack of awareness may decrease 
the demands of society for companies to improve their practices which leads to poor 
corporate governance practices by Saudi companies. For example a questionnaire 
respondent wrote that: 
"Corporate governance practices are new for the Saudi business 
environment and there is a lack of awareness of its importance. However, by 
increasing the level of corporate governance awareness, corporate 
governance practices and the relationships between companies and their 
shareholders will improve". 
6.2.4 The Saudi Corporate Governance Code 
This section of the questionnaire also addressed issues related to the Saudi Corporate 
Governance Code to evaluate the domestic code from the stakeholders' perspectives. The 
respondents indicated little satisfaction with the adequacy and effectiveness of the Saudi 
corporate governance code, with a mean of 2.77 for Q3(e). This attitude was generally 
held among all the stakeholders groups, as can be seen with no differences in the K-W 
and M-W results. However, group R who represent the bodies charged with standardising 
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and controlling companies were slightly happier with the Saudi corporate governance 
code as they had the highest mean score among the groups of 3.15. Furthermore, Saudi 
stakeholders believe that Saudi companies generally do not comply with the Saudi 
corporate governance code, as indicated by the mean score of 2.45 for Q3(f). Respondent 
group M were more favourable in their opinion that companies comply with the Saudi 
Corporate Governance Code; the M-W test P-values show significant differences 
between the attitudes of group M and those of groups N (. 00) and 0 (. 01). The variation 
in the attitude between groups M and 0 can possibly be understood as group M may 
think that they are complying with the code and group 0 do not, but what is surprising is 
the attitude of group N as they disagree with group M and think that Saudi companies do 
not generally follow the Saudi corporate governance code; the opinions of group N gain 
more significance as they are in a position to allow them to appropriately judge 
companies' compliance. In response to Q3(b), the respondents agree to a great extent that 
the Saudi corporate governance code should be mandatory for all listed companies, with a 
mean of 4.47 and a standard deviation of 0.79. Although group M did not agree as 
strongly, in general the responses of the stakeholder groups emphasise their strong belief 
in the necessity of enforcing the Saudi corporate governance code among Saudi 
companies. The group means in Table 6.2 indicate the strength of conviction of the 
regulators and auditors on this question which gives an impression that the mandatory 
nature of the code may now only be a matter of time. 
Respondents also agreed strongly with statement 3(c), which suggests that there should 
be penalties for non-compliance with the Saudi corporate governance code: the overall 
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mean was 4.37 and the standard deviation was 0.81. Insiders (group M), with a mean of 
3.66, only seemed to agree to some extent with this proposition, just as they had with the 
Saudi corporate governance code. K-W and M-W test results for Q3(c) indicate very 
significant differences between the attitudes of group M and those of three other groups 
of. 0, I and R, which supports the result that some managers and executive directors are 
not happy with any kind of penalties that they may suffer if they do not comply with 
corporate governance requirements. One of the questionnaire respondents wrote that: 
"There won't be a real compliance with the corporate governance code if 
penalties do not exist for non-compliant companies. In contrast the 
complying companies should be rewarded to encourage the practice of good 
corporate governance. " 
Overall, the results obtained from the responses to parts of question 3 suggest that, 
although there is an adequate awareness among the stakeholders of the importance of 
corporate governance for the local business environment, there is a low satisfaction with 
Saudi companies' current practices of corporate governance and think that there is an 
inadequate awareness of such regulations in the Saudi business environment. 
Furthermore, the sample of stakeholders are not satisfied with the Saudi corporate 
governance code and do not consider it as an adequate and effective code, and that Saudi 
companies are not generally complying with the code. On the other hand, the 
stakeholders stressed the importance of having a mandatory code for listed companies 
and that penalties should be used for non-compliance. 
5.2.5 The Arabic Translation of the English Term "Corporate Governance" 
Question 3(d) was designed to investigate the extent to which stakeholders in Saudi 
Arabia were happy with the Arabic translation of the English term "corporate 
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governance". They were also asked in Question 4 about their opinions of the Arabic 
terms most often used to translate the concept. The results in Table 6.2 show that the 
respondents only agreed to some extent that the Arabic translation of the English term 
"corporate governance" carries the same meaning as in English, with a mean score of 
3.16. This result highlights that there is a potential problem related to the Arabic 
translation of corporate governance since this translation does not provide the same 
meaning of the English term which could cause misunderstanding and be misleading. 
Group 0, with a mean of 2.79, were the group that agreed least with the accuracy of the 
Arabic translation. Thus, stakeholders who are more remote from companies have more 
of a problem with the Arabic translation. 
Table 6.3 reveals that the official Arabic term used by the CMA and the most popular 
Arabic translation, Hawkama, is rated as the most suitable translation, with a mean score 
of 3.62. Furthermore, the Table shows that all stakeholder groups favour Hawkama, 
except group M, who prefer Edarat wa Ttawjeh Alshareka, which is a direct Arabic 
translation of Cadbury's definition of corporate governance as controlling and directing 
the company; this translation has been adopted by Saudi Telecom Company STC in its 
own code', which was the first Saudi corporate governance code ever issued in Saudi, 
even before the official code issued by the CMA. This term was the second most popular 
among all stakeholders, with an overall mean of 3.11. 
The other translations appear to have been broadly rejected by the respondents, since 
their means were 2.39 for Edarat wa Tandheem Alshareka, 2.38 for Aledarah Alrashedah 
It has been changed latter to Hawkama 
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and 1.99 for Hakmea2. Although there was no strong agreement on an appropriate Arabic 
term to translate the English, there was some acceptance of Hawkama to refer to 
corporate governance. The K-W and M-W test results indicate that there were no 
significant differences between the groups in their responses to Q4. 
9r-m. 't This Arahir Tranclatinnc of rnrnnrafe Gnvernance 
Arabic Term In Arabic N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 0 
Groups Means 
RIN M 
a. Hawkama Y 170 3.62 1.24 3.56 3.76 3.58 4.05 3.33 
b. Edarat wa Ttawjeh r. jj rjL: t 168 3 11 1 34 90 2 3.19 3.25 2.76 3.58 
Alshareka . is le . . . 
c. Edarat wa =Jt't 166 2 39 1 21 2 35 2.46 2.61 1.68 2.35 
Ttandheern Alshareka 45a . . . 
d. Aledarah 46VSi. 3Y/ 167 2.38 1.32 2.35 2.46 2.61 1.68 2.35 
Alrashedah 
e. Hakemea 165 1.99 1.20 1.92 2.23 2.11 1.50 1.93 
Note: Cronbach's Alpha 1 est °u. b 1 for y4. i ne i ab le snows the number of respondents, me means, 
standards deviations and group means for Q4 
However, with a mean of 4.05, N seem to be the stakeholder group that agreed most 
strongly with the use of Hawkama, while M agreed the least strongly, with a mean of 
3.33. In contrast, M were most likely to choose Edarat wa Tawjeh Alshareka as the right 
translation (mean = 3.58), while N agreed least with this translation. It is interesting, that 
group M prefer the term of Edarat wa Tawjeh Alshareka as this portrays the narrow view 
of corporate governance, as an internal system to control and direct the company, and 
accords with Cadbury's definition. Group N have a wider conception of corporate 
governance from stakeholders perspective and tend to accept Hawkama which has a 
wider meaning of corporate governance than controlling and directing the company. This 
2 All these Arabic terms are different translations to the English term of "Corporate Governance" and can 
not be explained as they all are attempting to translate the English term. 
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result indicates the influence of the role of groups M and N over their perception of 
corporate governance translation. 
6.3 Board of Directors 
The next section of the questionnaire related to board of directors issues such as: factors 
influencing selection of executive, non-executive and independent directors; the existence 
of Independent NEDs in Saudi companies; the maximum number of memberships that a 
person should have on companies boards; board size; meetings, responsibilities and sub- 
committees. 
6.3.1 Board of Directors Composition 
This section focuses on the factors that i nfluence t he process of selection of board 
members in Saudi companies. 
6.3.1.1 Factors Influencing the Selection of Executive Directors 
Question 5.1 invited respondents to express the extent of their agreement with the 
influence of certain factors on the process of selecting executive directors (EDs). The 
results, as shown in Table 6.4, indicate that share ownership and personal relationships 
were considered to have the most significant roles in the appointment of EDs in Saudi 
companies, with means of 4.05 and 3.99 re spectively. The level of experience and 
qualifications of the EDs, and their reputation were ranked next by stakeholders as 
reasons for their appointments, followed by having enough time to spend on company 
business, favouritism and having knowledge in other specialist areas, which were all 
considered to have slightly less influence. Surprisingly, the factor judged to have the least 
impact on the appointment of EDs was having financial knowledge. 
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Table 6.4 reveals very significant differences according to the K-W test between the 
respondents' answers concerning share ownership, personal relationships and favouritism 
for appointments. The group means for the first two factors indicate that groups 0, R, and 
N strongly believe that share ownership and personal relationships significantly influence 
the selection of EDs, whereas groups I and M agree less strongly. 
Group 0 strongly believe that favouritism has an impact on the selection of EDs, while 
groups R, I and N agree to some extent, but group M themselves disagree that 
favouritism is important, with a mean of 2.73. Groups M and R consider experience and 
qualifications to be influential in the choice of EDs, whereas other groups place less 
importance on this factor. The remaining factors 5.1(e) to (h) were accepted to some 
extent by all stakeholder groups. However, M-W test results indicate that there were very 
significant differences between certain pairs of respondent groups mainly concerning the 
factors of: share ownership, personal relationships, and favouritism. However, group M 
were more likely to consider experience and qualifications, having enough time to spend 
on company business and reputation, to be influential in their appointments, putting 
themselves in a favourable light. 
6.3.1.2 Factors Influencing the Selection of Non-Executive Directors 
In Q5.2, participants were asked to assess the importance of the same factors influencing 
the process of selecting NEDs as opposed to EDs in Saudi companies. As shown in Table 
6.5, factors that respondents considered to have an influence were share ownership and 
personal relationships. A second group of factors, favouritism, reputation, experience and 
qualifications and having knowledge in other specialist areas, we re regarded by the 
respondents as being influential to some extent, whereas having financial knowledge and 
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having enough time to spend on company business were assessed as not being taken into 
account when deciding on the appointment of NEDs. 
Moreover, although there was strong agreement among all the stakeholder groups 
concerning the major influence of share ownership on the selection of NEDs, the M-W 
points to significant differences in responses between group N and groups of 0, M, and I 
as, surprisingly, group N believe that ownership influences their appointment, with a 
group mean of 4.78. In addition, groups 0 and N were the most likely to believe in the 
influence of personal relationships and favouritism in selecting NEDs. This was quite 
surprising about NEDs views of themselves and provides evidence of the major 
influences of ownership, relationships and favouritism on the appointment of NEDs on 
the Saudi companies boards of directors. 
63.1.3 Factors Influencing the Selection of Independent Non-Executive Directors 
Question 5.3 addresses the factors that may influence the process of appointing 
independent NEDs as opposed to NEDs that may or may not be independent in Saudi 
companies. Table 6.6 shows the overall mean responses for these factors and indicates 
that personal relationships were seen to have an essential role in the appointment of 
independent NEDs, with a mean of 3.93, followed by reputation, favouritism, and 
experience and qualifications. This is surprising as it they are meant to be independent 
there should not be any personal relationships. 
Respondents considered the knowledge of independent NEDs in other specialist areas 
and in finance to influence their appointment only to some extent, and appeared to assign 
only minor importance to the factors of having enough time to spend on company 
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business and, unsurprisingly, share ownership. Group means listed in Table 6.6 show that 
groups 0, I and N believe strongly in the impact of personal relationships on the selection 
of independent NEDs and that group R consider the reputation of independent NEDs to 
be the most important factor, while group M consider their financial knowledge to be the 
major issue. The K-W and M-W tests results indicate significant differences between the 
respondent groups regarding share ownership and reputation as influential factors. 
It is somewhat surprising that share ownership is mentioned as influencing the selection 
of independent NEDs as the assumption is that they are independent and should not have 
shares in a company. A possible explanation for this might be because company law 
states that board members, regardless of being independent or not, should own shares in a 
company. Furthermore, the local code of corporate governance states that the holding of a 
controlling interest in a company or in any other company within that company's group is 
considered as an infringement of such independence, without specifying this controlling 
interest proportion. These two official requirements may explain why share ownership 
appears to have a small influence over the appointment of independent NEDs in Saudi 
companies. 
The results obtained from questions 5.1,5.2, and 5.3, which define the factors that could 
influence the process of appointing board of directors in Saudi companies, indicate that 
there is consistency on the criteria of selecting executive and non-executive (but not 
independent) directors in Saudi companies as they are both highly influenced by the 
percentage of their ownership in a company and their personal relationships with 
company directors and owners. In contrast, personal relationships are the major 
influential factor to be considered when looking for independent NEDs. The share 
204 
ownership factor appears to have a minor influence over the selection of independent 
NEDs, possibly since those directors are assumed to not have a significant number of 
shares in the company and are therefore deemed to be independent. 
Table 6.7 Factor Analysis for Factors Influencing the Selection of FDs, NEDs, and 
Indenendent NEDs 
EDs NEDs Independent NEDs 
Com ponent 
1 2 I 2 I 2 
Eigenvalues 0 3.356 1.743 3.013 1.999 2.965 1.799 
a. Share ownership 01 -. 117 249 -. 364 
b. Personal 
-. 628 . 
600 
- 118 . 
878 273 
relationships . . 
c. Favouritism 
-. 519 "6`S3 -. 147 '842 . 
334 
d. Experience and 71 1 . 741) 
qualifications . 
214 . . 
215 
. 
064 
e. Having financial 319 134 I29 knowledge 
f. Having knowledge 
in other specialist 
. 
371 N'' 
. 
051 ' -. 201 
areas 
g. Reputation 
. 
317 . 026 -. 068 't'`' 
I 
_. 293 
Ii. Having enough 
time to spend on . 
217 
. 
048 -. 319 
company business 
Note: I ne I ante snows inc results of factors analysts for Q3.1,03.2 and Q5.3.1 he I able indicates the 
components victors that influence selecting of executive, non-executive and independent non-executive 
directors. The Table shows the Eigenvalues for each components and values of each factors. All the factors 
selected in the table were those with l: igenvalues greater than 1.0. 
Factor analysis was used to identify an explanation of what influences the process of 
selection of directors in Saudi companies. The results presented in Table 6.7 show that 
there are two main factors that can be considered to have an influence over selecting 
directors in Saudi companies. The first factor can be labeled "Competence" which 
contains experience and qualifications; having financial knowledge; having knowledge in 
other specialist areas; reputation; and having enough time to spend on company business. 
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The second factor labeled "Relationship" and contains share ownership; personal 
relationships; and favouritism. Consistent with the findings above, share ownership is the 
only factor that does not appear to influence the process of selecting independent NEDs. 
6.3.2 Independent Non-Executive Directors in Saudi Companies 
Question 6 concerned the number of independent NEDs that stakeholders considered to 
be appropriate on the boards of Saudi companies. Table 6.9 presents responses about 
independent NEDs that boards should have and shows that Saudi stakeholders believe in 
the importance of the role of independent NEDs on company boards, as 99% of the 
sample stated that companies should appoint independent NEDs, and a clear majority of 
respondents (63%) agreed with the Saudi Corporate Governance Code that requires 
independent NEDs to comprise one third of board membership. However, 29% of the 
respondents disagreed with this proposition and proposed instead that half of each board 
should comprise independent NEDs, and 7% of respondents stated that independent 
NEDs should form a majority, occupying two thirds of board memberships; only one 
respondent replied that independent NEDs had no place on the boards of Saudi 
companies. 
Table 6.8 indicates that, apart from group N, all stakeholder groups agreed that one third 
of the board was the appropriate proportion of independent NEDs for Saudi companies; 
unsurprisingly group R (92%) agreed most strongly with this fraction as stated in the 
Saudi corporate governance code figure. Interestingly, group N thought the independent 
NEDs should form half of the board; may be they thought such a proportion would 
enable them to practice their role and fulfil their responsibilities better, whereas being a 
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minority could make their task much more difficult. As a company chairman interviewee 
stated: 
"..... they (independent NEDs) cannot influence the board's direction, since 
one or two independent NEDs will always be in the minority in the 
boardroom". 
The results show that, surprisingly, over half of group M agreed that independent NEDs 
should form half or two thirds of the board which indicates that there is an adequate 
awareness and belief among group M on the importance of independent NEDs. For 
example an Independent NEDs interviewee mentioned that: 
"There is more of a tendency to invite qualified specialists, even from 
outside the known circle". 
Table 6.8 The Number of Independent Non-Executive Directors that Should be on a 
Sandi Comnanv Board 
The role of respondents 
0 R I N M 
Total 
One third of the board 39 72% 24 92% 33 57% 7 37% 8 44% 111 63% 
Half of the board 12 22% 1 4% 18 31% 12 63% 7 39% 50 29% 
Two thirds of the 2 4% 1 4% 6 10% 0 0% 3 17% 12 7% board 
None 1 2% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 1 0.6% 
Other 0 0% 0 0% 1 2% 0 0% 0 0% 1 0.6% 
Total 54 26 58 19 18 175 
Note: The Table shows the group means for Q6.1. 
Table 6.9 The Actual Number of Independent Non-Executive Directors in the 
! 'mmnaniec 
The role of respondents Total 
N M 
One third of the board 16 84% 11 61% 27 73% 
Half of the board 1 5% 3 17% 4 11% 
Two thirds of the board 0 0% 4 22% 4 11% 
None 1 5% 0 0% 1 3% 
Other 1 5% 0 0% 1 3% 
Total 19 18 37 
Note: The Table shows me group means for yo. 1 
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In response to a question concerning the actual numbers of independent NEDs on Saudi 
boards, Table 6.9 shows that 73% of the company respondents asked this question replied 
that most boards had `one third'. Thus, the majority of Saudi companies have one third of 
their board members as independent NEDs as required by the national code; among these 
respondents, group N (84%) gave this answer more often than group M respondents 
(61%)3. There were also 17% of group M who indicated that their companies had boards 
of which half of the members were independent NEDs, while 22% claimed that the 
proportion was two thirds. Only one company respondent stated that there was no 
independent NEDs in his company. 
Figure 6.3 The Number of Independent Non-Executive Directors that Should be and 
that Actually are in Saudi companies 
Actu 
o One third of the 
board 
o Half of the board 
u Two thirds of the 
board 
  None 
o Other 
Note: The Figure shows the perception of the five stakeholders regarding the number of independent NEDs 
that should be in the Saudi companies' boards and also the actual number of independent NEDs in Saudi 
companies' boards as given by groups of N and M. 
3A possible explanation may be because both group N and M represent different companies 
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From the previous discussion of the findings it is clear to see that the majority of 
stakeholders are happy with the proportion of independent NEDs in the local corporate 
governance code. Moreover, the majority of Saudi companies seem to be in compliance 
with this requirement and some go beyond the requirements and have appointed a greater 
proportion of independent directors than one third as shown in Figure 6.3. 
6.3.3 The Maximum Number of Board Memberships 
Question 7 sought views on the maximum number of listed companies' boards of which a 
person could be a member at the same time. The cumulative percentage in Figure 6.6 
shows that 98% of respondents considered the maximum to be five boards or less, while 
42% stated that the maximum should be three, 25% considered that it should be five and 
only 3 respondents out of 175 believed that a person should be allowed to sit on more 
than five boards. One of them was a private investor, one a company employee and the 
third was an independent company chairman who had four directorships4. 
Question 8 was only addressed to the company respondents to state the number of boards 
of which they were members. The overall mean response was 2.22. The results in Figure 
6.4 indicate that respondents tend to be board members of relatively few listed 
companies. Forty six percent of the respondents (N= 22) sat on only one board, 14% had 
two board memberships, while 18% sat on three and 18% sat on four boards. One 
4 The results for groups' means, K-W and M-W tests indicate that there were no significant differences 
between the group means in response to Q7; in other words, all responses were close to the overall mean of 
3.41. 
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respondent was a member of five boards and had reached the maximum number of 
boards memberships recommended by the Saudi corporate governance code. 
Figure 6.4 The Number of Directorships that there Should be and that 
Actually were Reported in Saudi coanies 
50 
45 
40 
35 
30 
Y 
P 
25 
  Should be 
ö, 20 
a 
15   Actually 
10 
5 
0 
12345678 
Number of boards 
Note: The Figure shows the perceptions of stakeholders regarding the number of board: 
memberships that a person should has at the same time and the actual number of boards 
memberships that the groups of N and M have. 
This respondent was a non-executive company chairman of a large company. 
Interestingly, the over 60 age group thought that the maximum number that a person 
should sit on is five boards. Although group M sit on more boards compared to group N, 
there were no significant differences between groups N and M according to the K-W test 
results. Thus, these results suggest that the majority of stakeholders think that a person 
should sit on no more than five boards at the same time and that Saudi companies seem to 
comply with the national code in relation to the number of memberships that a person 
should hold at the same time. The latter was an unexpected result, since there is a general 
impression that the directors of Saudi companies dominate companies' boards and sit on 
many of them. A possible explanation for this might be that the limited number of 
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directors who answered this question (only 22) does not portray the general situation. 
Another possible explanation for this is that directors have reduced the number of their 
memberships recently in order to comply with the national corporate governance code. 
6.3.4 Board of Directors Size 
The aim of the next question Q9, was to identify views about the appropriate size of 
boards for Saudi companies of different sizes. The results in Table 6.10 reveal that the 
respondents disagreed with the Saudi corporate governance code specification of 
minimum and maximum numbers for all listed companies; they suggested different sizes 
of boards for each size of company. Surprisingly, even group R themselves, disagreed 
with the code. 
Tahle 6.10 The Board of Directors Size that Su¢¢ested by Stakeholders 
Q9 any 
Com Board should be N Mean 
Std. 
p Si De viation 
9a Not less than 176 4.38 1.51 
9b 
Small Not more than 176 8.01 1.87 
9c Not less than 176 94 5 2.01 di M . 
9d um e Not more than 176 9.87 1.87 
9e L 
Not less than 176 7.44 2.60 
9f arge Not more than 176 11.74 2.15 
Note: The Table shows the number or respondents, the means and standards deviations tor cry. 
The mean values in Table 6.10 and Figure 6.5 indicate that small companies should have 
no fewer than 4 and not more than 8 board members, since the overall means were 4.38 
and 8.01; for medium-sized companies there should be 6 to 10 members (with means of 
5.94 and 9.87), whereas boards of large companies should, in the views of respondents, 
comprise between 7 and 12 members (with means of 7.44 and 11.74). However, the K- 
W test indicates very significant differences between the respondent groups regarding the 
minimum number of board members for small companies. The group means and M-W 
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tests clearly show that for small companies the company respondents (groups M and N) 
thought that there should be 5 to 6 directors on the board compared with others groups 
who thought there should only be 4 
ure 6.5 Board of Directors Size Suggested by Stakeholders 
Not more 
  Small 
H Medium 
W Large 
Note: The Figure shows the stakeholders suggestion of the minimum and the maximum 
numbers of directors that should be on the board of small, medium and large companies' 
size. 
Tahle 6.11 The Actual Size of Saudi Companies' Boards of Directors 
' 
No of directors on the board l ' Turnover Company 
7 8 9 10 Il 
tota 
Less than 500m (Small) 2 40% 0 0% I 20% 1 20% I 20% 5 
Between 501 m and 1.5b (Medium) 1 6% 3 19% 7 44% 2 12% 3 19% 16 
More than 1.5b (Large) 3 25% I 8% 2 17% 3 25% 3 25% 12 
'total 6 18% 4 12% 10 30% 6 18% 7 22% 33 
Note: The Table shows the actually number of directors in the participants companies 
Similarly, the M-W test outcomes for large companies indicate significant differences in 
the maximum numbers of member of large companies' boards. Group N wanted a lower 
maximum number than other groups and were the only group of stakeholders who agreed 
that large companies should not appoint more than 11 directors to the board. 
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The company respondents indicate that the average number of directors actually on Saudi 
listed companies' boards is nine. Table 6.11 shows that 30% of respondents to this 
question (N= 33) stated that there were an average of 9 members on their companies' 
boards. 
Eighteen percent stated that there were 7 directors; these were the smallest boards, while 
the largest had 11 directors as reported by 22% of the respondents. These results suggest 
that Saudi companies comply with the Saudi corporate governance code in relation to 
board size, where boards of directors of listed companies should have no fewer than 3 
and no more than 11 members. Table 6.11 reveals that, excluding medium-size 
companies, that to some extent tend to have boards with nine seats (40%), there is not a 
clear relationships between the size of company and size of board; furthermore, 
correlation tests do not appear to show any significant correlation between the size of the 
companies and their board size. 
6.3.5 Board of Directors Meetings 
In question 11 the respondents were asked how many meetings boards of directors should 
hold on a yearly basis in order to discharge their responsibilities and the corporate 
respondents (groups M and N) were asked to state how often their boards actually met. 
Table 6.13 and Figure 6.6 show that a small majority of respondents (53%) believe that 
boards should meet quarterly, 21% and 19% of respondents stated that they should meet 
every two months or every month. The normative view on what boards should do broadly 
reflects reality in that company respondents indicate that, in their view, Saudi boards of 
directors generally meet quarterly (according to 54% of respondents) or three times a year 
215 
6.3.6 Board of Directors' Responsibilities 
Q13 sought respondents' opinions on the roles that directors should have in order to fulfil 
their responsibilities. They were asked to state the extent of their agreement with 
statements referring to ten functions for which board members should be responsible. The 
results in Table 6.14 reveal that there was a high level of general agreement among the 
Saudi stakeholders that boards of directors should be responsible for all of these 
functions. Furthermore, standard deviation values for Q13.1 in Table 6.14 indicate that all 
respondents generally agreed strongly with these roles, since they all had low standard 
deviations. The group means in Table 6.14 indicate that group R were the group most 
strongly in favour of making boards of directors responsible for these ten roles and that N 
were the second most supportive group, whereas group M seem to be the least 
enthusiastic for enforcement of the board's responsibilities. The M-W test results indicate 
that there were major differences between groups R and M with respect to their responses 
to all statements which make it clear that there is a variation between groups R and M in 
the way they both look at boards of directors' responsibilities, one is the party that is in 
charge of regulating and the other party is the one that has to follow those regulations. A 
possible explanation for this might be that the insider group, M, are not convinced, or are 
unaware of, the essence of such tasks as board responsibilities, and they do not want to 
impose upon themselves more roles for which they would be responsible. There were 
also a number of very significant differences between group R and other groups which 
may be explained as that, although all stakeholders groups are highly in favour that 
boards of directors should be responsible for those ten roles, group R have a stronger 
belief in them. 
214 
(35%). One manager stated that his board met monthly and another that his convened 
only every six months. 
Table 6.13 The Board of Directors Should and Actually Meetings 
Should Actually do 
No Percent No Percent 
Every 3 months 93 53% 20 54% 
Every 2 months 37 21% 2 5% 
Every month 33 19% 1 3% 
Every 4 months 6 3% 13 35% 
Every 6 months 3 2% I 3% 
More often than monthly 2 1% 0 0% 
Total 174 100% 37 1000/ 
Note: The Table shows the number and percentages of respondents answered QI I. 
6.6 The Board of Directors Should, and Actually Do Hold Meetings 
  Every month 
  Every 2 months 
v Every 3 months 
  Every 4 months 
o Every 6 months 
u More often 
Note: The Figure shows the perceptions of stakeholders about how regular should the 
board of director meet and the actual meetings that hold by companies' hoards 
according to response of groups N and M about their own companies. 
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In order to elicit stakeholders' evaluation of the extent to which directors of Saudi 
companies discharge their responsibilities by fulfilling their functions, they were asked in 
Q13.2 to express their opinions of the extent of actual adherence to board responsibilities 
within Saudi companies. The results displayed in Table 6.14 reveal a general 
dissatisfaction among respondents with the performance of boards of directors in respect 
of the responsibilities that they should shoulder, since there was only a limited agreement 
that Saudi boards actually review and guide corporate strategy, have major plans of 
action and risk policy, oversee annual budgets and business plans, oversee major capital 
expenditure, acquisitions and divestitures, set performance objectives and align the 
remuneration of key executives and directors with the longer-term interests of the 
company and its shareholders. From another perspective, excluding statement (j) 
regarding the oversight of major capital expenditure, acquisitions and divestitures, K-W 
and M-W tests show significant differences between the respondent groups in their 
answers to Q13.2, as shown in Table 6.14. These differences mainly result from 
differences between respondents from companies and those from outside companies; the 
outsider parties appear more dissatisfied about the way that boards of directors are 
actually shouldering their responsibilities. 
However, when asked about the actual practices in their own companies, groups M and N 
indicated that, although in general the boards of Saudi companies do not always meet all 
their responsibilities, there is an acceptable level of performance in their own companies. 
The comparison of results obtained from Question 13, as shown in Figure 6.7, indicates 
that boards of directors should be responsible for many roles in exercising their jobs but 
that stakeholders were unhappy with what boards of directors were actually doing and 
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Table 6.15 Board Sub-Committees' Importance, Existence and Effectiveness 
Panel A: Questions of Importance and Existence 
itt C 
Importance 
Q 14.1 
Existence 
Q14.2 
ee omm 
N Mean Std Deviation N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
a. Audit Committee 175 4.63 . 76 172 4.13 . 
89 
b. Executive Committee 175 4.42 . 91 171 
3.78 1.04 
c. Remuneration Committee 175 4.35 . 87 171 
2.95 1.14 
d. Nomination Committee 174 4.33 . 90 169 
2.87 1.13 
e. Corporate Governance Committee 173 4.30 . 98 170 2.21 1.14 
f. Risk Committee 174 4.07 1.06 170 2.06 1.10 
g. Social Responsibility Committee 174 3.83 1.08 170 1.85 . 98 
h. Sharta Committee 174 3.82 1.24 170 2.13 1.21 
Note: Cronbach's Alpha Test for Q14.1 - 0.89 and Q14.2 - 0.77. Panel A of Table 6.15 shows the number 
of respondents, the means and standards deviations for Q14.1 and 14.2. 
Panel B: Existence and Effectiveness of Committees 
Committee 
Existence 
Q15.1 
Effectiveness 
Q15.2 
Yes No N Mean Std. Deviation 
a. Audit Committee 94% 6% 34 4.26 . 75 
b. Executive Committee 78% 22% 27 4.37 . 62 
c. Remuneration Committee 64% 36% 26 4.07 . 84 
d. Nomination Committee 58% 42% 23 4.17 . 71 
g. Social Responsibility Committee 14% 86% S 4.40 . 89 
h. Sharia Committee 14% 86% 6 4.16 . 75 
e. Corporate Governance Committee 11% 89% 7 4.42 . 78 
f. Risk Committee 6% 94% 4 3.75 1.50 
Note: Cronbach's Alpha = 0.99, N= 36. Panel B of Table 6.15 shows the percentages of response for 
Q15.1and the number of respondents, the means and standards deviations for Q15.2. 
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think that they are not doing enough to fulfil their roles and discharge their 
responsibilities, even though company respondents were satisfied with the way that their 
own boards were discharging their responsibilities. 
6.7 Board of Directors 
5 
4.5 
4 
3.5 
3 
2.5 
2 
3oards should do, 
4.554 
My board does, 
3.904 
Boards actually do, 
2.922 
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 
Note: The Figure shows the differences between the stakeholders perceptions about the board of directors' 
responsibilities. The first circle shows the perception of stakeholders regarding that boards should be 
responsible for ten elements given in Q13.1, while second circle shows their perception about the actual 
practices of these elements by boards of directors ten (Q13.2). The last circle show the perception of groups 
N and M about the practices of these elements by boards of their own companies (Q 13.3). 
6.3.7 Board of Directors' Sub-Committees 
Questions 14 and 15 were designed to assess the importance, existence and effectiveness 
of board subcommittees in the Saudi business environment. Table 6.15 (Panel A), shows 
that stakeholders perceive the audit committee as the most important board 
subcommittee, with a mean of 4.63, while they consider the executive committee the 
second most important (4.42), followed by committees concerned with remuneration 
(4.35), nomination (4.33) and corporate governance (4.30). Those considered important 
but not to a great extent were the risk, social responsibility and Sharia committees. 
Groups means for Q14.1, listed in Table 6.15 (Panel C), show that while group R are in 
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favour of almost all of the committees, group M were less responsive that these board 
subcommittees are important. The K-W test reveals significant differences between 
groups in their assessment of the importance of all committees except the social 
responsibility committee, while the M-W test P-values indicate significant differences 
between all stakeholder groups except R and I who seem to have similar attitudes about 
board subcommittees. However, the audit committee was chosen by all stakeholder 
groups as the most important board subcommittee, but, surprisingly, the Sharia 
committee was ranked least important by all stakeholders groups, apart from group I, who 
appear to believe in the role of such committee to ensure that companies adhere to Sharia 
law. 
It is difficult to explain this result, but it might be related to stakeholders' awareness 
about the nature and role of the Sharia committee since there is no adequate information 
about the issues related to Sharia committees, such as its role, composition, and authority, 
or simply because they do not believe such a committee is necessary at all. 
When asked about the existence of board sub-committees as opposed to the importance of 
them, the audit committee was regarded by respondents as the committee that most 
commonly existed in Saudi companies (Table 6.15) (Panel A); scores for all other 
committees apart from the executive committee were below 3, indicating that they 
generally do not exist in Saudi companies. According to the K-W P-values shown in 
Table 6.15, there were very significant differences among the respondents in respect of 
views about the existence of audit and executive committees; M-W tests indicate that the 
key differences were between groups N and M on one side and the other stakeholders 
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previous question had asked all stakeholders about the importance and existence of these 
committees generally in Saudi companies. Table 6.15 (Panel B) presents data on the 
replies concerning the actual existence and effectiveness of board subcommittees in 
respondents' companies and confirms the above results, that audit committees exist most 
widely, as 94% of the company respondents state that their companies have set up audit 
committees, and executive committees are the second most commonly reported, by 78% 
of respondents to this question. Almost two-thirds of participants (64%) say that 
remuneration committees are in place in their companies and over half (58%) of those 
surveyed report the existence of nomination committees, whereas only a small number of 
respondents indicate that there were social responsibility (14%), Sharia (14%), corporate 
governance (11%) or risk (6%) committees in their companies. 
When asked to evaluate the effectiveness of these subcommittees, Table 6.15 (Panel B) 
shows that the company respondents indicate their satisfaction with all committees. 
Interestingly, the corporate governance committee is considered as the most effective 
committee, with a mean of 4.42, and the social responsibility came next with a mean of 
4.40. even though so few companies have either of these committees. Thus, although 
corporate governance and social responsibility committees rarely exist in Saudi 
companies, they are very effective in fulfilling their roles when they do exist. Also 
executive committees (4.37) receive strong recognition as effectual committees, whereas 
risk committees are considered not as effective as other board subcommittees. The K-W 
tests results show that there are no significant differences among respondents regarding 
their responses to Q15.2. 
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groups. Furthermore, group means shown in Table 6.15 (Panel C) indicate that groups N 
and M were most likely to report the existence of these committees in their companies. 
This result suggests that there is a gap between company respondents and other 
stakeholders groups about the existence of board subcommittees. Perhaps this can be 
explained as a result of inadequate information about these committees or by the lack of 
information that stakeholders have about companies. 
Figure 6.8 provides a comparison between which board subcommittees stakeholders think 
companies should have and the existence of these committees. The comparison indicates 
that there is a variance between which subcommittees should exist and the actuality of 
these committees in Saudi companies. The figure shows that, apart from the audit and 
executive committees, other committees only exist infrequently. 
Figure 6.8 The Importance and Existence of Board of Directors Sub- 
Committees 
a. Audit Committee 
h. Sharia C 
g" 
f. Risk G 
xecutive... 
c. Remuneration... 
lomination... 
-Importance 
-Existence 
Note: The Figure shows the comparison between the perceptions of stakeholders about 
the important of board's committees and their perceptions of the existence of these 
committees on the Saudi companies' boards. 
The next question asked only the company respondents, groups N and M, about the actual 
existence and effectiveness of board subcommittees in their own companies, whereas the 
e. Corporate... 
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Overall, the results raised from Q15 reflect that board subcommittees are recognised as 
important committees and, furthermore, they are generally regarded as effective 
committees. However, the audit and executive committees are most common with less 
nomination and remuneration committees. 
6.4 The Corporate Governance Framework in Saudi Companies 
The next section of the questionnaire focused on issues related to the corporate 
governance frameworks in the Saudi business environment. Respondents were asked 
about what company practices should be and these responses were compared with what 
company respondents reported regarding their own companies' actual practices. 
While respondents agree that Saudi companies should adopt all eleven elements that 
appear in Table 6.16 to provide an appropriate framework for good corporate governance 
practices, there were three distinct levels of agreement. First, they agreed strongly that 
companies should do statements (g), (h), (k), (i), (c ), and (f). The second slightly lower 
level of agreement, was with statements (d), (a) and (j). Finally, the least strong 
agreement was with statements (e) and (b). 
Interestingly, Table 6.16 shows that group M, with a mean of 3.66, and group N (3.72) 
only agreed to some extent that companies should have an independent chairmen. This 
result can possibly be explained by evidence from the interviews with the company 
directors, where they debated whether companies with owner-chairmen would perform 
better since owner chairmen regard themselves as the spiritual fathers of their companies 
and that such chairmen come from family businesses with wide experience and the 
desire, as an owner, to look after their companies' interests and monitor transactions and 
achieve their objectives. Group R agreed more so than the rest of the groups that Saudi 
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companies should adopt all these elements to create a good environment for the 
implementation of corporate governance. However, respondents indicated their 
dissatisfaction with current corporate governance practices in the Saudi business 
environment. Their answers reflect a weak corporate governance framework and show 
that companies have only adopted corporate governance practices to a minor extent; the 
overall means ranged between 2.11 and 2.83. The only exception is that, there is to some 
extent a separation between chairman and CEO roles in Saudi companies (mean = 3.01). 
When asked to describe their own companies' actual corporate governance practices, 
groups M and N reported low levels of adherence to desirable norms. Group means and 
K-W tests show there is a correspondence in the views of M and N in relation to their 
companies' actual practices of corporate governance. 
6.5. Disclosure and Transparency 
Question 16 elicited respondents' views about the aspects of information that companies 
should disclose and their assessment of the level of commitment to disclosure by Saudi 
companies. Groups M and N were asked about their own companies' disclosure practices. 
Respondents generally agreed that Saudi companies should disclose all nine elements 
identified in question 16.1, although there was stronger agreement on the importance of 
disclosing the financial and operating results of the company (mean = 4.74), company 
objectives (4.53), future plans (4.53) and major share ownership and voting rights (4.50) 
than other information. K-W test results show significant differences among the groups in 
their answers to 7 out of 9 elements, especially between group R and company officers as 
represented by groups M and N. Group R felt most strongly that companies should 
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disclose all nine elements, whereas company respondents (groups M and N) were the 
groups least strongly in support of disclosure and transparency. This result signifies the 
different perceptions that regulators and companies have about what information should 
be disclosed. And, apart from the financial and operating results of the company, 
companies are still conservative about disclosing other information in relation to 
companies and think that stakeholders should not know about them. 
Table 6.17 Disclosure and Transparency 
Panel A: Ouestions 
Companies should 
disclose (Q16.1) 
Companies actually 
disclose (Q16.2) 
My company discloses 
(Q16.3) 
Statement 
N Mean Std. N Mean Std. N Mean Std. Deviation Deviation Deviation 
a. The financial and 
operating results of the 175 4.74 . 71 173 3.84 . 97 
37 4.48 
. 60 
company 
b. Company objectives 174 4.53 . 85 172 3.31 1.01 37 4.13 . 78 
c. Company future 175 4.53 
. 84 173 2.79 1.01 37 3.67 1.02 plans 
d. Major share 
ownership and voting 173 4.50 . 95 171 2.57 1.13 37 3.24 1.32 
rights 
e. Related party 175 4.34 . 95 171 2.59 1.06 36 3.44 1.18 transactions 
f. Foreseeable risk 174 4.33 
. 94 170 2.28 . 99 
37 2.89 1.24 
factors 
g. Governance 
structures and policies, 
in particular, the 
content of any 175 4.32 
. 91 171 2.35 . 98 
36 3.00 1.04 
corporate governance 
code or policy and the 
process by which it is 
implemented 
h. Remuneration, 
qualifications, 
selection, other 175 4.16 1.08 172 2.36 . 99 37 2.97 1.14 directorships and 
independence 
i. Issues regarding 
employees and other 175 4.00 1.14 171 2.18 . 99 37 
2.72 1.14 
stakeholders 
Note: Cronbacd's Aipna i est ror Lio. i=u. y 1,1116.1= U. 88 and Q16.3=U. 94. Panel A of labte 6.17 
shows the number of respondents, the means and standards deviations for Q16.1, Q16.2 and Q16.3. 
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In contrast to the general support for disclosure and transparency, the survey indicates 
widespread dissatisfaction with companies' actual practices in this area, and disagreed 
that disclosure and transparency were occurring with respect to 7 out of 9 elements. In 
Table 6.17, K-W tests show 7 significant differences among the respondents groups, the 
most significant ones, according to the M-W test, being between group M and both 
groups 0 and I. The former believed more strongly that their companies complied with 
the requirements for disclosure and transparency. It is somewhat surprising that group R 
agreed the most that Saudi companies are disclosing the financial and operating results 
(4.570) and company objectives (4.11) even more so than the company respondents 
themselves. However, a p-value of (. 01) of M-W test reveals very significant differences 
between groups M and N with regard to companies disclosure about remuneration, 
qualifications, selection, other directorships and independence, and suggests that group N 
are dissatisfied with companies disclosure about these issues. This result shows the 
variance among company directors' viewpoints in relation to disclosing enough 
information about themselves, which supports some interviewees views that there is a 
lack of information about directors in Saudi companies. 
In respect to disclosure and transparency practices in their own companies, groups M and 
N indicated that, while there was disclosure of financial and operating results (mean = 
4.48), company objectives (4.13), future plans (3.67), transactions with related parties 
(3.44), and major share ownership and voting rights (3.24), the remaining elements are 
less well disclosed, since the respondents agreed to only a minor extent that their own 
companies actually disclosed them. 
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6.6 Stakeholders 
This section focuses on companies' stakeholders indicating the perception of the 
respondents in relation the accountability relationship between companies and their 
stakeholders and shows the ownership structure in Saudi companies and the rights of 
stakeholders and shareholders. 
6.6.1 Stakeholders and Accountability 
Question 17.1 sought the respondents' views of which groups of stakeholders have 
accountability relationships with Saudi companies, and Q17.2 which stakeholders should 
have representation on the board. Table 6.18 shows that respondents strongly agreed that 
there was an accountability relationship between a company and its shareholders, with a 
mean of 4.27, and also with other stakeholders (environmental groups, the regulatory and 
monitoring bodies, the government, customers, the community, auditors, financial 
consultants and analysts, lenders, suppliers and employees) apart from academics. Table 
6.18 (Panel A) shows that all respondent groups agreed strongly that there was an 
accountability relationship between a company and its shareholders, and group It, 
believed that there was such a relationship with the government, the regulatory and 
monitoring bodies, employees, the community, auditors and lenders. The K-W and M-W 
tests indicate that there were no significant differences between respondent groups in 
respect of the accountability relationship between a company and its shareholders, but 
there were many significant differences between the five groups about accountability to 
all other stakeholder parties, the major differences were between group N and groups 0 
and R and between groups R and M. In response to which stakeholder groups should be 
represented on company boards, respondents again agreed that only shareholders should 
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have seats, with an overall mean of 4.39. Other stakeholders were not considered to have 
any right to be represented on boards. Moreover, K-W and M-W test outcomes show that 
there were no significant differences between the respondent groups in respect of the 
representation rights of shareholders. On the other hand, K-W tests demonstrate 
significant differences between respondents group in their answers with reference to other 
stakeholders parties, and M-W tests show that the most important differences were 
between groups N and 1 (13 times), N and 0 (12 times), N and R (11 times) N and M (7 
times). These differences are a consequence of the strong belief among group N that no 
stakeholders, other than shareholders, have a right to sit on the board. This was an 
unexpected result since the non-executive directors, especially independent directors, 
should represent stakeholder parties who are not on the board but surprisingly they 
thought these parties do not have any right to be represented on the board. 
Table 6.18 Stakeholders 
Panel Ae nnestions 
Statement 
There is an accountability 
relationship between a company 
and: (Q17.1) 
These stakeholders should 
have a representative on the 
board 17.2 
N Mean Std. N Mean Std. 
Deviation Deviation 
a. Shareholders 174 4.27 1.02 174 4.39 1.07 
b. Regulatory and monitoring bodies 173 3.79 1.18 174 2.59 3.44 
c. The government 175 3.72 1.16 174 2.18 1.35 
d. Lenders 174 3.67 1.18 175 2.11 1.21 
e. Employees 174 3.67 1.27 176 2.42 1.35 
f. Auditors 175 3.57 1.23 174 2.10 1.34 
g. Customers 175 3.52 1.31 175 1.96 1.22 
h. Suppliers 175 3.50 1.27 174 1.82 1.07 
1. Community 174 3.48 1.30 174 2.19 1.31 
J. Financial consultants and analysts 175 3.38 1.24 174 2.16 1.27 
k. Environmental groups 175 3.15 1.30 175 1.94 1.16 
1. Media 176 3.14 1.26 175 1.74 1.09 
m. Academics 176 2.94 1.25 175 1.83 1.13 
Note: Cronbach's Alpha Test for Q 17.1 =U. 94 and Q17.2=0.88. Panel A of Table 6.18 shows the number 
of respondents, the means and standards deviations for Q 17.1 and Q17.2. 
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6.6.2 Ownership Structure 
Q18 asked group M and N about the ownership structure of their companies and to 
specify the proportion of shares held by major shareholders and whether these 
shareholders had representatives on the board. Table 6.19 presents the proportions of 
ownership given by 30 respondents to six major categories of shareholders in their 
companies. The results show that individual private investors (who are often in reality a 
part of a business family but sometimes some famous investors are considered as 
individuals), family members and the government are the most common shareholders 
types. Apart from one respondent who stated that fund managers owned more that 10% of 
her/his company shares, no shareholder has more than 10% of a company's shares other 
than the three major shareholders mentioned above. Institutional investors, such as fund 
managers, social insurance funds and pension funds, were all reported to have less than 
10% of companies' shares. 
Table 6.19 The Proportions of Ownership of Major Shareholders and their 
upnrPQPntatinnc on the Boards 
Government Individual 
Public Social Pension Fund Fa mily Private 
Investment Insurance Funds Managers Members Investors 
Fund 
Ownership Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent 
ro ortion 
<%10 10 67% 11 100% 10 100% 15 94% 5 20% 6 20% 
11%<%30 4 26% 0 0% 0 0% 1 6% 12 48% 19 64% 
31%<%50 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 6 24% 4 13% 
>50% 1 7% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 2 8% 1 3% 
N=30 15 11 10 16 25 30 
Do the have representatives on the board? 
Yes 12 35% 8 23% 8 23% 2 6% 29 85% 29 85% 
No 22 65% 26 77% 26 77% 32 94% 5 15% 5 15% 
N=34 
Note: The'l able snows me responaent of groups N ana m regaraing the percentages inat eacn catogries oz 
major shareholders own in their companies and whether they have representative on the board or not. 
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The results show that individual private investors and family shareholders own between 
11% and 30% of the companies shares, and they rarely own more than a half of a 
company's shares. Unexpectedly, the government seems to own more than 10% of 
companies; it has between 11% and 30% ownership in four companies and in one 
company was the major shareholder. These results point out that there is a concentrated 
ownership structure among Saudi companies since major investors have substantial 
shares blocks. 
Question 18.2 asked respondents whether the major shareholders in their companies had 
representatives on the board; 34 companies responded as shown in the bottom of Table 
6.19. As expected the results show that individual private and family members were the 
investors most likely to have directorships, as 85% of the respondents declared that these 
two groups had seats on their companies' boards. Approximately one third of respondents 
stated that government investors had such representatives, while less than a quarter (23%) 
said that institutional investors of social insurance and pension funds did so. Interestingly, 
fund managers were said by two respondents to have representatives on their board, 
although regulations do not allow them to sit on Saudi companies' boards, because, in 
Saudi fund managers belong to banks; so it may be that the respondents believe these 
board members represent fund managers but in reality represent other shareholders. 
Figure 6.9 provides a model of how Saudi companies' boards of directors are structured 
by gathering the company respondents' answers about the representatives on their 
companies' boards. The figure shows that individual private and family investors equally 
dominate two thirds of boards whereas other major shareholders represent one third. This 
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third contains 14% of government investors and 9% for each of social insurance and 
pension funds investors. 
ure 6.9 The Owners Representation on Companies Boards 
Representation on board 
  Government 
Y Social Insurance 
u Pension Funds 
  Fund Wagers 
U Family 
u Private Investors 
Note: The Figure shows the company's respondents, groups N and M been answers about 
which of their own companies owners have representatives on the board. 
6.6.3 The Roles and Rights of Shareholders and Stakeholders 
The purpose of Q19 was to provide a wider understanding of the roles of shareholders 
and stakeholders in Saudi companies by asking the participants to express their views on 
10 statements addressing some important issues related to shareholders and stakeholders. 
Q19(a) asked all respondents whether it was common for Saudi companies to have major 
shareholders. The results in Table 6.20 show that Saudi companies tend to have major 
shareholders, with an overall mean score of 4.30 (standard deviation = . 94), and all five 
stakeholder groups agreed with the existence of major shareholdings in listed companies. 
This result confirms the previous results about ownership structure in their own 
companies and that there is a concentrated ownership structure in Saudi companies. 
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Respondents also agreed, in response to Q19(b), that major shareholders had control and 
a direct influence over companies' activities, with an overall mean of 4.18. The strongest 
agreement came from group R (4.57), whereas the weakest was that of group M (mean = 
3.63). Consistent with these results, M-W tests suggested that the responses of group M 
were significantly different from those of groups R and I. 
In response to Q19(c), respondents agreed (mean = 4.01) that ownership structure 
affected corporate governance practices and again M agreed less strongly (3.68). As a 
response to Q19(e) and (h), despite the fact that respondents have a neutral attitude 
regarding the protection of shareholders' interests, including minority shareholders, under 
Saudi law, with an overall mean of 3.27; they were unhappy with the current practice of 
shareholder protection in the Saudi business environment. Interestingly, the results show 
there are differences between insider and outsider directors in relation to the protection of 
shareholders rights by Saudi companies, group N with a mean of (2.68) disagreed with 
the adequacy of shareholder protection in Saudi companies, whereas group M had a mean 
of (3.21). 
The survey indicates that there is inequitable treatment of shareholders by Saudi 
companies (mean = 2.60). Group means show significant differences between the two 
groups of company respondents: group M, with a mean of 3.33, supported to some extent 
the proposition that companies treat all types of shareholders equitably, while group N 
(2.57) had a different perception, believing on balance that companies distinguish 
between their different categories of shareholders. 
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However, these results draw attention to the fact that there is a perception inadequate of 
protection of shareholders rights and inequitable treatment of shareholders by Sau di 
companies and, arguably, more effort is required to be done in laws regulating, 
supervising and monitoring the protection and equitable treatment of shareholders 
including minorities. 
Question 19(d) focused on the role that an accumulative voting system plays in enabling 
minority shareholders to appoint representatives on company boards. The participants 
appeared to be supportive of such a procedure to assist shareholders in placing their 
representatives in the boardroom, as they agreed to some extent with statement 19(d), 
with a mean of 3.73. Group R were the stakeholder group who believed most strongly in 
the importance of an accumulative voting system to support the rights of minority 
shareholders to be represented on the board, as seen by a group mean of 3.96, whereas 
group M were least likely to consider this voting system as an efficient tool for minority 
shareholders to affect decision-making (mean = 3.47). The unfamiliarity and lack of 
awareness of the nature and role of such a voting system was also found when doing the 
interviews, and could be an explanation for only weak agreement by the respondents and 
may indicate the need for more enlightenment in this area. 
The participants were neutral about the extent to which institutional investors exercised 
their ownership rights (mean = 3.00). Groups means in Table 6.20 show that group N are 
the most to disagree that institutional shareholders are fulfilling their roles and see them 
as not exercising their ownership rights. Although the rest of the stakeholders had a 
different attitude from group N and agreed more readily that institutional investors 
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exercised their ownership rights, group N viewpoint is, arguably, particularly important 
due to that fact their position enables them to judge and evaluate institutional investors' 
engagement. In Q19(g) the respondents were asked to express the extent of their 
agreement with the proposition that Saudi companies respect the rights of stakeholders as 
established by law or through mutual agreements. The overall mean of 3.00 indicates that 
they expressed limited agreement on this point. M-W test results show that there were 
significant differences in answers between group 0, who thought that companies did not 
respect their rights, and groups R, I and M. Furthermore, low mean scores of 2.56 and 
2.51 respectively for statements 19(j) and (k) reflect a belief that Saudi companies do not 
adequately provide equal, timely and cost-efficient access to relevant information for all 
stakeholders and do not adequately enable stakeholders to communicate freely to the 
board their concerns about illegal or unethical practices. Group means reveal that the only 
group that had a different opinion were M. However, the results obtained from Q19 (g, j, 
and k), which focused on the stakeholders rights and the facilities that Saudi companies 
provide them, gives an impression that stakeholders rights are not considered as an 
essential issue among Saudi companies and it seems that it is very difficult for 
stakeholders to practice their rights as they do not have appropriate facilities which would 
enable them to look after their interests in the companies. 
6.7 Accountability Framework in the Saudi Business Environment 
Stakeholders' perceptions in relation to accountability and the Islamic accountability 
framework and their practices in the Saudi business environment were addressed next in 
the survey. 
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6.7.1 Accountability 
Respondents' views on accountability issues in the Saudi business environment were 
addressed by Q20. Table 6.21 suggests that the respondents had low agreement that 
accountability was generally practiced in Saudi society (mean = 2.30), and this 
dissatisfaction applied across all stakeholders groups (Table 6.21). Furthermore, the 
participants had low agreement that accountability was practiced in the Saudi business 
environment (mean = 2.61) and that companies, boards and managers are accountable for 
their actions. All stakeholder groups were less than enthusiastic about the level of 
accountability practiced by Saudi companies although, surprisingly, group N felt most 
strongly that accountability was poor in Saudi companies (2.10), whereas group R, with a 
mean of 2.80, were more positive that companies, boards and managers were accountable 
for their actions. Group R's attitude was also greater than group M themselves which can, 
perhaps, be explained that, although they are unhappy with the level of accountability 
practice in the Saudi business society, group R can see some improvements in relation to 
that. For example, a regulator interviewee stated that: 
"The awareness of board members has been improved. They know that 
membership is not honorary any more, that there are many huge 
responsibilities and that they should obtain the information which enables 
them to make decisions and have adequate time to deal with them, because 
they know that they are subject to accountability. " 
Additionally, in response to statement 20(c), concerning the accountability relationships 
between stakeholders and companies, respondents were unconvinced that stakeholders 
held companies to account (mean = 2.50). Although group N, agreed least strongly (mean 
= 2.10) whereas group M (2.89) were more neutral on whether stakeholders held 
companies to account. In relation to the extent of available accountability mechanisms in 
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Saudi companies, Table 6.21 shows that the responses differed little from the other 
accountability questions: the stakeholders of this study did not think that there were 
accountability mechanisms in place in Saudi companies (mean of 2.42), although group 
M (mean of 2.89), were again less negative about the existence of accountability 
mechanisms in Saudi companies. 
However, the participants agreed strongly that companies should adopt good corporate 
governance to discharge their accountability, since the overall mean of responses to 
statement 20(a) was 4.17 (standard deviation = 0.96). Although group 0 agreed less 
strongly (mean = 3.71), actual practice does not appear to accord with their wishes. 
Overall, the results of Q20 show that accountability practices are generally absent in 
Saudi society and, accordingly, in the business environment. In such an environment, 
stakeholders do not practice their rights to bring companies, boards, and managers, to 
account and so be accountable for their actions. However, Saudi stakeholders strongly 
believe that good corporate governance practices would improve the accountability of 
companies to their stakeholders and help companies to discharge their responsibilities. 
6.7.2 Islamic Accountability Framework 
In order to examine the views of Saudi stakeholders about the Islamic conception of 
accountability and the extent of its application in Saudi companies, respondents were 
asked to rate their level of agreement with seven relevant statements in Question 21 of the 
questionnaire as shown in Table 6.22. 
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Table 6.22 shows that respondents strongly agreed with the seven statements of Q21.1, 
They believe that companies, their boards and managers are accountable for their actions 
according to the Islamic conception of accountability, they most agreed that companies, 
their boards and managers are accountable to Allah in the first place and then to 
shareholders and stakeholders according to the Islamic conception of accountability. 
This result indicates clear support for the proposition that Saudi companies should be 
subject to all Islamic concepts of accountability and corporate governance. 
Furthermore, the results indicate that respondents were strongly in favour of considering 
Sharia as appropriate to business: (mean of 4.29), and that Saudi companies should be 
subjected to Sharia in all their transactions. Additionally, there was agreement that 
companies should offer the opportunity for stakeholders to participate in making 
decisions according to the Islamic concept of shura (consultation) (mean = 3.96) and that 
they should provide the opportunity to stakeholders to ensure that all their interests in the 
company are protected according to the Islamic concept of hisba (mean = 4.02). Group 
mean values and the M-W test results in Table 6.22 show that group N recorded the 
lowest means for all seven statements and indicate the existence of significant differences 
between group N and other groups. These results show that they are more dubious about 
the other five statements. 
Respondents appeared to believe that, in practice, Saudi companies do not fully obey 
Sharia in their all transactions and are far from applying the Islamic conception of 
accountability and conceptions of Shura and Hisba. The overall mean responses listed in 
Table 6.22 indicate that respondents strongly believe in Sharia and Islamic 
accountability, in addition to Shura and Hisba, but at the same time are not satisfied with 
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the actual practices of Saudi companies in this regard. The comparison of group means in 
Table 6.22 confirms that group M agreed more strongly with the practice of Islamic 
accountability by their companies; this attitude caused some significant differences 
between group M and other groups, as can be seen from M-W tests results. This indicates 
that there is a gap between companies and stakeholders in relation to the practice of 
Islamic accountability where even companies practicing accountability do not connect 
such conceptions to an Islamic perspective. 
Table 6.22 Islamic Accountability Framework 
Panel A: Ouestions 
Should be (21.1) Actually are (21.2) 
Statement 
N Mean Std. N Mean Std. Deviation Deviation 
a. Companies, their boards and managers are 
accountable to Allah according to the Islamic 175 4.49 . 88 172 2.88 1.13 
conception of accountability 
b. Companies, their boards and managers are 
accountable to shareholders according to the 175 4.41 . 88 173 2.63 1.02 Islamic conception of accountability 
c. Companies, their boards and managers are 
accountable to stakeholders according to the 174 4.35 . 90 172 2.65 . 95 Islamic conception of accountability 
d. Companies, their boards and managers are 
accountable for their acts according to the Islamic 175 4.33 . 97 
173 2.52 
. 96 
conception of accountability 
e. Companies are subject to Sharia in all their 
transactions 175 4.29 1.01 173 2.80 . 95 
f. Companies provide the opportunity to 
stakeholders to ensure that all their interests in the 
company are protected according to the Islamic 
174 4.02 1.17 171 2.42 . 87 
concept of Hisba 
g. Companies offer the opportunity for stakeholders 
to participate in making decisions according to the 175 3.96 1.20 173 2.37 . 89 Islamic concept of Shura 
Cronbach's Alpha . 928 . 910 
Note: Cronbach's Alpha 1 est for Q21.1 = U. 93 and Q21.2 = 0.91. Panel A of Table 6.22 shows the number 
of respondents, the means and standards deviations for Q 21.1 and Q21.2. 
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Question 22 was designed to establish whether there was any conflict between Sharia law 
and any corporate governance principles that could affect the practice of good corporate 
governance in an Islamic business environment such as that of Saudi Arabia. The results 
show that 98% of those who answered Q22 believe that Sharia does not conflict with 
good corporate governance principles. Some comments were made by the participants 
when they responded to this question, for example, an executive director who did not see 
any conflict between Sharia and corporate governance stated that: 
"A part of corporate governance principles is to protect shareholders' 
interests and to organize the relationship between the company's owners and 
board of directors which does not conflict with Islamic Sharia". 
In addition to that, an independent company chairman agreed, but raised the question: 
"Are we, as a Muslim society, actually implementing Sharia principles, 
which call for honesty, integrity and good treatment? ". 
However, a CEO thought there was a conflict between Sharia and corporate governance 
principles and mentioned that: 
"The Saudi corporate governance code should be well prepared according to 
Sharia which is the country's constitution". 
Surprisingly, the previous respondent thought that corporate governance principles 
conflicted with Sharia just because it had not been issued according to Sharia, not 
because the principles themselves were against Sharia. Furthermore, an investor 
respondent claimed that corporate governance principles do not seem to conflict with 
Sharia, but added that corporate governance principles should be confirmed by an 
authorized Sharia organisation and not be a matter only for regulatory bodies and 
companies' Sharia committees. These comments indicate that those who see a conflict 
between Sharia and corporate governance principles do not have any concern about the 
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principles themselves but a desire that these principles are issued according to Islamic 
Sharia Law and approved by an authorized Sharia body. 
6.8 Regulatory and Legal System 
The next section of the questionnaire asked about general views of the adequacy and 
effectiveness of the regulatory and legal system in the Saudi business context and 
examined the extent to which it would assist in providing an appropriate environment for 
corporate governance and accountability practices. It also sought to elicit an evaluation of 
the compliance with laws and regulations by companies and t he various regulatory, 
supervision and monitoring bodies. 
In Q23(b) respondents were asked to express their level of agreement with the statement 
that the laws and systems in Saudi Arabia are adequate, effective and provide an 
appropriate environment for corporate governance practices. Table 6.23 shows that the 
overall mean response was 2.87, indicating general low agreement with this statement 
and dissatisfaction with local laws and systems, and their ability to provide an appropriate 
atmosphere for the application of good corporate governance. Group means in Table 6.23 
show that group N were the group most strongly in agreement with statement 23(b) 
(mean = 3.31) in addition to groups M (3.10) and R (3.07), whereas groups of 0 and I 
were least likely to trust the laws and systems to provide the required conditions for 
practicing good corporate governance, with respective means of 2.53 and 2.87. This 
indicates that those who are more involved in companies' laws and systems are slightly 
happier about their adequacy and effectiveness than those parties who are less involved. 
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The overall response to statement 23(d), with a mean of 2.69, shows that respondents in 
all groups had very limited agreement with the proposition that the laws and systems in 
place in Saudi Arabia are adequate, effective and provide an appropriate environment for 
accountability practices. There was also limited satisfaction among respondents with the 
role of the judiciary and the courts in maintaining good corporate governance practices 
(mean = 2.34). Group N had least agreement with the suggestion that the judiciary and 
the courts play a significant role in maintaining good corporate governance practices. 
Respondents were asked in statement 23(e) to evaluate the bodies regulating, supervising 
and monitoring corporate governance; the overall mean response of 2.45 suggests that 
they did not consider these bodies to be effective. Furthermore, the respondents believed 
that the regulatory, supervisory and monitoring bodies did not coordinate well with each 
other (mean = 2.43). 
However, in response to statement 23(a), participants agreed to some extent that there 
was a need to establish a separate and independent body to look after corporate 
governance issues in Saudi Arabia, with an overall mean of 3.48. Group N (mean = 4.05) 
were the only group who strongly believed in the significance of the role of such an 
independent body, and group R agreed least strongly. Some of the questionnaire 
respondents commented on the importance of establishing an independent body and they 
thought that such a body would be a good idea to encourage corporate governance 
practice in the local business environment. For example, a financial consultant stated in 
the questionnaire that: 
"Corporate governance is in its early stages of implementation in Saudi 
Arabia, therefore, this requires that an independent body take the 
responsibility of organising and setting corporate governance codes and 
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regulations. This body should also require companies to adopt these codes 
and regulations" 
Moreover, an institutional investor claimed that: 
"Such an independent body for corporate governance should monitor the 
companies' practices of corporate governance in order to activate the role of 
real corporate governance as what is implemented is actually not more than 
nominal and a visit to any AGM proves that" 
In order to give a general perspective on the extent of adherence to laws and regulations 
by Saudi companies, respondents were asked to assess the extent of their agreement that 
Saudi companies comply with laws and regulations. The results shown in Table 6.23 
indicate that there were very limited satisfaction with such compliance, (mean = 2.84). 
M-W tests show significant differences between group 0, who felt least strongly that 
Saudi companies complied with laws and regulations (mean = 2.46) than all the other 
respondent groups. This gives an impression that the public thinks companies have only 
weak adherence with laws and regulations. 
The results obtained from Q23 demonstrate that Saudi stakeholders, and even group R 
themselves, are not happy with the regulation, law and systems in the Saudi business 
environment and that the legal system does not provide the appropriate environment for 
the good practice of accountability and corporate governance. In addition to that, there is 
limited satisfaction related to the performance of regulatory and supervisory bodies as 
well as to companies' non-compliance with laws and regulations, all of which shows that 
there is a perception of a weak legal system in the Saudi business environment that 
directly affects the practice of good corporate governance. A possible explanation of why 
stakeholders do not agree strongly with the idea of establishing a separate and 
independent body to take care of corporate governance issues in Saudi Arabia may be 
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that stakeholders think the problem is not only limited to corporate governance 
regulations but to the legal framework in Saudi Arabia in general and to the business 
legal framework more specifically. 
6.9 Other Factors Influencing Corporate Governance in Saudi Arabia 
This section investigates the impact of social, cultural, political, economic and other 
factors on the practice of corporate governance in Saudi Arabia. In response to statements 
24(a) and 24(b), respondents agreed that social and cultural factors, such as favouritism, 
family ties and tribalism, have a direct impact on corporate governance practices in Saudi 
Arabia, with respective means of 4.03 and 4.00. They also agreed that corruption, politics 
and the economic situation in Saudi Arabia all have an impact on corporate governance 
practices. Group means in Table 6.24 indicate that group N believe strongly that social, 
cultural, political and economic factors, as well as corruption, have an impact on the 
practice of corporate governance in Saudi business, whereas group M thought less about 
the impact of these factors. This shows that outsider directors are more concerned about 
the impact of these factors over companies' practices. 
However, some questionnaire respondents commented on the impact of the political 
situation over the practice of corporate governance in Saudi Arabia. For example, a non- 
executive company chairman drew attention to a crucial issue when he stated in the 
questionnaire that: 
"Corporate governance can not be effective without equality treatment for 
all parties and implementing the decision of the Council of Ministers which 
disallows the ministers and senior officers in the government for chair or 
being a member of boards of directors ofjoint-stocks companies". 
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A company manger (without giving any further details) notes that: 
"The presence on boards or enforcement of partnership of some of the royal 
family memberships should be considered as an influential factor over 
corporate governance practices in Saudi Arabia". 
In the same context, an academic argued in the questionnaire that: 
"Corporate governance should be effective and implemented in reality, 
without any exception, and regardless of who are the companies chairmen". 
In relation to the corruption factor, a company non-executive chairman mentioned that: 
"Good practice of corporate governance in Saudi will take time, till then; the 
most important issue for shareholders is to ensure that their companies' 
decisions are free of corruption". 
Some participants talked in the questionnaire about economic factors such as the weak 
level of investment knowledge in Saudi Arabia and considered it as an obstacle facing 
good corporate governance practice, for example, a fund manger argued that: 
"The investment knowledge is absent among the minorities of shareholders, 
more work should be done to make them aware of their rights". 
Furthermore, the auditing and accounting professions in Saudi Arabia seem to exert 
some influence on corporate governance practices, as the respondents showed reasonable 
agreement with this (mean of 3.84). However, they were less sure that the cost of 
corporate governance affected the practice of corporate governance in Saudi Arabia: the 
overall mean was 3.14. 
The most interesting results were found by the M-W tests in relation to the two previous 
factors where there was a very significant difference between groups R and M in 
response to the impact of the auditing and accounting professions on corporate 
governance practices; group R, that includes auditor respondents, strongly believe the 
profession is important while group M only agree to some extent. 
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Another interesting result is related to how the cost of corporate governance could affect 
corporate governance practices; group M do not consider the matter of cost when looking 
to corporate governance, whereas other stakeholders groups do. 
6.10 Summary 
To obtain a larger view of stakeholders about corporate governance in Saudi Arabia a 
questionnaire survey was conducted as the second research data collection method. Seven 
hundred and sixty questionnaires were distributed over different groups of stakeholders in 
Saudi Arabia between April and June 2008, with a response rate of 23%, 176 
questionnaires returned. 
The questionnaire results are generally very similar to the results obtained from 
interviews. The results indicate that participants tend to perceived corporate governance 
from a narrow principal-agent view and only secondly from a stakeholder perspective. 
The questionnaire respondents confirmed the importance of corporate governance for 
Saudi companies but they pointed out that there is an inadequate awareness of corporate 
governance in the country. Furthermore, they agreed only to some extent with the Arabic 
translations of the English term corporate governance, and they chose Hawkama as the 
most suitable Arabic term to refer to corporate governance. 
The questionnaire findings reflect dissatisfaction among Saudi stakeholders about 
companies' current practices of corporate governance. However, although Saudi 
stakeholders are in favour and aware of boards of directors' responsibilities they are 
dissatisfied with the way these responsibilities are carried out by Saudi companies. They 
were also dissatisfied with the Saudi corporate governance code as well as with 
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companies' compliance with the code. The results provide evidence that the processes of 
the selection of directors in Saudi companies are often ba sed on t wo factors, share 
ownership and personal relationships. The respondents thought that ownership and 
personal relationship factors are the major factors to influence directors' appointments in 
Saudi Arabia. The results show that stakeholders agree with the national code in relation 
to the proportion of independent NEDs as one third of the board, and Saudi companies 
seem to comply with this requirement. The respondents also agree with the code that five 
memberships should be the maximum number of board memberships that a person should 
have at any one time, the companies again seem to comply with this. On the other hand, 
the questionnaire respondents disagree with the code in relation to the size of the board, 
as the code requires companies to have between 3 and 11 members; the results suggest 
that there should be different sizes of board according to company size, but Saudi 
companies are complying with the national code of corporate governance in relation to 
board size. The respondents considered all board sub-committees as effective committees 
but they indicated that the audit and executive committees are the most common 
committees in Saudi companies. 
Although the respondents supported an accountability relationship between a company 
and its stakeholders, they indicated that Saudi companies do not respect stakeholder's 
rights and do not enable them to practice their accountability relationships. The results 
suggest that there is a concentrated ownership structure in Saudi companies and the major 
shareholders are the government and families, and these major shareholders have control 
and a major influence over companies', activities and over the practices of corporate 
governance. The results show that although the participants have moderate agreement 
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that the rights of shareholders, including minorities, are well protected in law they were 
dissatisfied with level of companies respecting these rights. 
The questionnaire results show that Saudi stakeholders believe in accountability and that 
companies, boards and managers should be accountable for their actions and that good 
corporate governance practice will assist companies to discharge their accountability. The 
stakeholders were also in favour of the Islamic conception of accountability and thought 
that companies, boards and managers should be accountable for their actions to Allah, 
shareholders and stakeholders. On the other hand, Saudi stakeholders were dissatisfied 
with actual practice of accountability and Islamic accountability in society in general and 
in the business environment in particular. 
The participants also indicated their dissatisfaction with legal system in Saudi and the 
business environment. The laws and systems in Saudi do not provide an appropriate 
environment for good practices of corporate governance and accountability. The results 
also indicate the direct impact that factors of social, cultural, political and economic have 
over the practice of corporate governance in Saudi. The findings of the questionnaire 
survey support the findings from the interviews. The next chapter present a general 
discussion and conclusion. 
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Chapter 7 
Discussion and Conclusion 
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Chapter 7 
Discussion and Conclusion 
7.1 Introduction 
This final chapter summarises and brings together the main areas covered in this thesis, it 
highlights the major findings from the empirical work and provides suggestions based on 
stakeholders' perceptions to improve corporate governance in Saudi Arabia. In addition it 
discusses the main limitations to the research, suggests future research avenues and 
presents the research contribution to knowledge and final concluding thoughts. 
7.2 Summary of Research Project 
The purpose of the current study was to determine the perception of corporate 
governance by stakeholders in Saudi Arabia. Consequently, the study set out to provide a 
general understanding of how Saudi stakeholders perceived corporate governance and 
their evaluation of current corporate governance practices by Saudi companies as well as 
the adequacy of the corporate governance framework. Saudi stakeholders' perceptions on 
accountability and their evaluation of practices of accountability in the Saudi business 
were also investigated. 
The thesis consists of seven chapters. Chapter 1 gives a general introduction about the 
study's aims, the research questions and structure. In Chapter 2, the general corporate 
governance literature is reviewed including the literature of corporate governance in 
emerging markets. Chapter 2 also covers corporate governance in Saudi Arabia. It 
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provides a general background about the country of study, including a range of issues in 
relation to Saudi politics, the social, economic and legal systems, the business 
environment and the accounting and auditing profession. 
The research findings are interpreted according to an accountability theoretical 
framework and the Islamic theory of accountability as discussed in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 
focuses on the research methodology and methods. An interpretive methodological 
approach has been adopted to provide an understanding of Saudi stakeholders' 
perceptions of corporate governance. Semi-structured interviews and a questionnaire 
survey are the two methods adopted to obtain the primary data of the study. In Saudi 
Arabia 22 stakeholders were interviewed, and 176 stakeholders participated in the 
questionnaire survey, these took place in two separate periods to investigate their view 
points on corporate governance. Chapters 5 and 6 contain an analysis of the results 
gathered from the interviews and the questionnaire survey respectively. 
This section discusses the main findings generated from both pieces of empirical work, 
the interviews and questionnaire survey that were chosen to investigate the perspective of 
stakeholders about corporate governance and accountability in Saudi Arabia. Various 
stakeholder groups were asked to express their opinions about different issues related to 
corporate governance and accountability with the intention of exploring their 
consideration of these subjects. In particular, they were asked to state their opinions about 
the current practices of corporate governance and accountability in the local environment, 
and the Islamic conception of accountability was also considered. 
This study addresses the following research questions: 
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1. What is the understanding of the concept of corporate governance in Saudi 
Arabia and does this fit in with an accountability and stakeholder framework? 
2. Do the current practices of corporate governance in Saudi Arabia reflect 
corporate accountability to stakeholders? 
3. How adequate is the corporate governance framework in Saudi Arabia? 
4. What is the understanding of accountability and its current practice in Saudi 
Arabia and does differ between different stakeholder groups? 
The following sections sum up the key findings of the study to answer the research 
questions and provide a general understanding of corporate governance and 
accountability in the Saudi business environment. 
7.3 The Understanding of Corporate Governance in Saudi Arabia 
The answer to the first research question provides a general understanding of how Saudi 
stakeholders consider corporate governance and includes issues such as the definition, 
importance, awareness, and translation of corporate governance as well as board of 
directors, disclosure, transparency and stakeholders. 
7.3.1 The Concept of Corporate Governance 
There is a wide agreement amongst the interviewees that corporate governance is new in 
the Saudi business environment and that serious debate about corporate governance only 
started after the Saudi stock market crash in February 2006. It was thought that the 
dramatic, continual increase in companies' share prices over a long period before 2006 
ensured that no one paid any attention to corporate governance until the collapse. In 
addition, there were no public scandals or collapses of any Saudi companies to alert 
shareholders to any corporate governance failings. 
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The questionnaire results provide evidence that, although there is no clear definition of 
corporate governance, stakeholders in Saudi Arabia generally have a very narrow 
conception of corporate governance as they consider Cadbury's definition of corporate 
governance, based on an agency perspective, as the appropriate definition. The system by 
which companies are directed and controlled, was the most accepted definition by the 
questionnaire respondents. Furthermore, interviewees also had a narrow standpoint by 
limiting their definition of corporate governance to the function of directing, and did not 
even consider the controlling of a company as a part of corporate governance. The 
stakeholder view received far less support than the Cadbury definition, by all the 
stakeholders groups. Except for NEDs (Group N), the other four groups saw corporate 
governance as an internal function of directing and controlling a company. The NEDs, 
who should look after the interests of the minority of shareholders and those 
unrepresented on the board, have a much wider view of corporate governance, consistent 
with their remit. However, the fact that most Saudi stakeholders have a narrow perception 
of corporate governance limits companies' accountability to a wide group of 
stakeholders. The accountability relationship regarding corporate governance appears to 
be just between company management and the board of directors; the managers are 
accountable to the board of directors and they discharge their accountability accordingly. 
The board of directors' accountability relationship with company shareholders and other 
stakeholders is not really recognised. 
The findings from both the interviews and questionnaire survey show that stakeholders 
consider corporate governance as essential for Saudi companies and that the absence of 
such a system may lead to many problems for them. Saudi stakeholders think that good 
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corporate governance is necessary for Saudi companies to assist them in: defining 
authorities and responsibilities; protecting shareholders' rights including minorities; 
protecting the company and increasing its trustworthiness; and strengthening the national 
economy. 
However, the results find that stakeholders think that there is a lack of awareness about 
corporate governance and of its significance for Saudi society, and that such a perception 
is widely held across society, even by those who are closely involved with companies 
such as directors and investors. The researcher found this himself in his own observations 
when doing the interviews and administering the questionnaire. Many of those who 
refused to participate did so because of their lack of knowledge about corporate 
governance; they included a wide range of stakeholders including board members. It is 
worrying that even board members acknowledge that they know nothing about corporate 
governance. It has been recommended that monitoring, supervisory, and regulatory 
bodies should take responsibility for spreading an awareness of corporate governance and 
improving society's knowledge of its importance by setting up conferences, seminars and 
workshops and distributing publications that focus on corporate governance issues and 
practices. Furthermore, Saudi companies appear to suffer from a lack of sources of 
training programmes to improve their corporate governance practices. In addition, 
reference is made to the lack of academic courses that focus on corporate governance in 
Saudi universities. Again, this suggests a lack of accountability in Saudi Arabia. 
One of the main findings of the research is that the Arabic translation of the English term 
"Corporate Governance" does not provide the same meaning as the English term. 
Moreover, there is a high possibility that the translation could cause misunderstanding or 
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be misleading. The term "Corporate Governance" has only recently been translated into 
Arabic, and there are various translations in use in the Arabic literature and press. The 
study finds that the official term used by the CMA, "Hawkama", was chosen by 
stakeholders as the most appropriate Arabic term to refer to the English term of 
"Corporate Governance". So it can be suggested that by consistently only using 
Hawkama to refer to corporate governance, it will help in increasing the awareness of 
corporate governance and help communication and the consistency of understanding and 
hence improve accountability. 
7.3.2 Boards of Directors 
The interviewees specified factors that should be considered relating to the composition 
of the board of directors including: having experience in a company's field; being a 
specialist or having a background in economics, management, finance or auditing; being 
qualified; contributing to the variety of board members; having a good reputation; and 
having enough time to give to the company. 
A major finding of this research is that Saudi stakeholders' views conflict with the Saudi 
corporate governance code in relation to the size of the board of directors, the research 
findings suggest that the size of a board of directors should relate to the size of a 
company. Respondents agreed that small companies should have a board of directors 
containing between 4 and 8 members, medium-sized companies' boards should have 6 to 
10 members, whereas large companies should appoint 7 to 12 directors. This is in 
contrast to the code which recommends 3 members as the minimum and 11 as the 
maximum number of directors for all listed companies. The findings show a wide 
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acknowledgement that companies are different in their size and that this should relate to 
the size of the board. One of the interviewees said that it would be difficult for some large 
companies to have a limit of 11 directors on the board as a company's business may be 
very complex and divergent, so there may be a need for more directors to cover all the 
company business tasks. He added that his company has had to accept the resignation of 
one of its directors to reduce the number of directors to 11 to comply with the code. 
The findings indicate that there is an awareness among participant stakeholders about the 
importance of the role of independent NEDs on the board, to have the freedom to decide 
on company matters. The majority of the questionnaire respondents think that a 
company's board should contain one third of independent NEDs, which is consistent with 
the Saudi corporate governance code requirements. Interestingly, NEDs think that 
independent NEDs should be a half of the board. This may indicate their dissatisfaction 
with the current position of independent directors as only minorities on boards. 
The responses also show that Saudi stakeholders agree that the maximum number of 
board memberships for anyone person should be five which is, again consistent, with the 
Saudi code. In relation to the meetings of boards of directors, on which the Saudi code is 
silent, the findings reveal that quarterly meetings of boards of directors would, in the 
view of respondents, be enough to fulfil their roles. The questionnaire respondents 
strongly agreed that boards of directors' authorities and responsibilities should be well 
defined and that board members should be aware of them. The respondents strongly 
agreed that boards of directors are responsible for the ten functions suggested in the 
questionnaire (see Table 6.14 Panel A); thus, stakeholders are expecting a lot from boards 
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of directors in monitoring and supervising companies in order to discharge their 
responsibilities. 
In regard to boards of directors' sub-committees, the audit committee was considered to 
be the most important committee. The findings also show that executive, remuneration, 
nomination, corporate governance, and risk committees are also very important, while 
social responsibility and Sharia c ommittees seem to be less important; this may be 
because there is little awareness of the nature and roles of these committees. The 
findings also indicate that Saudi stakeholders strongly agree that boards of directors 
should: apply high ethical standards; provide access to accurate, relevant and timely 
information to board members; ensure that board members act on a fully informed basis, 
in good faith, with due diligence and care, and in the best interests of the company and 
the shareholders; have appropriate standards to evaluate board business; separate the 
chairman and CEO roles; exercise objective independent judgement on corporate affairs; 
subject board members to orientation programmes to train and qualify them; and have an 
independent chairman. These results illustrate that stakeholders are aware of, and agree 
with boards of directors' authorities and responsibilities according to corporate 
governance principles to discharge their accountability. 
7.3.3 Disclosure, Transparency and Stakeholders 
The current study explores the perception of stakeholders about disclosure and 
transparency in the Saudi business environment. There is an obvious concern about the 
role of disclosure and transparency; the findings show that there is a real desire for more, 
and better, disclosure and transparency by companies. The elements most emphasised 
269 
that companies should disclose and be transparent about are: the financial and operating 
results of the company; company objectives; company future plans; major share 
ownership and voting rights; related party transactions; foreseeable risk factors; 
governance structures and policies, in particular, the content of any corporate governance 
code or policy and the process by which it is implemented; remuneration, qualifications, 
selection, other directorships and independence; and issues regarding employees and 
other stakeholders. 
The findings reveal that participants regard all those who affect, or are affected by, a 
company's actions as its stakeholders and a company should take into account the 
interests of all stakeholders. However, when digging deeper the respondents do not 
believe that stakeholders, other than shareholders, should have the right of board 
representation. This indicates that consideration is given to shareholders in the Saudi 
business environment and, although a company could affect other parties, it appears that 
shareholders are viewed as those who most affect and are affected by a company's 
actions; consequently they are viewed as the only ones to have the right to be represented 
on the board to look after their own interests. 
The questionnaire respondents and interviewees agreed that an accumulative voting 
system would assist minority of shareholders to appoint representatives on the board. 
However, agreement was not unanimous amongst those surveyed and it may suggest 
that there is an inadequate awareness of the nature of the accumulative voting system, as 
the researcher observed while conducting the empirical work. Hence accountability 
seems to be severely restricted to only majority and powerful shareholders. 
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Overall, The answers to the first research question shows that Saudi stakeholders 
generally considered corporate governance from a narrow agency perspective which 
limited the accountability relationship to a limited groups of stakeholders, whoever, there 
was some consideration of a wide stakeholder perspective. In addition, although that 
corporate governance was considered as an important for Saudi companies it seem that 
there was an inadequate awareness of corporate governance in Saudi Arabia and that the 
Arabic translation of the English term seem to contribute to the lack of awareness since 
the findings indicate that these translations are misunderstanding or be misleading. The 
participants indicate well awareness about corporate governance issues in relation to 
board of directors, disclosure, transparency and stakeholders and that Saudi companies 
should improve their practices of these aspects of corporate governance to discharge their 
accountability. 
7.4 Current Practices of Corporate Governance in Saudi Arabia 
This section answers the second research question investigating the current practices of 
corporate governance in the Saudi business environment, the findings from both the 
interviews and the questionnaire gave general perceptions about how stakeholders 
regarded Saudi companies' practices of corporate governance. The findings show that, in 
general, Saudi companies started to pay attention to corporate governance issues just after 
the release of the corporate governance code by the CMA in November 2006. This was 
found to be the case even though there were at least two initiatives, recognised by Saudi 
companies, regarding corporate governance before this date. The findings indicate that 
there is a perception of inadequate compliance with corporate governance in Saudi 
271 
business society; Saudi stakeholders are dissatisfied with the current poor practices of 
corporate governance by companies and there is no single Saudi company which is 
viewed as having appropriately adopted corporate governance principles. Nevertheless, 
some companies have started to consider corporate governance requirements and have 
issued their own codes resulting in many changes in order to comply with corporate 
governance requirements. 
There are two main factors according to the participants in the research that influence 
Saudi companies' attitudes towards corporate governance are: the commitment of a 
company's chairman, owners, and board members; and a company's size and experience 
of dealing with corporate governance issues. The interviews illustrated that, although 
more efforts are needed to encourage better corporate governance practices, pressure at 
AGMs, and the CMA are increasing the pressure on companies to adopt good corporate 
governance systems; some interviewees think that it is just a matter of time before good 
corporate governance will occur in practice. The following subsections highlight the 
most important findings raised from the research in relation to the current state of 
corporate governance practice in Saudi Arabia. 
7.4.1 Boards of Directors 
The major factor that influences the process of appointing boards of directors in Saudi 
companies is personal relationships. The appointment of directors to Saudi companies is 
to a great extent, affected by personal relationships and favouritism. These relationships 
have, in the view of respondents, greater significance in the appointment of Saudi 
directors to companies' boards than experience, qualifications, financial or other specific 
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knowledge, reputation, or having enough time to spend on company business. The 
findings indicate that personal relationships influence the process of selection of 
executive, non-executive and independent non-executive directors, although, independent 
non-executive directors appointments are not influenced so much by the ownership 
factor. Boards that are dominated by directors who come through personal relationship 
channels may, consequently, follow the interests of those who appoint them and be only 
accountable to them, ignoring other stakeholders. Further, their lack of knowledge, 
experience, and qualifications might make it difficult for them to achieve even their own 
interests. The interviewees indicate that, although appointments in family-owned and 
government-owned companies are influenced by ownership, personal relationships and 
favouritism, some of these companies are also concerned about appointing directors who 
are well-qualified and with relevant expertise for their companies' boards. The study 
finds that majority shareholders dominate the decision of selecting board members and 
there is no role for nomination committees. Moreover, as an accumulative voting system 
is not used, major shareholders can agree among themselves about the composition of the 
board. The researcher's personal observations from attending some companies' AGMs 
are consistent with this result. 
This is however, a perception of a remarkable increase in the appointment of independent 
NEDs on companies' boards recently, at the same time as the overall number of 
executive directors has been reduced. The questionnaire respondents' results suggest that 
almost all of companies' boards contain at least one third of independent NEDs. This 
finding indicates that Saudi companies are generally in compliance with the Saudi 
273 
corporate governance code in regard to the number of independent NEDs that boards of 
directors should contain, but interviewees drew attention to the reality of NEDs 
independence, as they were chosen according to personal relationships. For example, an 
institutional investor declared that: 
"There should be a revision of the conception of balance that appears in the 
corporate governance code, as the balance of power is much more important 
that the balance of numbers" 
According to the responses, Saudi companies were also found to be in compliance with 
the requirements of the number of board memberships that a person have, which is not 
more than five boards at the same time, similarly, there was perception of compliance 
with requirements about the board of directors size, since all boards were between 7 and 
11 directors. The results also show that the majority of companies' board meetings are 
convened quarterly, and fewer companies met only three times a year, which was 
consistent with stakeholders' perceptions that were mentioned above. Table 7.1 compares 
the Saudi corporate governance code with stakeholders' perceptions of the actual 
practices of Saudi companies in relation to: the size of the board of directors; board 
meetings; proportion of independent NEDs; and the number of directorships that a person 
can have at the same time. 
Another important finding is that Saudi companies generally do not adhere to some 
crucial corporate governance practices. The participants claim that Saudi companies do 
not: separate the roles of chairman and CEO; have an independent chairman; subject 
board members to orientation programmes to train and qualify them; ensure that board 
members act on a fully informed basis, in good faith, with due diligence and care and act 
in the best interests of the company and the shareholders; apply high ethical standards; 
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exercise objective independent judgement on corporate affairs; have appropriate 
standards to evaluate board business; and provide access to accurate, relevant and timely 
information to board members. 
Table 7.1 Comparison between the Saudi Code, Stakeholders Perspective and 
Companies Actual Practice 
Saudi Corporate Stakeholders' perceptions of Companies' Actual 
Governance Code best practice Practice 
board of 
4 to 9 (small company) Size 
directors 
of b3 
to 11 Members 
6 to 10 (midum-size company) Comply 
7 to 12 (large company) Between 7 and 11 
Board of directors 
meetings 
One third 
Quarterly The majority meet 
quarterly 
Proportion of 
independent NEDs 
Boards 
memberships 
One third 
Not more than 5 Not more than 5 
Comply 
Comply 
Note: The Table compares between the Saudi corporate governance code and the questionnaire respondents 
perception of and the company's respondents about their own companies actual practices in relation to 
issues of board of directors size; meetings; independent NEDs; and number of directorships. 
However, the company respondents who thought that Saudi companies failed to adopt 
good corporate governance practices, st ated that their own companies adopted t hese 
aspects of corporate governance, apart from having an independent chairman and 
subjecting their boards members to training programmes. Moreover, the results show that 
Saudi stakeholders are concerned about the inadequate situation of there being no 
definition of a board's authorities and responsibilities or of ensuring that board members 
are aware of them. 
In relation to board sub-committees, audit and executive committees are viewed as being 
the most common in Saudi companies and that remuneration and nomination committees 
275 
are the next most widely found. All board sub-committees were considered as effective in 
fulfilling their roles although the executive and audit committees were regarded as the 
most effective committees. 
Overall, these findings suggest that personal relationships and favouritism have a major 
influence over the composition of board of directors' and activities in the Saudi 
companies, which mean that there is an accountability gap between these directors and a 
company's stakeholders. 
7.4.2 Disclosure, Transparency and Stakeholders 
The findings from the interviews and the questionnaire survey indicate that Saudi 
stakeholders are not happy with the disclosure and transparency of companies. The 
elements that companies inadequately disclosed most are: company future plans; major 
share ownership and voting rights; related party transactions; governance structures and 
policies, in particular, the content of any corporate governance code or policy and the 
process by which it is implemented; foreseeable risk factors; remuneration, qualifications, 
selection, other directorships and independence; and issues regarding employees and 
other stakeholders. However, the interviews indicate that, although they are dissatisfied 
with the companies' current disclosure and transparency, there are considerable 
improvements that have recently been made by CMA in promoting Saudi companies' 
disclosure and transparency. 
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The findings suggest that stakeholders' as distinct from shareholders are not considered 
when making decisions, and companies do not seem to respect the legal rights of 
stakeholders to an appropriate level. The participants believe that Saudi companies do not 
provide equal, timely and cost-efficient access to relevant information for all 
stakeholders. In addition to that, stakeholders are not able to communicate freely with the 
board about their concerns about any illegal or unethical practices. 
The results also indicate that Saudi companies are viewed as having a concentrated 
ownership structure and are dominated by major shareholders such as family and 
government investors. These major shareholders have control and a direct influence over 
companies' activities, and over companies' corporate governance practices. Additionally, 
the findings indicate that the rights of shareholders, including minority shareholders are 
viewed as being inadequately protected in practice and Saudi companies do not treat all 
shareholders equitably. 
In summary, answering the second research question indicates that although Saudi 
companies seem to be in compliance with some corporate governance features, they 
generally fail to comply with most corporate governance principles and have a poor 
corporate governance practices which means that Saudi companies are not discharging 
their accountability to stakeholders. Furthermore, directors in Saudi companies are 
generally appointed through relationships and are thus only accountable to the majority 
shareholders who appoint them. This indicates limited accountability of Saudi companies 
that do not consider a wider group of stakeholders' interests. 
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7.5 The Adequacy of the Corporate Governance Framework in Saudi Arabia 
The third question in this research relates to the adequacy of the corporate governance 
framework in Saudi Arabia in order to assess how this framework would assist good 
corporate governance practices. The follow subsections present the key findings of the 
interviews and questionnaire survey to different aspects of the corporate governance 
framework. 
7.5.1 Legal Systems 
The laws and systems in Saudi are not viewed as adequate or effective and do not provide 
an appropriate environment for corporate governance and accountability practices. The 
participants argue that the judiciary and courts do not play any significant role in 
maintaining strong corporate governance practices. The issues that concern the 
interviewees about the legal system in Saudi are the unclear and uncertain laws and 
systems; as well as the performance of the judiciary and courts. There are characterised 
by long routine procedures and a dissatisfaction with judges' professional performance, 
the shortage of judges and, in particular, qualified judges in business matters. An 
interviewee stated that: 
"There is an undoubted risk around commercial activities and business 
transactions. It's impossible to speak about an obvious, systematic and 
clearly defined legal environment where the rights, duties and obligations 
are determined. We are still far from this status. " 
The findings show that there is a widely held view that there is little compliance with 
laws and regulations by Saudi companies, that there is an inadequate legal framework in 
Saudi society and that this has a direct and negative impact over the practice of good 
corporate governance and accountability. 
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7.5.2 Regulatory, Supervisory and Monitoring Bodies 
The Ministry of Commerce and the Capital Market Authority are the two major bodies in 
charge of regulating, supervising and monitoring corporate governance in Saudi. These 
bodies are not viewed as efficient nor as fulfilling their roles, although the interviews 
show an appreciation for what the CMA has done to improve corporate governance 
practices. However, there is more dissatisfaction towards the Ministry of Commerce. 
Furthermore, the findings reveal that the regulatory, supervisory and monitoring bodies 
are not viewed as working well together and there are conflicts between them. These 
bodies are characterised as having a lack of professionalism and a lack of expertise. 
Consequently, the regulatory, supervisory and monitoring bodies in Saudi are not 
considered as providing an appropriate environment for the good practice of corporate 
governance and accountability. The findings suggest the need for establishing a new 
independent body to look after corporate governance issues in the Saudi business 
environment. 
In relation to the Saudi corporate governance code, which was issued in November 2006 
by the CMA, there is a general appreciation for the step of issuing the code and a general 
satisfaction among the interviewees but the questionnaire findings suggest that 
stakeholders are not satisfied with the code and do not see it as an adequate and 
effective. The interviews indicate that the code covers major corporate governance issues 
but the most important issue the code has raised is about an accumulative voting system. 
However, criticisms are that it is very general and lacks certainty and specification. Some 
interviewees see this as an advantage as the code just highlights the major corporate 
governance issues and lets companies themselves design their own corporate governance 
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policies and procedures according to their companies' circumstances. Other criticisms 
mentioned are that the code came too late and should have started from other countries 
codes. Some interviewees stated that the code appeared weak and repetitive as some 
issues are already in company law. The code also does not define some significant issues 
such as: the independence of NEDs; the authority and responsibilities of the board of 
directors; and its accountability; its nomination requirements; its evaluation standards; 
methods of protecting against corruption; and disclosure and transparency. The 
interviewees also think that the CMA should get help from national and international 
sources. 
The findings also show that Saudi companies generally are not viewed as being in 
compliance with the code, and suggest that the corporate governance code should be 
mandatory and that there should be penalties for non-compliant companies. However, 
although the results show there is a moderate familiarity among stakeholders with the 
national corporate governance code there is less familiarity with international 
developments in corporate governance. 
These results show that even though the Saudi corporate governance code is not efficient 
in term of discharging companies' accountability, Saudi companies do not even comply 
with it. In summary, a lot of work still needs to be done in regulating the practice of 
corporate governance in order to discharge companies' accountability. 
7.5.3 The Accounting and Auditing Profession 
The findings suggest that there is a real concern about the accounting and auditing 
profession in Saudi Arabia and the direct impact this has over the practices of corporate 
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governance and accountability. The issues of most concern to interviewees are: the 
weakness of the accounting and audit profession; non appropriate professional care; 
competitive costs; and a distrust of the work of external auditors. The findings show that 
it is very important to improve the accounting and auditing profession in order to provide 
an appropriate environment for good corporate governance. Consequently regulations and 
standards are needed in addition to the regulatory and supervisory roles of SOCPA to 
assist in maintaining good corporate governance and accountability practices by Saudi 
companies. 
7.5.4 Other Factors Influencing Corporate Governance in Saudi Arabia 
The finding of both the interviews and the questionnaire highlight the crucially influential 
role that social and cultural factors have over the practices of corporate governance in the 
Saudi business environment. The cultural and social aspects such as favouritism, family 
ties and tribalism have a major impact over companies' corporate governance practices as 
these are considered to have a deep power over the whole of society. These factors 
influence companies' activities and consequently affect corporate governance and 
accountability practices. The main issues that appear to be influential as soc ial and 
cultural factors are: the process of appointing companies' directors and managers and 
defining their authorities and responsibilities; and the perceived low level of 
accountability relationships. The interviewees indicate that some social and cultural 
factors, such as the low level of compliance with laws and systems as well as a negative 
attitude towards monitoring and evaluation of people in the Saudi society, leads to a 
negative impact on the practices of corporate governance among Saudi companies. 
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However, the research results indicate that there is a significant role for religion, and that 
companies should consider and apply some Sharia requirements, such as not dealing with 
interest (Riba). Furthermore, the findings suggest that politics, the economic situation and 
corruption also have a direct impact over practicing corporate governance in Saudi 
Arabia. The most important economic factors that influence the practice of corporate 
governance are the cost of such systems and the lack of qualified human resources. 
There is a lack of expertise in relation to corporate governance in the light of the 
restrictive rules that the government has issued over employing foreigners in order to 
support the employment of Saudi nationals. The findings indicate some concern about the 
role of some powerful parties that influence the practices of corporate governance among 
Saudi companies. 
Overall, the findings in relation to the third research question point to a weak framework 
of corporate governance in the Saudi business environment which consists of inefficient 
legal systems; poor regulatory, supervisory and monitoring bodies of corporate 
governance; a minimalist code of corporate governance; little compliance with the code; 
and a poor accounting and auditing profession leading to a poor environment for 
corporate governance and accountability in Saudi Arabia. 
7.6 Accountability Framework in Saudi Arabia 
The fourth research question examines the accountability framework in Saudi Arabia in 
order to evaluate how Saudi stakeholders consider accountability and the Islamic 
conception of accountability, this section highlights the main findings regarding 
accountability in Saudi Arabia. 
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The interview findings reveal that accountability reflects the notion that individuals who 
are given tasks, authorities, and responsibilities should be accountable for their actions. 
This conception applies equally for both individuals and organisational bodies, and is 
well recognized by participant stakeholders who strongly believe in its importance to 
provide an appropriate environment for good corporate governance practices. 
Furthermore, there is a belief that a company, its board and managers, should be 
accountable for their actions to all stakeholders, and should discharge this accountability 
by providing stakeholders with information that they need to ensure that their interests 
are protected; this can be through financial statements or board reports. Moreover, the 
findings indicate that stakeholders strongly agree that adopting good corporate 
governance will help Saudi companies to discharge their accountability. 
The findings also show that there is a general agreement among stakeholders of the 
importance of Sharia and that all Saudi companies should be subject to Sharia law in all 
their transactions. However, the findings from the interviews show that there is a variance 
between participants in their understanding of the implications of Sharia. The majority 
think that companies should not deal with any transactions prohibited by Sharia, whereas 
some think that, since the constitution of the country is based on Sharia, all companies 
transactions approved by the government are acceptable. This indicates that there are 
variant perceptions of whether, and how, companies should follow Sharia. For example, 
can company avoid interest on loans (Riba) which go against the principles of Sharia. 
However, most interviewees, including company directors, indicate that the majority of 
Saudi companies have submitted to society's demands to subject their transactions 
according to Sharia, e specially in relation to dealing with Riba. This illustrates the 
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influential power that society and religion have over companies. It suggests that if there is 
a widely held belief in society, companies will respond positively to society's concerns. 
Moreover, the results indicate that there is no perception of a conflict between Sharia and 
good corporate governance principles. On the contrary, the respondents argue that Sharia 
can play a crucial role in supporting and improving the implementation of good corporate 
governance in Saudi society as Sharia calls for good principles such as fairness, honesty, 
probity, integrity, protecting interests, and accountability. The correspondence between 
Sharia accountability and corporate governance and the wide acceptance of Sharia in 
Saudi society, may lead to suggestions that there should be an Islamic corporate 
governance code. This could be based on Sharia resources that organise business 
relationships and at the same time benefit from international developments in corporate 
governance that do not conflict with Sharia. Interviewees agree with this suggestion that 
such a code would be more appropriate for Saudi society. 
The findings also reveal that there is significant awareness among stakeholders about the 
Islamic conception accountability, as the both interviews and questionnaire results show 
that Saudi stakeholders believe that a company, its board and managers are accountable 
for their actions to Allah as well as to the company's stakeholders. There was a general 
appreciation of the Islamic conception of accountability and the stakeholders think the 
promotion of such a conception will play a significant role in improving accountability 
practices in society. The findings suggest that companies should provide the opportunity 
to stakeholders to ensure that all their interests in the company are protected according to 
the Islamic concept of Hisba and offer the opportunity for stakeholders to participate in 
making decisions according to the Islamic concept of Shura. 
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Nevertheless, stakeholders do not believe that accountability is practiced in Saudi society 
in general or in the business environment in particular. The participants claim that, in 
practice, companies, boards and managers are not accountable for their actions and 
stakeholders do not exercise their accountability relationships with companies who 
themselves do not provide the appropriate mechanisms for practising accountability. 
However, the findings suggest that some Saudi companies do not even comply with 
Sharia in their transactions. Thus, Saudi companies are going against the principles of 
Sharia, and are not considering the Islamic conception of accountability. Indeed, the 
findings indicate that there is a complete absence of some aspects of the Islamic 
conception of accountability; there are no practices of Shura that would enable 
stakeholders to participate in making decisions, nor of Hisba which would enable 
stakeholders to ensure that all their interests in the company are protected. The next 
section analyses the differences between the different stakeholders to see whether their 
views vary. 
7.6.1 The Difference in Perceptions between Stakeholder Groups 
The participants in the questionnaire survey were categorised into five main groups for 
the purpose of analysis, as discussed in Chapter S. The Mann-Whitney test provides an 
appropriate tool to investigate the differences in the perceptions between each pair of 
stakeholder groups and these differences between stakeholder groups in relation to 
different questions were laid out in Chapter 5. This section summarises the differences 
between the stakeholder groups in relation to the four main research questions in order to 
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present a broad understanding of the bigger picture of the differences in the perceptions 
of stakeholder groups in Saudi Arabia in relation to corporate governance matters. 
Table 7.2 groups all the questionnaire statements that relate to each research question and 
shows the significant differences (at 0.01 and 0.05) between each pair of five stakeholder 
groups. The Table identifies the questions with the most differences between each 
stakeholder group. The largest differences arise in relation to the understanding of 
corporate governance, with differences in 38% of pairs of stakeholder groups. 
The accountability framework and adequacy of the corporate governance framework 
come next with 28% and 27% respectively. Responses to the current practice of corporate 
governance have the least difference between stakeholder groups with only 24% of pairs 
of stakeholders groups disagreeing with each other. 
The split of the components that relate to the understanding of corporate governance, in 
Table 7.2 indicates that the major issues that stakeholders have different perceptions 
about are the boards of directors and the importance and an awareness of corporate 
governance, with 45% of pairs of stakeholders disagree with each other on these two 
issues. The regulators account for over half of the differences of this total on this 
category, and the differences are mainly related to boards of directors and disclosure and 
transparency, where regulators agree most with the roles and responsibilities of boards of 
directors and with the disclosure and transparency requirements according to principles 
of corporate governance; they also are the most familiar with the local corporate 
governance code and international developments in corporate governance. 
4 
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Table7.2 Summary of the Differences between the Stakeholder Groups form the 
Questionnaire Findings 
No. of 
Across all stakeholders 
rou s 
- 
Categories Statements No. of 
differences 
% of 
differences 
No. of 
differences 7 % of total No. of differences 
1. Understanding of CC issues Re ulators 
Definition of CG 5 12 24% 3 25% 
Importance and awareness of CG 4 18 45% 8 44'%, 
Translation of CG 6 6 10% 1 17% 
Board of directors 29 131 45% 83 63% 
Disclosure and Transparency 9 35 39% 22 63% 
Stakeholders 14 51 36% 13 251)%, % 
Total 67 253 38% 1 130 51% 
2. Current Practices of CC Other stakeholders 
Satisfaction with current 
practices of CG 
1 2 20 0 0 
Appointment of directors 24 41 17 24 58% 
Board roles and responsibilities 22 51 23 32 63% 
Board's subcommittees 8 24 30 9 37% 
Disclosure and transparency 9 29 32 13 45% 
Stakeholders 9 27 22 II 41% 
Total 73 174 24% (4) 89 51% 
3. Adequacy of CC Framework N EDs Managers 
CG code 4 10 25% I 10% 8 80% 
Legal systems 8 25 31% 13 52%,, 5 20'% 
Other factors (e. g Social, culture, 
politic, economic) 
7 23 33% 11 48% 12 52% 
Total 19 51 27%(3) 25 43% 25 43% 
4. Accountability Framework N EDs 
Accountability relationship 13 46 35% 25 54`%4 
Current practices of 
accountability 
5 10 20% 5 50% 
Perception of Islamic 
accountability 
7 15 21% 14 93% 
Current practices of Islamic 
accountability 
7 19 27% 4 2 
Total 32 90 28%(2) 48 53'% 
Note: There are 10 pairs ot'stakeholders groups: O-R, O-I, O-N. O-M, R-I, R-N, R-M, I-N, I-M and N-M. The "fahle 
shows differences between stakeholder groups in relation to each category of the questionnaire. The second column 
shows the number of statements that related to each category and each different sub-categories. The third column 
shows number of significant differences between the stakeholders groups according to Mann-Witney test at the 
confidence level of 99% and 95%, and it also shows the percentage of' differences between the stakeholder groups. 
The fourth column shows the number of differences and the percentage of differences based on the most dominant 
stakeholder group in related to each category. To aid the reader an explanation 
for the results in the first row follows: 
12/(5* 10)* 100=24%; and 3/12* 100= 25%. 
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Table 7.2 ranks accountability as the second area with most differences between 
stakeholders. Figure 7.1 shows that non-executive directors (Group N) have the most 
differences with the other stakeholders groups. The main differences between non- 
executive directors and other stakeholders groups in relation to accountability are that 
non-executive directors are the group of stakeholders least likely to agree that companies 
operate within the Islamic accountability framework and that there is an accountability 
relationship between a company and all its stakeholders other than shareholders. 
Figure 7.1 Differences between Stakeholder Groups in Relation to the Questionnaire 
Understanding of CG 
Current Practices of CG 
Adequacy of the CG Framework 
Accountability Framework 
Total 
 O  R 1  N  M 
Note: The l able snows the numoer of aitterences of each stakenoiaer group 
questionnaire categories. 
relation to each 
The adequacy of the corporate governance framework was the third category to have 
differences between stakeholders groups. Figure 7.1 indicates that non-executive 
directors and managers (Groups of N and M) have the most differences with other 
stakeholders groups. The major reasons for this are because managers believe more 
strongly that Saudi companies comply with the local corporate governance code and, 
interestingly, they are the group who agreed least with the code being mandatory as well 
as with setting penalties for non compliance companies. The managers considered the 
impact of other factors as being least important. Non-executive directors mostly agreed 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
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about the major influence that these factors have. Another issue causing differences are 
that non-executive directors agree least that the judiciary and courts maintain good 
corporate governance and agree most strongly about the need to establish a new and 
independent body to look after corporate governance in Saudi Arabia. 
The current practices of corporate governance resulted in the least number of differences 
between stakeholder groups. These indicate that other stakeholders (Group 0) had the 
most differences with the rest in this category. An analysis shows that these differences 
are because other stakeholders (Group 0) think that boards of directors in Saudi 
companies are not fulfilling their roles and responsibilities, in addition they also see 
Saudi companies as not disclosing enough or being transparent. 
However, answers in relation to the fourth research question confirm that, in general, 
accountability does not appear to operate in practice in Saudi Arabia and there are differ 
between stakeholder groups regarding accountability according to their roles and 
positions. 
7.7 Stakeholders' Suggestions to Improve Corporate Governance in 
Saudi Arabia 
Some suggestions were raised from both the interviews and questionnaire survey in terms 
of improving the practice of corporate governance in Saudi Arabia as follows: 
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9A need for a common, appropriate and acceptable term for the English phrase 
"corporate governance" and, to reduce the confusion over the translation problem, 
Hawkama should be used consistently. 
9 There is a need to establish a separate and independent body to look after 
corporate governance issues in Saudi Arabia; such a body should focus on 
improving the awareness of corporate governance, providing appropriate methods 
to train directors, assisting companies in implementing corporate governance and 
monitoring corporate governance in practice. 
9 More effort should be made to encourage an awareness of corporate governance 
in the Saudi business environment through conferences, seminars and 
publications; universities should also provide appropriate corporate governance 
courses. 
" The Saudi corporate governance code should be a mandatory code and should 
include penalties for non-compliance. 
" Different board sizes should be allowed for different sizes of companies; boards 
should comprise between 4 and 8 members for a small company, between 6 and 
10 for a medium-sized company and between 7 and 12 for a large company. 
" An accumulative voting system should be mandatory to stop coalitions of major 
shareholders controlling boards and to enable minority shareholders to select their 
representatives on the boards. 
9 There should be specified requirements for the appointment of companies' 
directors based on their experience, qualifications and specialisms. 
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" There should be more requirements to ensure and promote the actual 
independence of non-executive directors. 
" The authorities and responsibilities of the board of directors and its sub- 
committees should be clearly defined in the code 
0 There should be appropriate standards to train board members and evaluate 
boards of directors in the code. 
" The laws and systems in relation to business in Saudi should be reviewed and 
updated to provide an appropriate environment for good corporate governance. 
" Specialist commercial courts and qualified judges in business matters should be 
introduced. 
" Regulatory, supervisory and monitoring bodies in relation to the business 
environment should be more effective and have the appropriate ability and 
resources enable them to fulfil their roles. 
" AGMs should using video conferencing technology to encourage shareholders' 
attendance at companies' AGMs, because of the long distances between Saudi 
cities. 
" An Islamic corporate governance code should be adopted that is based on both 
modern corporate governance principles and the heritage of Sharia law. 
7.8 Limitations 
A number of important limitations to this thesis need to be considered. First, with a small 
number of participants and respondents, caution must be applied as the findings may not 
be generalisable. The study conducted 22 interviews and analysed 176 usable 
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questionnaires that were returned; as normal when using such methods they might not 
reflect the perspective of stakeholders as a whole in Saudi Arabia about corporate 
governance. Another important limitation lies in the fact that the participants in the study 
represent a number of stakeholders groups, but not an exhaustive list of all of them (such 
as: environmental groups, religious scholars, customers, and suppliers), as it is very 
difficult to include all stakeholders groups, so this might also affect the generalisation of 
the results. A third limitation also relates to generalisability and the issues of selection 
bias as those who agreed to participate in the interviews and the survey may be more 
knowledgeable about corporate governance as there were many who refused to be 
involved, due to their lack of awareness and knowledge about corporate governance. 
Other limitations are related to the research methods. For example, using semi-structured 
interviews and questionnaire survey methods could be deceptive in some cases as some 
of the interviewees may not want to show their lack of knowledge or give a bad 
impression about their organizations, which makes them provide "perfect" answers. 
Another issue is that qualitative methods can be too impressionistic and subjective as the 
analysis relies to a great extent on the researcher's perspective and evaluation. Using a 
questionnaire survey faces the problem of the respondents getting bored after a while and 
then giving random answers to finish rather than thinking about their answers. Further, 
the questionnaire used in the study was long, and is a good lesson for the researcher in 
future projects. 
Another important limitation is that this study investigates the perceptions of stakeholder 
groups about issues relating to corporate governance and accountability in Saudi Arabia. 
The findings of the study thus reflect the views of these stakeholders and rely on their 
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understanding of corporate governance and accountability and their perception of 
practices in the local environment. As a result, the study is limited regarding actual 
companies' corporate governance practices or companies' compliance with the corporate 
governance code although the responses include company respondents regarding their 
own companies practices. 
7.9 Future Research Avenues 
Few studies a bout corporate governance in Saudi Arabia ha ve been conducted a nd, 
according to the researcher's knowledge, the current study is the first major study to 
investigate the perspective of a wide range of stakeholders about corporate governance in 
Saudi Arabia. As a result, more research is needed, in different areas of corporate 
governance, to fill the huge gap in the literature about corporate governance in Saudi 
Arabia. 
The following are, thus, some recommendations for further research in relation to 
corporate governance. First, further research should investigate the ownership structure in 
Saudi companies and its impact over companies' activities. Information about Saudi 
companies' ownership is now publicly available as Tadawal disclose those who own 5% 
or more of all listed companies. The current study provides evidence of the significant 
role that ownership structure has over companies' activities and their practices of 
corporate governance and research into this area will provide a better understanding of 
the nature of the ownership structure in Saudi Arabia and its role in influencing corporate 
governance practices. 
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Another crucial issue that needs to be covered by future research is on the board of 
directors in Saudi companies. The current study shows that boards have a major role over 
companies' activities and corporate governance practices in Saudi. Consequently, issues 
such as: the separation of chairman and CEO roles; the real independence of NEDs; 
board of directors roles and responsibilities; the efficiency of the board of directors; 
board of directors subcommittees; and the impact of board of directors structure over 
companies' corporate governance practices. 
The present study draws attention to poor shareholder protection in practices thus future 
possible research should look at the shareholders, including minority rights in the Saudi 
business environment to improve the protection of their rights. The nature and roles of 
institutional investors can also be recommended especially their activism and their role in 
protecting their interests in companies in addition their impact over corporate governance 
practices. 
Over two years have passed since the issue of the Saudi corporate governance code by 
the CMA, and future research should investigate companies' compliance with the code 
and the obstacles facing their compliance. Finally, it would be interesting for future 
research to suggest a proposal for an Islamic corporate governance code relying on both 
corporate governance principles and the principles and heritage of Islamic Sharia. 
7.10 Contribution to Knowledge 
The current findings will assist to fill the huge gap in the literature regarding corporate 
governance practices in Saudi Arabia, specifically and in the Middle East in general. In 
addition to its contribution to the corporate governance literature, there is also a lack of 
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studies that focus on the perception of stakeholders as most of the literature considers 
positivist studies that evaluate companies' corporate governance according to their 
performance. 
The current study contributes to knowledge by providing a general understanding how 
corporate governance is considered in an emerging market and, particular, in a major 
market in the Middle East, that of Saudi Arabia. Another contribution made by the study 
is drawing attention to the problem of misunderstandings from the translation of the 
English term of "corporate governance" to the Arabic language. 
The study provides an understanding of the current practices of corporate governance in 
Saudi Arabia and underscores the major factors that influence the practices of corporate 
governance in the local business environment. In addition to that, the issues in relation to 
the corporate governance framework are addressed. 
The present study enhance an understanding of the boards of directors in Saudi 
companies especially in relation to their: composition; roles and responsibilities; sub- 
committees; meetings; size. It also adds substantially to an understanding of the 
ownership structure in Saudi companies and indicates the major shareholders' influence 
over companies. Furthermore, institutional investors in Saudi Arabia is an ignored area in 
the literature and this study has gone some way towards enhancing the understanding 
of nature and the role of those crucial investors in the Saudi market. 
The study contributes to the knowledge as it contains the first attempt to evaluate the 
Saudi corporate governance code and also Saudi companies' compliance with it. Another 
main contribution that this study makes is providing an understanding of the 
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accountability framework and the Islamic accountability framework in regard to current 
practices in the Saudi business environment. 
7.11 Concluding Thoughts 
In conclusion, the findings of the study indicate that corporate governance in an emerging 
market such as Saudi Arabia is in its early stages, with characteristics of a lack of 
accountability, a weak legal framework and poor protection of shareholders. The 
influence of social, culture and economics factors are evident and boards of directors are 
dominated by major shareholders, thus good corporate governance practices have many 
challenges. However, the pressure for good corporate governance should be generated 
from effective regulatory bodies (the CMA) and shareholders (at AGMs). Accountability 
also needs to be practiced in the business environment in order to develop an appropriate 
environment for good corporate governance by Saudi companies. 
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PART 1 
PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS 
Article 1: Preamble 
a) These Regulations include the rules and standards that regulate the 
management of joint stock companies listed in the Exchange to ensure 
their compliance with the best governance practices that would ensure 
the protection of shareholders' rights as well as the rights of 
stakeholders. 
b) These Regulations constitute the guiding principles for all companies 
listed in the Exchange unless any other regulations, rules or 
resolutions of the Board of the Authority provide for the binding 
effect of some of the provisions herein contained. 
c) As an exception of paragraph (b) of this article, a company must 
disclose in the Board of Directors' report, the provisions that have 
been implemented and the provisions that have not been implemented 
as well as the reasons for not implementing them. 
Article 2: Definitions 
a) Expression and terms in these regulations have the meanings they bear 
in the Capital Market Law and in the glossary of defined terms used in 
the regulations and the rules of the Capital Market Authority unless 
otherwise stated in these regulations. 
b) For the purpose of implementing these regulations, the following 
expressions and terms shall have the meaning they bear as follows 
unless the contrary intention appears: 
Independent Member: A member of the Board of Directors who enjoys 
complete independence. By way of example, the following shall constitute 
an infringement of such independence: 
1. He/she holds a controlling interest in the company or in any other 
company within that company's group. 
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2. He/she, during the preceding two years, has been a senior executive 
of the company or of any other company within that company's 
group. 
3. He/she is a first-degree relative of any board member of the company 
or of any other company within that company's group. 
4. He/she is first-degree relative of any of senior executives of the 
company or of any other company within that company's group. 
5. He/she is a board member of any company within the group of the 
company which he/she is nominated to be a member of its board. 
6. If he/she, during the preceding two years, has been an employee with 
an affiliate of the company or an affiliate of any company of its group, 
such as external auditors or main suppliers; or if he/she, during the 
preceding two years, had a controlling interest in any such party. 
Non-executive director: A member of the Board of Directors who does not 
have a full-time management position at the company, or who does not 
receive monthly or yearly salary. 
First-degree relatives: father, mother, spouse and children. 
Stakeholders: Any person who has an interest in the company, such as 
shareholders, employees, creditors, customers, suppliers, community. 
Accumulative Voting: a method of voting for electing directors, which 
gives each shareholder a voting rights equivalent to the number of shares 
he/she holds. He/she has the right to use them all for one nominee or to 
divide them between his/her selected nominees without any duplication of 
these votes. This method increases the chances of the minority shareholders 
to appoint their representatives in the board through the right to accumulate 
votes for one nominee. 
Minority Shareholders: Those shareholders who represent a class of 
shareholders that does not control the company and hence they are unable to 
influence the company. 
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PART 2 
RIGHTS OF SHAREHOLDERS AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 
Article 3: General Rights of Shareholders 
A Shareholder shall be entitled to all rights attached to the share, in 
particular, the right to a share of the distributable profits, the right to a share 
of the company's assets upon liquidation; the right to attend the General 
Assembly and participate in deliberations and vote on relevant decisions; the 
right of disposition with respect to shares; the right to supervise the Board of 
Directors activities, and file responsibility claims against board members; 
the right to inquire and have access to information without prejudice to the 
company's interests and in a manner that does not contradict the Capital 
Market Law and the Implementing Rules. 
Article 4: Facilitation of Shareholders Exercise of Rights and Access to 
Information 
a) The company in its Articles of Association and by-laws shall specify 
the procedures and precautions that are necessary for the 
shareholders' exercise of all their lawful rights. 
b) All information which enable shareholders to properly exercise their 
rights shall be made available and such information shall be 
comprehensive and accurate; it must be provided and updated 
regularly and within the prescribed times; the company shall use the 
most effective means in communicating with shareholders. No 
discrepancy shall be exercised with respect to shareholders in relation 
to providing information. 
Article 5: Shareholders Rights related to the General Assembly 
a) A General Assembly shall convene once a year at least within the six 
months following the end of the company's financial year. 
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b) The General Assembly shall convene upon a request of the Board of 
Directors. The Board of Directors shall invite a General Assembly to 
convene pursuant to a request of the auditor or a number of 
shareholders whose shareholdings represent at least 5% of the equity 
share capital. 
c) Date, place, and agenda of the General Assembly shall be specified and 
announced by a notice, at least 20 days prior to the date the meeting; 
invitation for the meeting shall be published in the Exchange' website, 
the company's website and in two newspapers of voluminous 
distribution in the Kingdom. Modem high tech means shall be used in 
communicating with shareholders. 
d) Shareholders shall be allowed the opportunity to effectively 
participate and vote in the General Assembly; they shall be informed 
about the rules governing the meetings and the voting procedure. 
e) Arrangements shall be made for facilitating the participation of the 
greatest number of shareholders in the General Assembly, including 
inter alia determination of the appropriate place and time. 
f) In preparing the General Assembly's agenda, the Board of Directors 
shall take into consideration matters shareholders require to be listed 
in that agenda; shareholders holding not less than 5% of the 
company's shares are entitled to add one or more items to the agenda. 
upon its preparation. 
g) Shareholders shall be entitled to discuss matters listed in the agenda of 
the General Assembly and raise relevant questions to the board 
members and to the external auditor. The Board of Directors or the 
external auditor shall answer the questions raised by shareholders in a 
manner that does not prejudice the company's interest. 
h) Matters presented to the General Assembly shall be accompanied by 
sufficient information to enable shareholders to make decisions. 
i) Shareholders shall be enabled to peruse the minutes of the General 
Assembly; the company shall provide the Authority with a copy of 
those minutes within 10 days of the convening date of any such 
meeting. 
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j) The Exchange shall be immediately informed of the results of the 
General Assembly. 
Article 6: Voting Rights 
a) Voting is deemed to be a fundamental right of a shareholder, which 
shall not, in any way, be denied. The company must avoid taking any 
action which might hamper the use of the voting right; a shareholder 
must be afforded all possible assistance as may facilitate the exercise 
of such right. 
b) In voting in the General Assembly for the nomination to the board 
members, the accumulative voting method shall be applied. 
c) A shareholder may, in writing, appoint any other shareholder who is 
not a board member and who is not an employee of the company to 
attend the General Assembly on his behalf. 
d) Investors who are judicial persons and who act on behalf of others - 
e. g. investment funds- shall disclose in their annual reports their 
voting policies, actual voting, and ways of dealing with any material 
conflict of interests that may affect the practice of the fundamental 
rights in relation to their investments. 
Article 7: Dividends Rights of Shareholders 
a) The Board of Directors shall lay down a clear policy regarding 
dividends, in a manner that may realize the interests of shareholders 
and those of the company; shareholders shall be informed of that 
policy during the General Assembly and reference thereto shall be 
made in the report of the Board of Directors. 
b) The General Assembly shall approve the dividends and the date of 
distribution. These dividends, whether they be in cash or bonus shares 
shall be given, as of right, to the shareholders who are listed in the 
records kept at the Securities Depository Center as they appear at the 
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end of trading session on the day on which the General Assembly is 
convened. 
PART 3 
DISCLOSURE AND TRANSPARENCY 
Article 8: Policies and Procedure related to Disclosure 
The company shall lay down in writing the policies, procedures and 
supervisory rules related to disclosure, pursuant to law. 
Article 9: Disclosure in the Board of Directors' Report 
In addition to what is required in the Listing Rules in connection with the 
content of the report of the Board of Directors, which is appended to the 
annual financial statements of the company, such report shall include the 
following: 
a) The implemented provisions of these Regulations as well as the 
provisions which have not been implemented, and the justifications 
for not implementing them. 
b) Names of any joint stock company or companies in which the 
company Board of Directors member acts as a member of its Board of 
directors. 
c) Formation of the Board of Directors and classification of its 
members as follows: executive board member, non-executive board 
member, or independent board member. 
d) A brief description of the jurisdictions and duties of the Board's main 
committees such as the Audit Committee, the Nomination and 
Remuneration Committee; indicating their names, names of their 
chairmen, names of their members, and the aggregate of their 
respective meetings. 
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e) Details of compensation and remuneration paid to each of the 
following: 
1. The Chairman and members of the Board of Directors. 
2. The Top Five executives who have received the highest 
compensation and remuneration from the company. The CEO 
and the Chief Finance Officer shall be included if they are not 
within the top five. 
f) Any punishment or penalty or preventive restriction imposed on the 
company by the Authority or any other supervisory or regulatory or 
judiciary body. 
g) Results of the annual audit of the effectiveness of the internal control 
procedures of the company. 
PART 4 
BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
Article 10: Main Functions of the Board of Directors 
Among the main functions of the Board is the fallowing: 
a) Approving the strategic plans and main objectives of the company and 
supervising their implementation; this includes: 
1. Laying down a comprehensive strategy for the company, 
the main work plans and the policy related to risk management, 
reviewing and updating of such policy. 
2. Determining the most appropriate capital structure of the 
company, its strategies and financial objectives and approving 
its annual budgets. 
3. Supervising the main capital expenses of the company and 
acquisition/disposal of assets. 
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4. Deciding the performance objectives to be achieved and 
supervising the implementation thereof and the overall 
performance of the company. 
5. Reviewing and approving the organizational and functional 
structures of the company on a periodical basis. 
b) Laying down rules for internal control systems and supervising them; 
this includes: 
1. Developing a written policy that would regulate conflict 
of interest and remedy any possible cases of conflict by 
members of the Board of Directors, executive management and 
shareholders. This includes misuse of the company's assets and 
facilities and the arbitrary disposition resulting from dealings 
with the related parties. 
2. Ensuring the integrity of the financial and accounting 
procedures including procedures related to the preparation of 
the financial reports. 
3. Ensuring the implementation of control procedures 
appropriate for risk management by forecasting the risks that 
the company could encounter and disclosing them with 
transparency. 
4. Reviewing annually the effectiveness of the internal 
control systems. 
c) Drafting a Corporate Governance Code for the company that does not 
contradict the provisions of this regulation, supervising and monitoring in 
general the effectiveness of the code and amending it whenever necessary. 
d) Laying down specific and explicit policies, standards and procedures, for 
the membership of the Board of Directors and implementing them after 
they have been approved by the General Assembly. 
e) Outlining a written policy that regulate the relationship with stakeholders 
with a view to protecting their respective rights; in particular, such policy 
must cover the following: 
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1. Mechanisms for indemnifying the stakeholders in case 
of contravening their rights under the law and their 
respective contracts. 
2. Mechanisms for settlement of complaints or disputes 
that might arise between the company and the stakeholders. 
3. Suitable mechanisms for maintaining good 
relationships with customers and suppliers and protecting 
the confidentiality of information related to them. 
4. A code of conduct for the company's executives and 
employees to regulate their relationship with the 
stakeholders. The code shall be compatible with the proper 
professional and ethical standards. The Board of Directors 
shall lay down procedures for supervising this code and 
ensuring compliance therewith. 
5. The Company's social contributions. 
f) Deciding policies and procedures to ensure the company's compliance 
with the laws and regulations and the company's obligation to disclose 
material information to shareholders, creditors and other stakeholders. 
Article 11: Responsibilities of the Board 
a) Without prejudice to the competences of the General Assembly, the 
company's Board of Directors shall assume all the necessary powers for the 
company's management. The ultimate responsibility for the company rests 
with the Board even if it sets up committees or delegates some of its 
powers to a third party. The Board of Directors shall avoid issuing general 
or indefinite power of attorney. 
b) The responsibilities of the Board of Directors must be clearly stated in 
the company's Articles of Association. 
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c) The Board of Directors must carry out its duties in a responsible 
manner, in good faith and with due diligence. Its decisions should be based 
on sufficient information from the executive management, or from any 
other reliable source. 
d) A member of the Board of Directors represents all shareholders; 
he/she undertakes to carry out whatever may be in the general interest of 
the company, but not the interests of the group he/she represents or that 
which voted in favor of his appointment to the Board of Directors. 
e) The Board of Directors shall determine the powers to be delegated to 
the executive management and the procedures for taking any action and the 
validity of such delegation. It shall also determine matters reserved for 
decision by the Board of Directors. The executive management shall submit 
to the Board of Directors periodic reports on the exercise of the delegated 
powers. 
f) The Board of Directors shall ensure that a procedure is laid down for 
orienting the new board members of the company's business and, in 
particular, the financial and legal aspects, in addition to their training, 
where necessary. 
g) The Board of Directors shall ensure that sufficient information about 
the company is made available to all members of the Board of Directors, 
generally, and, in particular, to the non-executive members, to enable them 
to discharge their duties and responsibilities in an effective manner. 
h) The Board of Directors shall not be entitled to enter into loans which 
spans more than three years, and shall not sell or mortgage real estate of the 
company, or drop the company's debts, unless it is authorized to do so by 
the company's Articles of Association. In the case where the company's 
Articles of Association includes no provisions to this respect, the Board 
should not act without the approval of the General Assembly, unless such 
acts fall within the normal scope of the company's business. 
Article 12: Formation of the Board 
Formation of the Board of Directors shall be subject to the following: 
12 
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a) The Articles of Association of the company shall specify the number 
of the Board of Directors members, provided that such number shall not 
be less than three and not more than eleven. 
b) The General Assembly shall appoint the members of the Board of 
Directors for the duration provided for in the Articles of Association of 
the company, provided that such duration shall not exceed three years. 
Unless otherwise provided for in the Articles of Association of the 
company, members of the Board may be reappointed. 
c) The majority of the members of the Board of Directors shall be non- 
executive members. 
d) It is prohibited to conjoin the position of the Chairman of the Board 
of Directors with any other executive position in the company, such as 
the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) or the managing director or the 
general manager. 
e) The independent members of the Board of Directors shall not be less 
than two members, or one-third of the members, whichever is greater. 
f) The Articles of Association of the company shall specify the manner 
in which membership of the Board of Directors terminates. At all times, 
the General Assembly may dismiss all or any of the members of the 
Board of Directors even though the Articles of Association provide 
otherwise. 
g) On termination of membership of a board member in any of the 
ways of termination, the company shall promptly notify the Authority 
and the Exchange and shall specify the reasons for such termination. 
h) A member of the Board of Directors shall not act as a member of the 
Board of Directors of more than five joint stock companies at the same 
time. 
i) Judicial person who is entitled under the company's Articles of 
Association to appoint representatives in the Board of Directors, is not 
entitled to nomination vote of other members of the Board of Directors. 
13 
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Article 13: Committees of the Board 
a) A suitable number of committees shall be set up in accordance with 
the company's requirements and circumstances, in order to enable the 
Board of Directors to perform its duties in an effective manner. 
b) The formation of committees subordinate to the Board of Directors 
shall be according to general procedures laid down by the Board, 
indicating the duties, the duration and the powers of each committee, 
and the manner in which the Board monitors its activities. The 
committee shall notify the Board of its activities, findings or decisions 
with complete transparency. The Board shall periodically pursue the 
activities of such committees so as to ensure that the activities 
entrusted to those committees are duly performed. The Board shall 
approve the by-laws of all committees of the Board, including, inter 
alia, the Audit Committee, Nomination and Remuneration 
Committee. 
c) A sufficient number of the non-executive members of the Board of 
Directors shall be appointed in committees that are concerned with 
activities that might involve a conflict of interest, such as ensuring the 
integrity of the financial and non-financial reports, reviewing the deals 
concluded by related parties, nomination to membership of the Board, 
appointment of executive directors, and determination of 
remuneration. 
Article 14: Audit Committee 
a) The Board of Directors shall set up a committee to be named the 
"Audit Committee". Its members shall not be less than three, including a 
specialist in financial and accounting matters. Executive board members 
are not eligible for Audit Committee membership. 
b) The General Assembly of shareholders shall, upon a 
recommendation of the Board of Directors, issue rules for appointing the 
members of the Audit Committee and define the term of their office and 
the procedure to be followed by the Committee. 
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c) The duties and responsibilities of the Audit Committee include the 
following: 
1. To supervise the company's internal audit department to 
ensure its effectiveness in executing the activities and duties 
specified by the Board of Directors. 
2. To review the internal audit procedure and prepare a 
written report on such audit and its recommendations with 
respect to it . 
3. To review the internal audit reports and pursue the 
implementation of the corrective measures in respect of the 
comments included in them. 
4. To recommend to the Board of Directors the appointment, 
dismissal and the Remuneration of external auditors; upon any 
such recommendation, regard must be made to their 
independence. 
5. To supervise the activities of the external auditors and 
approve any activity beyond the scope of the audit work 
assigned to them during the performance of their duties. 
6. To review together with the external auditor the audit plan 
and make any comments thereon. 
7. To review the external auditor's comments on the financial 
statements and follow up the actions taken about them. 
8. To review the interim and annual financial statements prior 
to presentation to the Board of Directors; and to give opinion 
and recommendations with respect thereto. 
9. To review the accounting policies in force and advise the 
Board of Directors of any recommendation regarding them. 
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Article 15: Nomination and Remuneration Committee 
a) The Board of Directors shall set up a committee to be named 
"Nomination and Remuneration Committee". 
b) The General Assembly shall, upon a recommendation of the Board of 
Directors, issue rules for the appointment of the members of the 
Nomination and Remuneration Committee, their remunerations, and 
terms of office and the procedure to be followed by such committee. 
c) The duties and responsibilities of the Nomination and Remuneration 
Committee include the following: 
1. Recommend to the Board of Directors appointments to 
membership of the Board in accordance with the approved 
policies and standards; the Committee shall ensure that no person 
who has been previously convicted of any offense affecting honor 
or honesty is nominated for such membership. 
2. Annual review of the requirement of suitable skills for 
membership of the Board of Directors and the preparation of a 
description of the required capabilities and qualifications for such 
membership, including, inter alia, the time that a Board member 
should reserve for the activities of the Board. 
3. Review the structure of the Board of Directors and 
recommend changes. 
4. Determine the points of strength and weakness in the Board 
of Directors and recommend remedies that are compatible with 
the company's interest. 
5. Ensure on an annual basis the independence of the 
independent members and the absence of any conflict of interest 
in case a Board member also acts as a member of the Board of 
Directors of another company. 
6. Draw clear policies regarding the indemnities and 
remunerations of the Board members and top executives; in 
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laying down such policies, the standards related to performance 
shall be followed. 
Article 16: Meetings of the Board 
1. The Board members shall allot ample time for performing their 
responsibilities, including the preparation for the meetings of the Board 
and the permanent and ad hoc committees, and shall endeavor to attend 
such meetings. 
2. The Board shall convene its ordinary meetings regularly upon a 
request by the Chairman. The Chairman shall call the Board for an 
unforeseen meeting upon a written request by two of its members. 
3. When preparing a specified agenda to be presented to the Board, the 
Chairman shall consult the other members of the Board and the CEO. 
The agenda and other documentation should be sent to the members in a 
sufficient time prior to the meeting so that they may be able to consider 
such matters and prepare themselves for the meeting. Once convened, the 
Board shall approve the agenda; should any member of the Board raise 
any objection to this agenda, the details of such objection shall be entered 
in the minutes of the meeting. 
4. The Board shall document its meetings and prepare records of the 
deliberations and the voting, and arrange for these records to be kept in 
chapters for ease of reference. 
Article 17: Remuneration and Indemnification of Board Members 
The Articles of Association of the company shall set forth the manner of 
remunerating the Board members; such remuneration may take the form of a 
lump sum amount, attendance allowance, rights in rem or a certain 
percentage of the profits. Any two or more of these privileges may be 
conjoined. 
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Article 18: Conflict of Interest within the Board 
a) A Board member shall not, without a prior authorization from the 
General Assembly, to be renewed each year, have any interest (whether 
directly or indirectly) in the company's business and contracts. The 
activities to be performed through general bidding shall constitute an 
exception where a Board member is the best bidder. A Board member 
shall notify the Board of Directors of any personal interest he/she may 
have in the business and contracts that are completed for the company's 
account. Such notification shall be entered in the minutes of the meeting. 
A Board member who is an interested party shall not be entitled to vote 
on the resolution to be adopted in this regard. The Chairman of the Board 
of Directors shall notify the General Assembly, when convened, of the 
activities and contracts in respect of which a Board member may have a 
personal interest and shall attach to such notification a special report 
prepared by the company's auditor. 
b) A Board member shall not, without a prior authorization of the 
General Assembly, to be renewed annually, participate in any activity 
which may likely compete with the activities of the company, or trade in 
any branch of the activities carried out by the company. 
c) The company shall not grant cash loan whatsoever to any of its Board 
members or render guarantee in respect of any loan entered into by a 
Board member with third parties, excluding banks and other fiduciary 
companies. 
PART 5 
CLOSING PROVISIONS 
Article 19: Publication and Entry into Force 
These regulations shall be effective upon the date of their publication. 
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Appendix II 
Semi-Structured Interviews Questions 
1. Companies 
a. CG Definition 
1. What is your definition and understanding of the concept of corporate 
governance? How important do you think it is? 
2. To what extent do you think that corporate governance is important for your 
company? 
3. What aspects of corporate governance are most important to your company? 
4. What improvements have your company made to corporate governance? 
5. What does your company do in the way of compliance with corporate 
governance? How do you assess your company's corporate governance 
performance? 
6. What are the obstacles facing your company in implementing better corporate 
governance? 
b. Board Structure, Responsibility, Disclosure and Transparency 
1. How is your company's board structured? What are the requirements for the 
board's directors? How are executive directors selected and appointed? How 
regular are board meetings? Are duties and authorities clearly defined? 
2. How many executive and non-executive directors do you have? What are the 
requirements for non-executive directors in your company? How are NEDs 
selected and appointed? What is the proportion of independent NEDs? And 
what their requirements? 
3. What board sub-committees does your company have? Are their members 
executives or non-executives? How regular are board sub-committees 
meetings? Are duties and authorities clearly defined? What are the obstacles 
facing these committees and their members? 
4. What could your company's board do further to fulfil its responsibility? 
5. How does your company's board monitor the company's managers? What 
information do board members get (accurate, relevant and timely 
information)? 
6. What steps have been taken by your company to improve disclosure and 
transparency? What are the most important elements in your company's 
disclosure? 
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7. How adequate do think that the disclosure and transparency standard 
requirements are? What does your company do to ensure its adherence to 
disclosure and transparency requirements? 
c. Stakeholders 
1. Who do you regard as the company's stakeholders? Do they have 
representatives on the board? Do they have influence over the activities of the 
company? 
2. Who are your major shareholders? Do they have any influence over the 
activities of the company? Are they on the board? What does your company 
do to protect shareholders' rights? What does it do to protect minority 
shareholders? 
3. What more could you do for stakeholders? What more could the regulators do 
to improve corporate governance for stakeholders? How far do you think that 
your stakeholders are satisfied? 
d. Regulatory Bodies & Legal System 
1. Which bodies are responsible for regulating corporate governance and which 
are responsible for monitoring companies' adherence to them? Is there any 
conflict between them? 
2. What is your assessment of the capability, sufficiency and strength of these 
bodies' performance? 
3. Which standards/regulations does your company find it most difficult to 
comply with and why? 
4. What do you think of the laws that companies are subject to? To what extent 
does the legal system affect the practice of corporate governance? 
5. What about the role of the judiciary and the courts in maintaining high 
corporate governance standards? 
6. Are you aware of different approaches of corporate governance in different 
parts of the world? 
7. Are you aware of the proposed corporate governance code issued recently by 
the Capital Market Authority? If so, what is your evaluation of it? To what 
extent has your company implemented it? Should it be mandatory or just for 
guidance? Should it apply to all companies or only to listed ones? 
8. Has Saudi Arabia joining the WTO had any influence on your company's 
corporate governance? 
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9. Are there any political, economic or social factors affecting corporate 
governance in your company? 
e. Accountability 
1. What is your definition and understanding of accountability? 
2. Are your company, its board of directors and managers accountable for their 
actions and performance? If so, to whom and how? 
3. What has your company done in order to discharge its accountability? To what 
extent do you think you have succeeded? 
4. Do you think that accountability requires your company to adopt a good 
corporate governance system? 
5. How well do you think that accountability is defined in the relevant 
regulations? 
6. How do stakeholders exercise their accountability relationship with the 
company? 
f. Accountability in Islam 
1. To what extent is your company subjected to Sharia? 
2. What is your definition and understanding of accountability in Islam? 
3. To what extent does the Islamic conception of accountability have any 
influence on your company's practice? 
4. To what extent does the Islamic conception of accountability affect your 
company's corporate governance system? 
5. To what extent does your company exercise the Islamic conception of Shura? 
6. Does your company offer the opportunity for stakeholders to participate in 
making decisions in the light of the concept of Shura? 
7. To what extent dose the Islamic concept of Hisba have any influence on your 
company? 
8. According to Hisba, do you think that stakeholders have the right to ensure 
that all their interests are protected? Are they doing that? And if so who and 
how? 
9. Is there a conflict between Islam and the corporate governance code? 
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2. Users 
a. CG Definition 
1. What is your definition and understanding of the concept of corporate 
governance? How important do you think it is? 
2. What is your assessment of corporate governance practices within Saudi 
Arabian companies? Are there any deficiencies? If so, what are they? 
3. What of aspects of corporate governance are most important? 
4. How far are Saudi companies concerned with corporate governance 
improvements? 
5. What aspects of corporate governance are most needed in Saudi Arabia? 
b. Board Structure, Responsibility, Disclosure and Transparency 
1. What do you think about the methods of structuring the boards of directors 
within Saudi companies? What they are usually based on? 
2. Do companies have independent non-executive directors? How they 
nominated? What is their role? 
3. What sub-committees do Saudi companies have? What is their role? What 
kinds of sub-committees are needed? 
4. To what extent do you think that boards of directors are fulfilling their 
responsibilities? 
5. How far do think that the disclosure and transparency standard requirements 
are adequate? 
6. What is your assessment of companies' disclosure and transparency? How far 
do they comply with disclosure and transparency requirements? 
c. Stakeholders 
1. How common is it for companies to have one or two major shareholders? 
What influence do they have over the activities of the companies? 
2. How well do you think that shareholders' rights are protected? Are 
shareholders treated equitably? 
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3. Are you concerned with improvements in corporate governance? Do you have 
representatives on the boards? Do you have influence over the activities of the 
companies? 
4. How well do you think that you and other stakeholders' rights are protected 
by the law and in practice? How far are you satisfied? 
5. What is your assessment of your roles (as a stakeholder)? What should be 
done? What are the obstacles? 
d. Regulatory Bodies & Legal System 
1. What is the extent of Saudi companies' compliance with regulations and 
standards? 
2. Which bodies are responsible for regulating corporate governance systems and 
monitoring companies' adherence to them? Is there any discrepancy between 
them? 
3. What do you think of the legal system in Saudi Arabia and the laws that 
companies are subject to? To what extent does the legal system affect the 
practice of corporate governance? 
4. What about the role of the judiciary and the courts in maintaining high 
corporate governance standards? 
5. What is your evaluation of the proposed corporate governance code issued 
recently by the Capital Market Authority? Should it be mandatory or just for 
guidance? Should it apply to all companies or only to listed ones? 
6. Has Saudi Arabia joining the WTO had any influence on Saudi companies' 
corporate governance? 
7. Are you aware of different approaches of corporate governance in different 
parts of the world? 
8. Are there any political, economic or social factors affecting corporate 
governance in your company? 
e. Accountability 
1. What is your definition and understanding of accountability? 
2. Are companies, their boards and managers accountable for their actions and 
performance? If so, to whom and how? 
3. Do you think that companies are doing enough to discharge their 
accountability? 
335 
4. Form your viewpoint, does accountability require companies to adopt a good 
corporate governance system? 
5. How well do you think that accountability is defined in the relevant 
regulations? 
6. Have you exercise your accountability relationship with the company? 
f. Accountability in Islam 
1. To what extent are Saudi companies subject to Sharia? 
2. What is your definition and understanding of accountability in Islam? 
3. To what extent dose the Islamic conception of accountability have any 
influence on companies' practice? 
4. To what extent does the Islamic conception of accountability affect 
companies' corporate governance systems? 
5. To what extent do Saudi companies exercise the Islamic concept of Shura? If 
so, how? If not, why not? 
6. Are Saudi companies offering the opportunity for stakeholders to participate in 
making decisions in the light of Shura? 
7. To what extent dose the Islamic concept of Hisba has any influence on Saudi 
companies? If so, how? If not, why not? 
8. According to Hisba, do you think that stakeholders have the right to ensure 
that all their interests are protected? How? Who is doing that? 
9. Is there a conflict between Islam and the corporate governance code? 
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3. Auditor 
a. CG Definition 
1. What is your definition and understanding of the concept of corporate 
governance? How important do you think it is? 
2. What is your assessment of corporate governance practices within Saudi 
Arabian companies? Are there any deficiencies? If so, what are they? 
3. What of aspects of corporate governance are most important? 
4. How far are Saudi companies concerned with corporate governance 
improvements? 
5. What aspects of corporate governance are most needed in Saudi Arabia? 
b. Board Structure, Responsibility, Disclosure and Transparency 
1. What do you think about the methods of structuring the boards of directors 
within Saudi companies? What they are based on? 
2. Do companies have independent non-executive directors? How are they 
nominated? What is their role? 
3. Which sub-committees do Saudi companies have? What is their role? What 
kind of sub-committees are needed? 
4. What is your assessment of the audit committees in the companies? 
5. Who are the members of audit committees? How are they nominated? What 
are their roles? What involvement do you have with them? 
6. To what extent do you think that boards of directors are fulfilling their 
responsibilities? 
7. How far do think that the disclosure and transparency standard requirements 
are adequate? 
8. What is your assessment of companies' disclosure and transparency? How far 
are they in compliance with disclosure and transparency requirements? 
c. Stakeholders 
1. How well do you think that shareholders' rights are protected? Are 
shareholders treated equitably? 
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2. What categories of stakeholders are concerned with the improvement of 
corporate governance? Do they have representatives on the boards? Do they 
have influence over the activities of the companies? 
3. How well do you think that stakeholders' rights are protected under the law 
and in practice? How far do think that stakeholders are satisfied? 
4. What is your assessment of stakeholders' roles? What should be done? What 
are the obstacles? 
d. Regulatory Bodies & Legal System 
1. What is the extent of Saudi companies' compliance with regulations and 
standards? 
2. Which bodies are responsible for regulating corporate governance systems and 
monitoring companies' adherence to them? Is there any discrepancy between 
them? 
3. What do you think of the legal system in Saudi Arabia and the laws that 
companies are subject to? To what extent does the legal system affect the 
practice of corporate governance? 
4. What about the role of the judiciary and the courts in maintaining high 
corporate governance standards? 
5. What is your evaluation of the proposed corporate governance code issued 
recently by the Capital Market Authority? Should it be mandatory or just for 
guidance? Should it apply to all companies or only to listed ones? 
6. Has Saudi Arabia joining the WTO had any influence on Saudi companies' 
corporate governance? 
7. Are you aware of different approaches of corporate governance in different 
parts of the world? 
8. Are there any political, economic or social factors affecting corporate 
governance in your company? 
e. Accountability 
1. What is your definition and understanding of accountability? 
2. Are companies, their boards and managers accountable for their actions and 
performance? If so, to whom and how? 
3. Do you think that companies are doing enough to discharge their 
accountability? 
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4. Form your viewpoint, does accountability require companies to adopt a good 
corporate governance system? 
5. How well do you think that accountability is defined in the relevant 
regulations? 
6. Have you exercise your accountability relationship with the company? 
f. Accountability in Islam 
1. To what extent are Saudi companies subjected to Sharia? 
2. What is your definition and understanding of accountability in Islam? 
3. To what extent dose the Islamic conception of accountability have influence 
on companies' practice? 
4. To what extent does Islamic accountability affect companies' corporate 
governance systems? 
5. To what extent do Saudi companies exercise the Islamic concept of Shura? If 
so, how? If not, why not? 
6. Are Saudi companies offering their stakeholders the opportunity to participate 
in making decisions in the light of Shura? 
7. To what extent dose the Islamic concept of Hisba has any influence on Saudi 
companies? 
8. According to Hisba, do you think that stakeholders have the right to ensure 
that all their interests are protected? How? Who is doing that? 
9. Is there a conflict between Islam and the corporate governance code? 
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4. Regulator 
a. CG Definition 
1. What is your definition and understanding of the concept of corporate 
governance? How important do you think it is? 
2. What is your assessment of corporate governance practices within Saudi 
Arabian companies? Are there any deficiencies? If so, what are they? 
3. What of aspects of corporate governance are most important? 
4. How far are Saudi companies concerned with corporate governance 
improvements? 
5. What aspects of corporate governance are most needed in Saudi Arabia? 
b. Board Structure, Responsibility, Disclosure and Transparency 
1. What has been done to improve the methods of structuring the boards of 
directors within Saudi companies? What they are based on? 
2. What has been done to encourage companies to have independent non- 
executive directors? What is their role? How are members of boards of 
directors nominated? How are they remunerated? 
3. What sub-committees do Saudi companies have to establish? What are their 
roles? Who are their members? 
4. What has been done to ensure that boards of directors are fulfilling their 
responsibilities? 
5. What has been done to improve companies' disclosure and transparency? 
6. What do you do to ensure companies' compliance with disclosure and 
transparency requirements? How well do they comply? What are the 
procedures if these requirements are not met? 
7. Are there any political, economic or social factors affecting companies' 
disclosure and transparency? 
c. Stakeholders 
1. What has been done to protect shareholders' rights and to ensure that all 
shareholders are treated equitably? What has been done to see that they are 
represented on the boards and have influence over the activities of the 
companies? 
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2. What efforts have been made to protect minority shareholders' rights? What 
mechanisms are used to ensure that all shareholders' rights are protected? 
What are the procedures if there is any threat to these rights? 
3. What efforts have been made to ensure that all shareholders are aware of their 
rights? 
4. Who do you regard as companies' stakeholders? What roles should they play? 
What has been done to protect their interests? To ensure their right of 
representation on the boards? To regulate their influence over the companies? 
To ensure that their interests are protected? 
5. What mechanisms are used to ensure that all stakeholders' interests are 
protected? What are the procedures if these interests are threatened? 
6. What efforts have been made to ensure that all stakeholders are aware of their 
rights? 
7. What has been done to measure stakeholders' satisfaction? 
f. Regulatory Bodies & Legal System 
What is the extent of Saudi companies' compliance with regulations and 
standards? 
2. Which bodies are responsible for regulating corporate governance systems and 
monitoring companies' adherence to them? Is there any discrepancy between 
them? 
3. What about the role of the judiciary and the courts in maintaining high 
corporate governance standards? 
4. What steps were taken in drafting the proposed corporate governance code? 
Were any stakeholders groups involved in (........... ) the code? 
5. Is there any influence from the OECD corporate governance code or 
developed countries' codes? 
6. Why is the code issued only as guidance and not mandatory? Is it for listed or 
all companies? 
7. How well have companies complied with this code? 
8. Do you have an adequate power and resources to monitor companies' 
compliance with the corporate governance regulations? 
9. Has the joining of the WTO had any influence on your regulation or 
monitoring of companies' corporate governance? 
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10. Are you aware of different approaches of corporate governance in different 
parts of the world? 
11. Are there any political, economic or social factors affecting your process of 
regulating and monitoring of companies' corporate governance? 
d. Accountability 
1. What is your definition and understanding of accountability? 
2. What has been done to make sure that companies, their boards and managers 
are accountable for their actions and performance? To whom and how? 
3. How do you ensure that companies are discharging their accountability? How 
well are they doing so? 
4. From your viewpoint, does accountability require companies to adopt a good 
corporate governance system? 
e. Accountability in Islam 
1. To what extent do you take into account the Sharia in the process of issuing 
company regulations and rules? 
2. What is your definition and understanding of accountability in Islam? 
3. Do you take into account the concept of accountability in Islam when 
regulating and monitoring companies? If so, to whom should companies be 
accountable? And how? 
4. Do you think that accountability in Islam required companies to adopt good 
corporate governance systems? If so, what do you do in this respect? 
5. What has been done to ensure that there is an appropriate adopting of the 
Islamic conception of Shura within Saudi companies? If there. how? If no, 
Why? 
6. What has been done to ensure that there is an appropriate participation 
opportunity for stakeholders in making decisions in the light of the concept of 
Shura? 
7. Do you think that the Islamic concept of Hisba has any influence on your 
regulatory processes? If so, how? If not, why not? 
8. In the light of Hisba, what has been done for 'stakeholders to have the right to 
ensure that all their interests are protected? How? Who is doing that? 
9. Is there a conflict between Islam and the corporate governance code? 
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Thank you in advance for completing this questionnaire. 
If you are involved in more than one role (below) please respond, where applicable in the questionnaire, in 
relation to your most significant role. 
A: Demographic Information 
- Please identify your role by ticking the appropriate box (please choose one) 
Q Executive Company Chairman 
Q Non-Executive Company Chairman 
0 Independent Non-Executive Company Chairman 
0 Chief Executive officer 
Q Executive Director 
0 Non-Executive Director 
Q Independent Non-Executive Director 
0 Company Manager 
0 Other (please specify) ....................... 
- What is your highest level of academic qualification? (please choose one box) 
Q PhD 
Q Master 
Q First degree 
Q Other (please specify) ................ 
- If you have any professional qualifications please specify 
.................................................. 
- Where have you studied? (please tick all that apply) 
Q Saudi Arabia 
0 Other Arab country 
Q United States 
Q United Kingdom 
0 Other (please specify) ................. 
- Please specify your age group: 
0 30 years or less 
0 31-40 years 
Q 41-50 years 
Q 51-60 years 
Q More than 60 years 
- Please identify your background: 
Q Saudi 
Q Arab (please specify) ........... 
Q Asian (please specify) ........... 
0 European (please specify) ....... 
O Other (please specify) ............. 
- Please indicate your company's turnover in Saudi Riyals: 
Q Less than 500m Q Between 50lm and l. 5bn 
- Please indicate which sector your company specialises in: 
Q Banking & Insurance Q Industrial & Electrical 
Q Services Q Telecommunication 
Q More than 1. Sbn 
Q Cement 
Q Agricultural 
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Please indicate your response through out the questionnaire by ticking the appropriate box where 
1= Not at all 5= To a great extent 
B: Corporate Governance Definition 
01. To what extent do you agree that the term "Corporate Governance" refers to: 
1 2 3 4 5 
a. The system by which companies are directed and controlled 
b. Organising the relationship between the company and its shareholders 
c. Organising the relationships between the owners, the board of directors and the managers 
d. Organising the relationship between the company and all the stakeholders who are affected 
by, or who affect, the company's decisions and activities 
e. The structures, processes, cultures and systems that engender the successful operation of 
the organisation 
Q2. Please indicate how familiar you are with the followin : 
I2343 
a. The Saudi Corporate Governance Code 
b. International developments in corporate governance 
03. To what extent do you agree with the following statements? 
1 2 3 4 5 
a. Corporate governance is important for Saudi companies 
b. Saudi companies' practices of corporate governance are satisfactory 
c. There is an adequate awareness of corporate governance issues in the Saudi business 
environment 
d. The Saudi Corporate Governance Code is adequate and effective 
e. Saudi companies generally comply with The Saudi Corporate Governance Code 
f. The Saudi Corporate Governance Code should be mandatory for all listed companies 
g. There should be penalties for non-compliance with the Saudi Corporate Governance 
Code 
h. The Arabic translation of the English term "Corporate Governance" provides the same 
meaning that the English term does 
Q4. To what extent do you agree with the following as appropriate terms to refer to the English term "Corporate 
Governance"? 
1 2 3 4 3 
a. Hawkama 
b. Hakmea 
c. Edarat Wa Taw'eh Alshareka 
d. Edarat Wa Tandheem A Ishareka 
e. Aledarah Alrashedah 
f. Other (Please spccify) ....................... 
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C. Board structure, subcommittees and responsibilities 
Q5. To what extent do you agree that the following factors influence the selection process of directors in Saudi 
rmmnsnies? 
Executive Directors Non-Executive Directors Independent NEDs 
Factor 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 S 
a. Share ownership 
b. Personal relationships 
c. Favouritism 
d. Ex erience and qualifications 
e. Having financial knowledge 
f. Having knowledge in other 
specialist areas 
Reputation 
h. Having enough time to spend 
on company business 
i. Other (please specify) 
Q6. In your opinion, how many Independent Non-Executive Directors should be on a Saudi company board, and 
how many Independent Non-Executive Directors are there in your company? (please choose one box for each 
rnw1 
None One third of the 
board 
Half of the 
board 
Two thirds of 
the board 
Other 
(specify) 
Companies should have 
my company's board 
Q7. In your opinion, what is the maximum number of listed companies for which a person should be a board 
member at any one time? (please choose one box) 
123456789 10 More than 10 
Q8 If you are a board member, please specify how many boards you are a member of? 
CO In vnnr nninion_ what should be the annrooriate number of hoard members for each size of Saudi cmmnanv? 
Small companies 
Turnover < 500m 
Medium companies 
Turnover between 501 m and l. 5bn 
Large companies 
Turnover > 1.5bn 
Not less than 
Not more than 
Q10. Please specify how many members are on your company's board of directors? 
......................................................... 
QI 1. In your opinion, how often should the board of directors meet? And how often does your company's board 
--. +o L. lAOCn rhnnce one 
hnx for each rnw) 
Every 6 Every 4 Every 3 Every 2 Every month More 
months months months months ollen 
Companies' boards 
should meet 
My company board 
meets 
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012. To what extent do you agree that companies should, are doing, and your company does, the following: 
Companies should Companies in general My company actually 
Statement do does 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
a. Separate the chairman and CEO 
roles 
b. Have an independent chairman 
c. Define the board's authorities and 
responsibilities and ensure that board 
members are aware of them 
d. Have appropriate standards to 
evaluate board business 
e. Subject board members to 
orientation programmes to train and 
qualify them 
f. Ensure that board members act on a 
fully informed basis, in good faith, 
with due diligence and care, and in the 
best interests of the company and the 
shareholders 
Treat all shareholders fairly 
h. Apply high ethical standards 
i. Take into account the interests of all 
stakeholders 
j. Exercise objective independent 
judgement on corporate affairs 
k. Provide access to accurate, relevant 
and timely information to board 
members 
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Q13. To what extent do you agree that Saudi companies' boards of directors should be, actually are, and your 
company is, responsible for the following: 
Board should be Boards actually are: My company's 
res onsible for: board is actual) : 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
a. Reviewing and guiding corporate 
strategy, major plans of action, risk policy, 
annual budgets and business plans 
b. Setting performance objectives 
c. Monitoring corporate performance 
d. Overseeing major capital expenditure, 
acquisitions and divestitures. 
e. Monitoring the effectiveness of the 
company's governance practices and 
making changes as needed. 
f. Selecting, compensating, monitoring and, 
when necessary, replacing key executives 
and overseeing succession planning. 
g. Aligning key executive and board 
remuneration with the longer term interests 
of the company and its shareholders 
h. Ensuring a formal and transparent board 
nomination and election process. 
i. Monitoring and managing potential 
conflicts of interest of management or 
board members including misuse of 
corporate assets and abuse in related party 
transactions 
j. Ensuring that appropriate systems of 
control are in place, in particular, systems 
for risk management, financial and 
operational control 
k. Overseeing the process of disclosure and 
communication 
Q14. To what extent do you think that it is important for Saudi companies to have the following board 
committees? And to what extent do these committees exist in Saudi companies? 
The importance The existence Committee 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 S 
a. Audit Committee 
b. Nomination Committee 
c. Remuneration Committee 
d. Executive Committee 
e. Corporate Governance Committee 
f. Risk Committee 
Social Responsibility Committee 
i. Sharia Committee 
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015. Please indicate which of the followine committees your comnanv has. and to what extent are they effective? 
itt C The existence The effect iveness omm ee Yes No 1 2 3 4 5 
a. Audit Committee 
b. Nomination Committee 
c. Remuneration Committee 
d. Executive Committee 
e. Corporate Governance Committee 
f. Risk Committee 
Social Responsibility Committee 
i. Sharia Committee 
D: Disclosure and Transparency 
Q16. To what extent do you agree that Saudi companies should be, actually are, and your own company is, 
disclosing the followine: 
Companies should be Companies actually are My company discloses: 
Statement disclosin : disclosin : 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 S 
a. The financial and operating results 
of the company 
b. Company objectives 
c. Company plans 
d. Major share ownership and voting 
rights 
e. Remuneration, qualifications, the 
selection process, other company 
directorships and independence 
f. Related party transactions 
Foreseeable risk factors 
h. Issues regarding employees and 
other stakeholders 
i. Governance structures and policies, 
in particular, the content of any 
corporate governance code or policy 
and the process by which it is 
implemented. 
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E: Stakeholders & Accountability 
017. To what extent do you agree with the followine: 
There 
relationship 
is an accountability 
between a com an and: 
These stakeholders should have a 
re resentative on the board 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
a. Academics 
b. Auditors 
c. Community 
d. Customers 
e. Employees 
f. Environmental groups 
Financial consultants and analysists 
h. The government 
i. Lenders 
'. Media 
k. The regulatory and monitoring bodies 
1. Shareholders 
m. Suppliers 
018. Please specify, approximately, the proportion of your company ownership by the following: 
Owner Percentage of 
ownership 
Do they have representatives on the board 
Yes No 
a. The Government (Public Investment Fund) 
b. Institutional Investors (Social Insuranc 
c. Institutional Investors (Pension Fund) 
d. Institutional Investors (Fund Managers) 
e. Family Members 
f. Individual Private Investors 
Other (please specify) ............... 
019. To what extent do you agree with the followine statements about Saudi companies? 
Statements 1 2 3 4 S 
a. It is common for Saudi companies to have major shareholders 
b. Major shareholders control and have a direct influence over companies' activities 
c. The ownership structure affects companies' corporate governance practices 
d. The rights of shareholders including minority shareholders are adequately protected 
b law 
e. The rights of shareholders including minority shareholders are adequately protected 
in practice 
f. Saudi companies treat all shareholders equitably 
g. An accumulative voting system would assist minority shareholders to choose their 
representatives on the board 
h. Institutional investors exercise their ownership rights 
i. Saudi companies respect the rights of stakeholders that are established by law or 
through mutual agreements. 
j. Saudi companies provide equal, timely and cost-efficient access to relevant 
information for all stakeholders 
k. Saudi companies enable stakeholders to freely communicate their concerns about 
illegal or unethical practices to the board 
L 
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020. To what extent do you agree with the followin¢ statements? 
Statement 1 2 3 4 5 
a. Accountability is practiced in Saudi society 
b. Companies, boards and managers are accountable for their acts 
c. Stakeholders exercise their accountability relationships with companies 
d. Accountability mechanisms are in place in companies 
f. Companies should adopt good corporate governance to discharge their 
accountability 
F. Accountability in Islam 
021 To what extent do you agree with that Saudi cmmnanies should and are dnina the following? 
St t t should 
be Actual) are 
emen a 1 2 3 4 S 
a. Companies are subject to Sharia in all their transactions 
b. Companies, their boards and managers are accountable 
for their acts according to the Islamic conception of 
accountability. 
c. Companies, their boards and managers are accountable to 
Allah according to the Islamic conception of accountability. 
d. Companies, their boards and managers are accountable to 
shareholders according to the Islamic conception of 
accountability. 
e. Companies, their boards and managers are accountable to 
stakeholders according to the Islamic conception of 
accountability. 
f. Companies offer the opportunity for stakeholders to 
participate in making decisions according to the Islamic 
conception of Shura. 
g. Companies provide the opportunity to stakeholders to 
ensure that all their interests in the company are protected 
according to the Islamic conception of Hisba. 
Q22. In your opinion, does Sharia conflict with any corporate governance principles? 
Yes Q No Q 
(If yes, please explain) 
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G. Regulatory and legal system 
M-1 To what tent do von agree with the fnllnwinn statements 
Statement 1 2 3 4 S 
a. The laws and systems in Saudi Arabia are adequate, effective and provide an 
appropriate environment for corporate governance practices 
b. The laws and systems in Saudi Arabia are adequate, effective and pr ovide an 
appropriate environment for accountability practices 
c. The judiciary and the courts play a significant role in maintaining high corporate 
governance practices 
d. The corporate governance regulatory, supervision and monitoring bodies are 
efficient 
e. The regulatory, supervision and monitoring bodies work well together. 
f. There is a need for establishing a separate and independent body to look after 
corporate governance issues in Saudi Arabia 
Saudi companies comply with laws and regulations 
Section H. The corporate governance framework 
MA Tn what extent do anree with the fo11owine statements: 
Statement 1 2 3 4 S 
a. Social factors have a direct impact on corporate governance practices in Saudi 
Arabia 
b. Cultural factors such as: favouritism, family ties and tribalism, have a direct impact 
on corporate governance practices in Saudi Arabia 
c. The political situation in Saudi Arabia impacts on corporate governance practices 
d. The economic situation in Saudi Arabia impacts on corporate governance practices 
f. Corruption in Saudi Arabia has an influence on corporate governance practices 
g. The auditing and accounting profession in Saudi Arabia impacts on corporate 
governance practices 
h. The cost of corporate governance affects the practice of corporate governance in 
Saudi Arabia 
Please feel free to add any comments that you think are related to corporate governance practices in Saudi 
companies in general 
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Thank you in advance for completing this questionnaire. 
If you are involved in more than one role (below) please respond, where applicable in the questionnaire, in 
relation to your most significant role. 
A: Demographic Information 
- Please identify your role by ticking the appropriate box (please choose one) 
0 Academic 
0 Auditor 
Q Company Employee 
Q Economic Journalist 
Q Family Investor 
Q Financial Consultant / Analyst 
Q Fund Manager 
Q Government Institutional Investor 
Q Judiciary 
Q Lender 
Q Private Investor 
Q Regulator 
Q Stock Broker 
0 Other (please specify) ......................... 
- What is your highest level of academic qualification? (please choose one box) 
Cl PhD 
0 Master 
Q First degree 
0 Other (please specify) ........................... 
- If you have any professional qualifications please specify 
....................................................... 
- Where have you studied? (please tick all that apply) 
Q Saudi Arabia 
0 Other Arab country 
0 United States 
0 United Kingdom 
Q Other (please specify) ..................... 
- Please specify your age group: 
Q 30 years or less 
Q 31-40 years 
Q 41-50 years 
Q 51-60 years 
0 More than 60 years 
- Please identify your background: 
0 Saudi 
0 Arab (please specify) ........... 
0 Asian (please specify) ........... 
Q European (please specify) ....... 
Q Other (please specify) ............. 
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Please indicate your response through out the questionnaire by ticking the appropriate box where 
1= Not at all 5= To a great extent 
B: Corporate Governance Definition 
01. To what extent do you agree that the term "Corporate Governance" refers to: 
1 2 3 4 5 
a. The system by which companies are directed and controlled 
b. Organising the relationship between the company and its shareholders 
c. Organising the relationships between the owners, the board of directors and the 
managers 
d. Organising the relationship between the company and all the stakeholders who are 
affected by, or who affect, the company's decisions and activities 
e. The structures, processes, cultures and systems that engender the successful 
operation of the organisation 
Q2. Please indicate how familiar you are with the followin : 
12345 
a. The Saudi Corporate Governance Code 
b. International developments in corporate governance P 
03. To what extent do you agree with the following statements: 
1 2 3 4 3 
a. Corporate governance is important for Saudi companies 
b. Saudi companies' practices of corporate governance are satisfactory 
c. There is an adequate awareness of corporate governance issues in the Saudi business 
environment 
d. The Saudi Corporate Governance Code is adequate and effective 
e. Saudi companies generally comply with The Saudi Corporate Governance Code 
f. The Saudi Corporate Governance Code should be mandatory for all listed companies 
g. There should be penalties for non-compliance with the Saudi Corporate Governance 
Code 
h. The Arabic translation of the English term "Corporate Governance" provides the 
same meaning as the English term 
Q4. To what extent do you agree with the following as appropriate terms to refer to the English term "Corporate 
Governance"? 
1 2 3 4 3 
a. Hawkama 
b. Hakmea 
c. Edarat Wa Tawjeh Alshareka 
d. Edarat wa Tandheem Alshareka 
e. Aledarah Alrashedah 
f. Other (Please specify) ....................... 
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C. Board structure, subcommittees and responsibilities 
An Executive Director is a board member who has a management position in a company. 
A Non-Executive Director is a board member who does not have a full-time management position at a company, 
or who does not receive a monthly or yearly salary. 
An Independent Non-Executive Director is a member of the board of directors who has complete independence. 
Q5. To what extent do you agree that the following factors influence the selection process of directors in Saudi 
companies? 
Executive Directors Non-Executive Directors Independent NEW 
Factor 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
a. Share ownership 
b. Personal relationships 
c. Favouritism 
d. Experience and qualifications 
e. Having financial knowledge 
f. Having knowledge in other 
specialist areas 
Reputation 
h. Having enough time to spend 
on company business 
i. Other (please specify) 
Q6. According to the Saudi Corporate Governance Code, the number of Independent Non-Executive Directors 
shall not be fewer than two members, or one-third of the members of a board, whichever is greater. In your 
opinion, how many Independent Non-Executive Directors should be on a Saudi company board? (please choose 
one box) 
None One third of the board Half of the board Two thirds of the board Other (specify) 
Q7. According to the Saudi Corporate Governance Code, a member of a board of directors shall not act as a 
member of the board of directors of more than five listed companies at the same time. In your opinion, what is 
the maximum number of listed companies for which a person should be a board member at any one time? (please 
choose one box) 
F1 23456789 10 More than 10 
Q8. According to the Saudi Corporate Governance Code, the maximum number of board members is I1 members 
and the minimum is 3 members. In your opinion, what should be the appropriate number of board members for 
each size of Saudi company? 
Small companies 
Turnover < 500m 
Medium companies 
Turnover between 500m and 1.5bn 
Large companies 
Turnover >1.5bn 
Not less than 
Not more than 
09. In your opinion, how often should the board of directors meet? 
Eve 6 months Every 4 months Every 3 months Every 2 months Every month More 
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010. To what extent do you agree that companies should do, and are doing, the following: 
Com anies should Companies in eneral do Statement 
1 2 3 4 S 1 2 3 4 S 
a. Separate the chairman and CEO roles 
b. Have an independent chairman 
c. Define the board's authorities and responsibilities and 
ensure that board members are aware of them 
d. Have appropriate standards to evaluate board business 
e. Subject board members to orientation programmes to 
train and qualify them 
f. Ensure that board members act on a fully informed basis, 
in good faith, with due diligence and care, and in the best 
interests of the company and the shareholders 
Treat all shareholders fairly 
h. Apply high ethical standards 
i. Take into account the interests of all stakeholders. 
j. Exercise objective independent judgement on corporate 
affairs 
k. Provide access to accurate, relevant and timely 
information to board members 
011. To what extent do you agree that the board of directors should be, and are, responsible for the following: 
Boards should be Boards actually are: 
responsible for: 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
a. Reviewing and guiding corporate strategy, major plans of 
action, risk policy, annual budgets and business plans 
b. Setting performance objectives 
c. Overseeing major capital expenditure, acquisitions and 
divestitures 
d. Monitoring the effectiveness of the company's 
governance practices and making changes as needed 
e. Selecting, compensating, monitoring and, when 
necessary, replacing key executives and overseeing 
succession planning 
f. Aligning key executive and board remuneration with the 
longer term interests of the company and its shareholders 
g. Ensuring a formal and transparent board nomination and 
election process 
h. Monitoring and managing potential conflicts of interest of 
management or board members including misuse of 
corporate assets and abuse in related party transactions 
i. Ensuring that appropriate systems of control are in place, 
in particular, systems for risk management, financial and 
operational control 
J. Overseeing the process of disclosure and communication 
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Q12. To what extent do you think that it is important for Saudi companies to have the following board 
committees? And to what extent do these committees exist in Saudi companies? 
The importance The existence Committee 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 S 
a. Audit Committee 
b. Nomination Committee 
c. Remuneration Committee 
d. Executive Committee 
e. Corporate Governance Committee 
f. Risk Committee 
Social Responsibility Committee 
i. Sharia Committee 
D: Disclosure and Transparency 
Q13. To what extent do you agree that Saudi companies should be, and actually are, disclosing the following: 
Statement 
Companies should be 
disclosin : 
Companies actually are 
disclosin 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
a. The financial and operating results of the company 
b. Company objectives 
c. Company future plans 
d. Major share ownership and voting rights 
e. Remuneration, qualifications, the selection process, other 
company directorships and independence 
f. Related party transactions 
Foreseeable risk factors 
h. Issues regarding employees and other stakeholders 
i. Governance structures and policies, in particular, the 
content of any corporate governance code or policy and the 
process by which it is implemented. 
E. Stakeholders & Accountability 
014. To what extent do you agree with the following: 
There is an accountability 
relationship between a company and: 
These stakeholders should 
have a representative on the 
board 
1 2 3 4 S 1 2 3 4 S 
a. Academics 
b. Auditors 
c. Community 
d. Customers 
e. Employees 
f. Environmental groups 
Financial consultants and analysists 
h. The government 
i. Lenders 
j. Media 
k. The regulatory and monitoring bodies 
1. Shareholders 
m. Suppliers 
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015_ To what extent do you aeree with the followine statements about Saudi companies? 
Statements 1 2 3 4 S 
a. It is common for Saudi companies to have major shareholders 
b. Major shareholders control and have a direct influence over companies' activities 
c. The ownership structure affects companies' corporate governance practices 
d. The rights of shareholders including minority shareholders are adequately protected 
b law 
e. The rights of shareholders including minority shareholders are adequately protected 
in practice 
f. Saudi companies treat all shareholders equitably 
g. An accumulative voting system would assist minority shareholders to choose their 
representatives on the board 
h. Institutional investors exercise their ownership rights 
i. Saudi companies respect the rights of stakeholders that are established by law or 
through mutual agreements. 
j. Saudi companies provide equal, timely and cost-efficient access to relevant 
information for all stakeholders 
k. Saudi companies enable stakeholders to freely communicate their concerns about 
illegal or unethical practices to the board 
016. To what extent do you agree with the following statements: 
Statement 1 2 3 4 S 
a. Accountability is practiced in Saudi society 
b. Companies, boards and managers are accountable for their acts 
c. Stakeholders exercise their accountability relationships with companies 
d. Accountability mechanisms are in place in companies 
f. Companies should adopt good corporate governance to discharge their 
accountability 
F. Accountability in Islam 
n17 Tn what extent do you aeree with that Saudi companies should and are doine the followinc? 
S 
Should be Ac tual) are tatement 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 S 
a. Companies are subject to Sharia in all their transactions 
b. Companies, their boards and managers are accountable 
for their acts according to the Islamic conception of 
accountability. 
c. Companies, their boards and managers are accountable to 
Allah according to the Islamic conception of accountability, 
d. Companies, their boards and managers are accountable to 
shareholders according to the Islamic conception of 
accountabilit . 
e. Companies, their boards and managers are accountable to 
stakeholders according to the Islamic conception of 
accountability. 
f. Companies offer the opportunity for stakeholders to 
participate in making decisions according to the Islamic 
conception ofShura. 
g. Companies provide the opportunity to stakeholders to 
ensure that all their interests in the company are protected 
according to the Islamic conception of Hisba. 
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Q18. In your opinion, does Sharia conflict with any corporate governance principles? 
Yes Q No Q 
(If yes, please explain) 
G: Regulatory and legal system 
r)10 Ti uihnt Pvtent do vnii aoree with the follnwino statements 
Statement 1 2 3 4 S 
a. The laws and systems in Saudi Arabia are adequate, effective and provide an 
appropriate environment for corporate governance practices 
b. The laws and systems in Saudi Arabia are adequate, effective and pr ovide an 
appropriate environment for accountability practices 
c. The judiciary and the courts play a significant role in maintaining high corporate 
governance practices 
d. The corporate governance regulatory, supervision and monitoring bodies are 
efficient 
e. The regulatory, supervision and monitoring bodies work well together. 
f. There is a need for establishing a separate and independent body to look after 
corporate governance issues in Saudi Arabia 
Saudi companies comply with laws and regulations 
H: The corporate governance framework 
ron Tn . rhnt rvtent tin avree with the fnllnwina stntemente- 
Statement 1 2 3 4 5 
a. Social factors have a direct impact on corporate governance practices in Saudi 
Arabia 
b. Cultural factors such as: favouritism, family ties and tribalism, have a direct impact 
on corporate governance practices in Saudi Arabia 
c. The political situation in Saudi Arabia impacts on corporate governance practices 
d. The economic situation in Saudi Arabia impacts on corporate governance practices 
f. Corruption in Saudi Arabia has an influence on corporate governance practices 
g. The auditing and accounting profession in Saudi Arabia impacts on corporate 
governance practices 
h. The cost of corporate governance affects the practice of corporate governance in 
Saudi Arabia 
Please feel free to add any comments that you think are related to corporate governance practices in Saudi 
companies in general 
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Thank you in advance for completing this questionnaire. 
If you are involved in more than one role (below) please respond, where applicable in the questionnaire, in 
relation to your most significant role. 
A: Demographic Information 
- Please identify your role by ticking the appropriate box (please choose one) 
0 Academic 
0 Auditor 
Q Company Employee 
Q Economic Journalist 
Q Family Investor 
0 Financial Consultant / Analyst 
Q Fund Manager 
0 Government Institutional Investor 
Q Judiciary 
Q Lender 
Q Private Investor 
Q Regulator 
Q Stock Broker 
Q Other (please specify) ......................... 
- What is your highest level of academic qualification? (please choose one box) 
0 PhD 
0 Master 
Q First degree 
0 Other (please specify) ........................... 
- If you have any professional qualifications please specify 
....................................................... 
- Where have you studied? (please tick all that apply) 
0 Saudi Arabia 
Q Other Arab country 
Q United States 
Q United Kingdom 
Q Other (please specify) ..................... 
- Please specify your age group: 
0 30 years or less 
Q 31-40 years 
Q 41-50 years 
Q 51-60 years 
Q More than 60 years 
- Please identify your background: 
Q Saudi 
Q Arab (please specify) ........... 
Q Asian (please specify) ........... 
Q European (please specify) ....... 
Q Other (please specify) ............. 
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Please indicate your response through out the questionnaire by ticking the appropriate box where 
1= Not at all 5= To a great extent 
B: Corporate Governance Definition 
01. To what extent do you agree that the term "Corporate Governance" refers to: 
1 2 3 4 S 
a. The system by which companies are directed and controlled 
b. Organising the relationship between the company and its shareholders 
c. Organising the relationships between the owners, the board of directors and the 
managers 
d. Organising the relationship between the company and all the stakeholders who are 
affected by, or who affect, the company's decisions and activities 
e. The structures, processes, cultures and systems that engender the successful 
operation of the organisation 
I L 
I 
02. Please indicate how familiar you are with the following: 
1 2 3 4 S 
a The Saudi Corporate Governance Code 
b. International developments in corporate governance 
03. To what extent do you aeree with the followine statements: 
1 2 3 4 S 
a. Corporate governance is important for Saudi companies 
b. Saudi companies' practices of corporate governance are satisfactory 
c. There is an adequate awareness of corporate governance issues in the Saudi business 
environment 
d. The Saudi Corporate Governance Code is adequate and effective 
e. Saudi companies generally comply with The Saudi Corporate Governance Code 
f. The Saudi Corporate Governance Code should be mandatory for all listed companies 
g. There should be penalties for non-compliance with the Saudi Corporate Governance 
Code 
h. The Arabic translation of the English term "Corporate Governance" provides the 
same meaning as the English term 
Q4. To what extent do you agree with the following as appropriate terms to refer to the English term "Corporate 
Governance"? 
1 2 3 4 
a. Hawkama 
b. Hakmea 
c. Edarat Wa Tawjeh Alshareka 
d. Edarat wa Tandheem Alshareka 
e. Aledarah Alrashedah 
f. Other (Please specify) ....................... 
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C. Board structure, subcommittees and responsibilities 
An Executive Director is a board member who has a management position in a company. 
A Non-Executive Director is a board member who does not have a full-time management position at a company, 
or who does not receive a monthly or yearly salary. 
An Independent Non-Executive Director is a member of the board of directors who has complete independence. 
Q5. To what extent do you agree that the following factors influence the selection process of directors in Saudi 
companies? 
Executive Directors Non-Executive Directors Inde pendent NEDs Factor 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
a. Share ownership 
b. Personal relationships 
c. Favouritism 
d. Experience and qualifications 
e. Having financial knowledge 
f. Having knowledge in other 
specialist areas 
Reputation 
h. Having enough time to spend 
on company business 
i. Other (leasespecify) 
Q6. According to the Saudi Corporate Governance Code, the number of Independent Non-Executive Directors 
shall not be fewer than two members, or one-third of the members of a board, whichever is greater. In your 
opinion, how many Independent Non-Executive Directors should be on a Saudi company board? (please choose 
one box) 
None One third of the board Half of the board Two hds of the board Other (specify) 
Q7. According to the Saudi Corporate Governance Code, a member of a board of directors shall not act as a 
member of the board of directors of more than five listed companies at the same time. In your opinion, what is 
the maximum number of listed companies for which a person should be a board member at any one time? (please 
choose one box) 
123456789 10 More than 10 
Q8. According to the Saudi Corporate Governance Code, the maximum number of board members is 11 members 
and the minimum is 3 members. In your opinion, what should be the appropriate number of board members for 
each size of Saudi company? 
Small companies 
Turnover < 500m 
Medium companies 
Turnover between 500m and 1.5bn 
Large companies 
Turnover > 1.5bn 
Not less than 
Not more than 
09. In your opinion, how often should the board of directors meet? 
Ever 6 months Every 4 months Every 3 months Eve 2 months Every month More 
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010_ To what extent do you agree that companies should do. and are doing. the following: 
C anies should Companies in general do Statement 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
a. Separate the chairman and CEO roles 
b. Have an independent chairman 
c. Define the board's authorities and responsibilities and 
ensure that board members are aware of them 
d. Have appropriate standards to evaluate board business 
e. Subject board members to orientation programmes to 
train and qualify them 
f. Ensure that board members act on a fully informed basis, 
in good faith, with due diligence and care, and in the best 
interests of the company and the shareholders 
. Treat all shareholders 
fairly 
h. Apply high ethical standards 
J. Take into account the interests of all stakeholders. 
J. Exercise objective independent judgement on corporate 
affairs 
k. Provide access to accurate, relevant and timely 
information to board members 
011 - To what extent 
do you agree that the board of directors should be. and are. responsible for the following: 
Boards should be Boards actually are: 
responsible for: 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
a. Reviewing and guiding corporate strategy, major plans of 
action, risk policy, annual budgets and business plans 
b. Setting performance objectives 
c. Overseeing major capital expenditure, acquisitions and 
divestitures 
d. Monitoring the effectiveness of the company's 
governance practices and making changes as needed 
e. Selecting, compensating, monitoring and, when 
necessary, replacing key executives and overseeing 
succession planning 
f. Aligning key executive and board remuneration with the 
Ionizer term interests of the company and its shareholders 
g. Ensuring a formal and transparent board nomination and 
election process 
h. Monitoring and managing potential conflicts of interest of 
management or board members including misuse of 
corporate assets and abuse in related party transactions 
i. Ensuring that appropriate systems of control are in place, 
in particular, systems for risk management, financial and 
o erational control 
J. Overseeing the process of disclosure and communication 
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Q12. To what extent do you think that it is important for Saudi companies to have the following board 
committees? And to what extent do these committees exist in Saudi companies? 
The importance The existence Committee 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
a. Audit Committee 
b. Nomination Committee 
c. Remuneration Committee 
d. Executive Committee 
e. Corporate Governance Committee 
f. Risk Committee 
Social Responsibility Committee 
i. Sharia Committee 
D: Disclosure and Transparency 
013. To what extent do you agree that Saudi companies should be, and actually are, disclosing the following: 
Statement 
Companies should be 
disclosing: 
Companies actually are 
di closing 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
a. The financial and operating results of the company 
Company objectives 
c. Company plans 
d. Major share ownership and voting rights 
e. Remuneration, qualifications, the selection process, other 
company directorships and independence 
f. Related party transactions 
Foreseeable risk factors 
h. Issues regarding employees and other stakeholders 
i. Governance structures and policies, in particular, the 
content of any corporate governance code or policy and the 
process by which it is implemented. 
E: Stakeholders & Accountability 
Q14. To what extent do you agree with the following: 
There is an accountability 
relationship between a company and: 
These stakeholders should 
have a representative on the 
board 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
a. Academics 
b. Auditors 
c. Communi 
d. Customers 
e. Employees 
f. Environmental groups 
Financial consultants and anal lists 
h. The government 
i. Lenders 
'. Media 
k. The regulatory and monitoring bodies 
1. Shareholders 
m. Suppliers 
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015. To what extent do you aeree with the followine statements about Saudi companies? 
Statements 1 2 3 4 S 
a. It is common for Saudi companies to have major shareholders 
b. Major shareholders control and have a direct influence over companies' activities 
c. The ownership structure affects companies' corporate governance practices 
d. The rights of shareholders including minority shareholders are adequately protected 
b law 
e. The rights of shareholders including minority shareholders are adequately protected 
in practice 
f. Saudi companies treat all shareholders equitably 
g. An accumulative voting system would assist minority shareholders to choose their 
representatives on the board 
h. Institutional investors exercise their ownership rights 
i. Saudi companies respect the rights of stakeholders that are established by law or 
through mutual agreements. 
_ j. Saudi companies provide equal, timely and cost-efficient access to relevant 
information for all stakeholders 
k. Saudi companies enable stakeholders to freely communicate their concerns about 
illegal or unethical practices to the board 
016. To what extent do you agree with the following statements: 
Statement 1 2 3 4 S 
a. Accountability is practiced in Saudi society 
b. Companies, boards and managers are accountable for their acts 
c. Stakeholders exercise their accountability relationships with companies 
d. Accountability mechanisms are in place in companies 
f. Companies should adopt good corporate governance to discharge their 
accountability 
F. Accountability in Islam 
017. To what extent do you aeree with that Saudi companies should and are doine the followine? 
Statement Should be Actuall are 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
a. Companies are subject to Sharia in all their transactions 
b. Companies, their boards and managers are accountable 
for their acts according to the Islamic conception of 
accountability. 
c. Companies, their boards and managers are accountable to 
Allah according to the Islamic conception of accountability. 
d. Companies, their boards and managers are accountable to 
shareholders according to the Islamic conception of 
accountabili . 
e. Companies, their boards and managers are accountable to 
stakeholders according to the Islamic conception of 
accountability. 
f. Companies offer the opportunity for stakeholders to 
participate in making decisions according to the Islamic 
conception of Shura. 
g. Companies provide the opportunity to stakeholders to 
ensure that all their interests in the company are protected 
according to the Islamic conception of Hisba. 
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Q18. In your opinion, does Sharia conflict with any corporate governance principles? 
Yes Q No Q 
(If yes, please explain) 
G: Regulatory and legal system 
M0 T- .., het -tont rin vnil star". With th fn11t win Ontementy 
Statement 1 2 3 4 S 
a. The laws and systems in Saudi Arabia are adequate, effective and provide an 
appropriate environment for corporate governance practices 
b. The laws and systems in Saudi Arabia are adequate, effective and pr ovide an 
appropriate environment for accountability practices 
c. The judiciary and the courts play a significant role in maintaining high corporate 
governance practices 
d. The corporate governance regulatory, supervision and monitoring bodies are 
efficient 
e. The regulatory, supervision and monitoring bodies work well together. 
f. There is a need for establishing a separate and independent body to look after 
corporate governance issues in Saudi Arabia 
g. Saudi companies comply with laws and regulations 
H. The corporate governance framework 
OM To what extent do aeree with the following statements: 
Statement 1 2 3 4 S 
a. Social factors have a direct impact on corporate governance practices in Saudi 
Arabia 
b. Cultural factors such as: favouritism, family ties and tribalism, have a direct impact 
on corporate governance practices in Saudi Arabia 
c. The political situation in Saudi Arabia impacts on corporate governance practices 
d. The economic situation in Saudi Arabia impacts on corporate governance practices 
f. Corruption in Saudi Arabia has an influence on corporate governance practices 
g. The auditing and accounting profession in Saudi Arabia impacts on corporate 
governance praStices 
h. The cost of corporate governance affects the practice of corporate governance in 
Saudi Arabia 
Please feel free to add any comments that you think are related to corporate governance practices in Saudi 
companies in general 
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Thank you in advance for completing this questionnaire. 
If you are involved in more than one role (below) please respond, where applicable in the questionnaire, in 
relation to your most significant role. 
A: Demographic Information 
- Please identify your role by ticking the appropriate box (please choose one) 
0 (13) Academic 
Q (15) Auditor 
Q (15) Company Employee 
Q (12) Financial Consultant / Analyst 
Q (14) Fund Manager 
Q (17) Government Institutional Investor 
0 (26) Private Investor 
0 (11) Regulator 
0 (15) Stock Broker 
Q (6) Non-Executive Company Chairman 
Q (5) Chief Executive officer 
Q (6) Executive Director 
Q (8) Non-Executive Director 
Q (5) Independent Non-Executive Director 
0 (8) Company Manager 
- What is your highest level of academic qualification? (please choose one 
box) 
0 (21) PhD 
Q (42) Master 
Q (97) First degree 
Q Other (please specify) (5) Diploma, (4) High School Degree and (7) Other 
- If you have any professional qualifications please specify 
- Where have you studied? (please tick all that apply) 
Q (95) Saudi Arabia 
Q (17) Other Arab country 
Q (35) KSA ndUnited States 
Q (21) KSA and United Kingdom 
Q Other (please specify) (1) USA and other Arab Country (3) USA and other country and (4) KSA and other Arab 
country 
- Please specify your age group: 
Q (26) 30 years or less 
Q (61) 31-40 years 
Q (65) 41-50 years 
Q (22) 51-60 years 
Q (1) More than 60 years 
- Please identify your background: 
Q (153) Saudi 
Q (20) Arab (please specify) ........... 
Q (1) Asian (please specify) ........... 
o (0) European (please specify) ...... 
Q Other (please specify) ............. 
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- Please indicate your company's turnover in Saudi Riyals: 
Q (6) Less than 500m Q (19) Between 501m and 1.5bn 
- Please indicate which sector your company specialises in: 
Q (13) More than 1. Sbn 
Q (3) Banking & Insurance Q (20) Industrial & Electrical Q (5) Cement 
Q (9) Services Q (1) Telecommunication Q (38) Agricultural 
Please indicate your response through out the questionnaire by ticking the appropriate box where 
1= Not at all 5= To a great extent 
B: Corporate Governance Definition 
nt Tn what PYtent do you agree that the term "Corporate Governance" refers to: 
1 2 3 4 5 
a. The system by which companies are directed and controlled 5 13 37 SS 64 
b. Organising the relationship between the company and its shareholders 3 18 51 51 50 
c. Organising the relationships between the owners, the board of directors and the 6 18 33 53 42 
managers 
d. Organising the relationship between the company and all the stakeholders who are 4 16 54 50 50 
affected by, or who affect, the company's decisions and activities 
e. The structures, processes, cultures and systems that engender the successful operation 6 17 47 S8 46 
of the organisation 
02. Please indicate how familiar You are with the following: 
1 2 3 4 3 
a. The Saudi Corporate Governance Code 14 26 37 33 46 
b. International developments in corporate governance 28 38 1 58 36 13 
( Ti what PYfPnt do von agree with the following statements? 
2 3 4 3 
a. Corporate governance is important for Saudi companies 1 2 3 23 143 
b. Saudi companies' practices of corporate governance are satisfactory 42 67 52 11 4 
c. There is an adequate awareness of corporate governance issues in the Saudi 
business environment 
39 76 41 13 6 
d. The Saudi Corporate Governance Code is adequate and effective 26 41 64 32 11 
e. Saudi companies generally comply with The Saudi Corporate Governance Code 23 72 60 15 4 
f. The Saudi Corporate Governance Code should be mandatory for all listed 
companies 
2 3 13 SO 108 
g. There should be penalties for non-compliance with the Saudi Corporate 
Governance Code 
1 4 19 S4 96 
h. The Arabic translation of the English term "Corporate Governance" provides the 
same meaning that the English term does 
32 17 47 43 33 
Q4. To what extent do you agree with the following as appropriate terms to refer to the English term "Corporate 
(; nvernance"? 
1 2 3 f S 
a. Hawkama 16 14 36 SS 49 
b. Hakmea e0 37 26 13 9 
C. Edarat Wa Tawjeh Alshareka 31 20 f3 f2 30 
d. Edarat Wa Tandheem Alshareka 53 37 f2 26 1 
c. Aledarah Alrashedah s$ 3E 34 22 IS 
f. Other Please specify) 
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C. Board structure, subcommittees and responsibilities 
Q5. To what extent do you agree that the following factors influence the selection process of directors in Saudi 
companies? 
Executive Directors Non-Executive Directors lnde en dent NEDs Factor 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 I 2 3 4 5 
a. Share ownership 14 15 15 35 97 3 9 18 37 106 50 23 38 23 37 
b. Personal relationships 12 11 25 45 82 8 7 27 46 85 9 12 34 42 73 
c. Favouritism 19 19 45 40 52 15 17 39 46 55 15 17 47 45 48 
d. Experience and qualifications 4 11 63 46 49 9 22 64 45 28 9 13 62 58 26 
e. Having financial knowledge 16 21 68 40 31 19 27 83 31 11 13 27 72 39 20 
f. Having knowledge in other 
specialist areas 
10 15 61 58 32 13 29 82 34 16 10 23 73 44 22 
Reputation 7 9 54 61 45 6 16 68 54 30 4 13 64 53 38 
h. Having enough time to spend 
on company business 
12 15 51 49 48 24 32 85 23 10 19 33 80 29 I1 
i. Other lease specify) 
Q6. In your opinion, how many Independent Non-Executive Directors should be on a Saudi company board, and 
how many Independent Non-Executive Directors are there in your company? (plcasc choose one box for each 
row) 
None One third of the 
board 
half of the 
board 
Two thirds of 
the board 
Other 
(Specify) 
Companies should have 1 111 50 12 1 
My company's board 1 27 4 4 1 
Q7. In your opinion, what is the maximum number of listed companies for which a person should be a board 
member at any one time? (please choose one box) 
123456789 10 Afore than 10 
10 27 74 17 44 12 
08 If you are a board member, please specify how many boards you are a member of? 
123456789 10 More than 10 
10 34411 
Q9. In your opinion, what should be the appropriate number of board members for each size of Saudi company? 
Small com anies (Turnover < 500m) 
Not less than 2 3 4 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 74 15 
fl 
12 11 3 2 0 
Not more than 5 6 7 9 10 11 12 13 16 
10 222 59 I6 38 3 24 1 1 1 
Medium com anies (Turnover between 501 m and 1.5hn) 
Not less than 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Is 
28 2 53 23 44 6 13 3 2 1 1 
Not more than 5 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 15 18 19 20 
2 12 7 66 22 56 5 2 1 1 1 1 
Lar e companies (Turnover > 1. Sbn) 
Not less than 3 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 is 18 
23 18 5 50 10 45 8 10 3 1 2 1 
Not more than 27 9 10 11 12 13 14 1S 19 20 21 23 
2 10 7 100 15 24 1 11 2 2 T- I 
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010. Please specify how many members are on your company's board of directors? 
Number of members 789 10 11 
Number of respondents 64 10 67 
Q11. In your opinion, how often should the board of directors meet? And how often does your company's board 
meet? (nlease choose one box for each row) 
Every 6 Every 4 Every 3 Every 2 Every month More 
months months months months often 
Companies' boards 3 6 93 37 33 2 
should meet 
My company board 1 13 20 2 1 
meets 
012. To what extent do you agree that companies should, are doing, and your comnanv does, the followinw 
Companies should Companies in general My company actually 
Statement do does 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 I 2 3 4 5 
a. Separate the chairman and 5 8 13 32 117 11 30 90 28 13 3 1 5 12 15 
CEO roles 
b. Have an independent chairman 7 12 36 36 83 24 44 74 20 11 17 3 6 5 5 
c. Define the board's authorities 4 3 15 31 122 12 47 83 27 4 1 3 11 13 9 
and responsibilities and ensure 
that board members are aware of 
them 
d. Have appropriate standards to 5 4 11 43 112 27 57 74 10 5 5 18 12 2 
evaluate board business 
e. Subject board members to 7 7 31 41 89 47 69 48 8 1 8 14 11 4 
orientation programmes to train 
and qualify them 
f. Ensure that board members act 2 3 15 41 114 23 69 63 14 4 7 18 7 5 
on a fully informed basis, in 
good faith, with due diligence 
and care, and in the best interests 
of the company and the 
shareholders 
Treat all shareholders fairly 2 4 11 33 125 15 75 60 19 4 2 1$ 14 6 
h. Apply hi h ethical standards 3 1 12 36 123 16 70 63 19 3 1 3 16 11 S 
i. Take into account the interests 3 1 13 39 119 14 59 77 19 4 I 2 16 14 4 
of all stakeholders 
j. Exercise objective independent 2 2 19 52 100 12 57 82 18 4 2 19 12 4 
judgement on corporate affairs 
k. Provide access to accurate, 2 2 11 40 120 10 50 80 23 9 4 14 13 6 
relevant and timely information 
to board members 
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Q13. To what extent do you agree that Saudi companies' boards of directors should be, actually are, and your 
comnanv is. responsible for the following: 
Board should be Boards actually are: My company's board 
responsible for: is actually: 
1 2 3 4 S 1 2 3 4 S 1 2 3 4 S 
a. Reviewing and guiding corporate 3 2 8 28 134 5 32 73 43 20 1 3 19 14 
strategy, major plans of action, risk 
policy, annual budgets and business 
plans 
b. Setting performance objectives 4 1 16 31 119 7 34 71 39 18 2 7 Ti 9 
c. Overseeing major capital 2 2 19 42 110 11 28 71 46 16 2 S 19 11 
expenditure, acquisitions and 
divestitures. 
d. Monitoring the effectiveness of the 2 1 16 38 115 18 52 71 20 8 2 16 8 
company's governance practices and 
making changes as needed. 
e. Selecting, compensating, 2 3 14 37 119 13 39 77 34 10 11 16 10 
monitoring and, when necessary, 
replacing key executives and 
overseeing succession planning. 
f. Aligning key executive and board 3 3 10 35 124 8 35 70 43 17 10 16 11 
remuneration with the longer term 
interests of the company and its 
shareholders 
g. Ensuring a formal and transparent 3 5 9 31 127 21 48 73 25 6 1 S 7 17 7 
board nomination and election 
rocess. 
h. Monitoring and managing 3 12 33 127 17 53 69 26 8 3 8 18 8 
potential conflicts of interest of 
management or board members 
including misuse of corporate assets 
and abuse in related party 
transactions 
i. Ensuring that appropriate systems 3 4 6 32 130 18 43 78 26 8 2 11 16 8 
of control are in place, in particular, 
systems for risk management, 
financial and operational control 
J. Overseeing the process of 2 3 8 47 114 21 49 70 24 9 2 9 21 S 
disclosure and communication 
Q14. To what extent do you think that it is important for Saudi companies to have the following board 
rnmmittees? And to what extent do these committees exist in Saudi comnanies? 
itt The i mportance The existence ee Comm 1 2 3 4 S 1 2 3 41 5 
a. Audit Committee 3 2 7 32 131 9 31 60 72 
b. Nomination Committee 3 6 16 53 96 23 38 38 37 13 
c. Remuneration Committee 3 4 17 SS 96 22 35 58 41 IS 
d. Executive Committee 4 3 18 39 111 S 16 37 65 8 
e. Corporate Governance Committee 5 4 23 42 99 54 57 37 12 10 
f. Risk Committee S 10 33 45 81 66 S2 34 11 7 
. 
Social Responsibility Committee S 13 49 46 61 78 52 29 8 3 
i. Sharia Committee 13 11 40 39 71 65 53 29 10 13 
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015. Please indicate which of the following committees your comnanv has, and to what extent are they effective? 
The existence The effectiveness Committee Yes No 1 2 3 4 5 
a. Audit Committee 34 2 1 21 12 
b. Nomination Committee 21 15 4 11 8 
c. Remuneration Committee 23 13 1 5 11 9 
d. Executive Committee 28 8 2 13 12 
e. Corporate Governance Committee 4 32 1 2 4 
f. Risk Committee 2 34 I 1 2 
Social Responsibility Committee 5 31 1 1 3 
I. Sharia Committee 5 31 1 3 2 
D: Disclosure and Transparency 
Q16. To what extent do you agree that Saudi companies should be, actually are, and your own company is, 
discinsinQ the followine: 
Companies should be Companies actually are My company discloses: 
Statement disclosin : disclosing: 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
a. The financial and operating results 3 2 4 19 147 2 13 45 62 51 2 15 20 
of the company 
b. Company objectives 3 3 14 32 122 7 25 70 46 24 1 6 17 13 
c. Company future plans 2 3 19 27 124 18 45 77 21 12 5 12 10 10 
d. Major share ownership and voting 4 6 14 24 125 35 44 63 17 12 4 7 11 6 9 
rights 
e. Remuneration, qualifications, the 5 9 34 32 95 36 60 59 11 6 5 6 14 9 3 
selection process, other company 
directorships and independence 
f. Related party transactions 2 8 24 34 107 27 55 58 22 9 2 6 10 10 8 
Foreseeable risk factors 3 6 22 42 101 42 58 53 13 4 7 6 11 10 3 
h. Issues regarding employees and 8 9 40 36 82 50 58 49 10 4 6 9 14 5 3 
other stakeholders 
i. Governance structures and policies, 2 5 27 41 100 36 61 57 12 5 4 5 16 9 2 
in particular, the content of any 
corporate governance code or policy 
and the process by which it is 
implemented. 
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E. Stakeholders & Accountability 
017. To what extent do you agree with the following: 
There is an accountability 
relationsbi between a com an and: 
These stakeholders should have a 
representative on the board 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
a. Media 23 30 51 42 30 104 34 22 8 7 
b. Academics 27 36 57 31 25 97 35 24 13 6 
c. Environmental groups 27 25 48 44 31 89 32 36 10 8 
d. The regulatory and monitoring bodies 11 17 26 62 57 70 27 39 19 18 
e. The government Employees 10 17 38 57 53 81 28 31 19 15 
f. Customers 17 27 28 53 50 91 34 26 14 10 
Community 19 19 43 44 49 78 29 36 17 14 
h. Auditors 13 21 44 46 51 84 34 28 10 18 
i. Shareholders 5 8 19 44 98 8 5 16 27 118 
Financial consultants and analysists 17 23 49 47 39 79 26 40 19 10 
k. Lenders 12 17 35 61 49 78 33 38 18 8 
I. Suppliers 19 17 40 54 45 94 36 30 9 
m. Employees 16 16 34 50 58 63 31 45 18 19 
01R. Please snecifv. annroximately. the nronortion of your comnanv ownershin by the followino! 
Owner Percentage of 
ownership 
Do they have representatives on the board 
Yes No 
a. The Government (Public Investment Fund) 12 22 
b. Institutional Investors (Social Insuranc 8 26 
c. Institutional Investors (Pension Fund) 8 26 
d. Institutional Investors (Fund Managers) 2 32 
e. Family Members 29 5 
f. Individual Private Investors 29 S 
Other (pleasspecify) ............... 
019. To what extent do you agree with the followincy statements about Saudi comnaniec? 
Statements 1 2 3 4 3 
a. It is common for Saudi companies to have major shareholders 4 7 is 33 94 
b. Major shareholders control and have a direct influence over companies' activities 5 3 
- 
23 37 82 
c. The ownership structure affects companies' corporate governance practices 4 i I 27 68 64 
d. The rights of shareholders including minority shareholders are adequately protected 
by law 
13 23 58 37 21 
e. The rights of shareholders including minority shareholders are adequately protected 
in practice 
13 50 76 20 13 
f. Saudi companies treat all shareholders equitably 26 48 74 19 6 
g. An accumulative voting system would assist minority shareholders to choose their 
representatives on the board 
12 21 T77 -3 69 
h. Institutional investors exercise their ownership rights 21 35 46 Iß 
L Saudi companies respect the rights of stakeholders that are established by law or 
through mutual agreements. 
6 4l 
M 
36 9 
j. Saudi companies provide equal, timely and cost-efficient access to relevant 
information for all stakeholders 
26 56 68 19 6 
k. Saudi companies enable stakeholders to freely communicate their concerns about 
illegal or unethical practices to the board 
25 65 59 22 4 
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020. To what extent do you agree with the following statements? 
Statement 1 2 3 4 S 
a. Accountability is practiced in Saudi society 38 68 48 19 2 
b. Companies, boards and managers are accountable for their acts 32 61 43 21 18 
c. Stakeholders exercise their accountability relationships with companies 31 60 53 26 5 
d. Accountability mechanisms are in place in companies 37 60 51 20 7 
f. Companies should adopt good corporate governance to discharge their 
accountability 
3 10 26 50 86 
F. Accountability in Islam 
021. To what extent do you agree with that Saudi companies should and are doing the following? 
S s hould 
be Actual! are tatement 1 2 3 4 5 
a. Companies are subject to Sharia in all their transactions 5 6 23 39 102 16 44 77 30 6 
b. Companies, their boards and managers are accountable 4 6 21 40 104 27 33 75 11 7 
for their acts according to the Islamic conception of 
accountability. 
c. Companies, their boards and managers are accountable to 3 5 13 35 119 21 37 75 18 21 
Allah according to the Islamic conception of accountability. 
d. Companies, their boards and managers are accountable to 3 4 17 44 107 25 47 78 12 11 
shareholders according to the Islamic conception of 
accountability. 
e. Companies, their boards and managers are accountable to 2 6 21 45 100 22 44 85 13 8 
stakeholders according to the Islamic conception of 
accountability. 
f. Companies offer the opportunity for stakeholders to 10 14 28 43 80 35 50 78 8 2 
participate in making decisions according to the Islamic 
conception of Shura. 
g. Companies provide the opportunity to stakeholders to 9 10 32 39 84 31 48 81 10 1 
ensure that all their interests in the company are protected 
according to the Islamic conception of Hisba. 
Q22. In your opinion, does Sharia conflict with any corporate governance principles? 
Yes (4) Q No (164) Q 
(If yes, please explain) 
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G. Regulatory and legal system 
023. To what extent do you agree with the followinn statements- 
Statement 1 2 3 4 S 
a. The laws and systems in Saudi Arabia are adequate, effective and provide an 
appropriate environment for corporate governance practices 
19 45 58 47 7 
b. The laws and systems in Saudi Arabia are adequate, effective and provide an 
appropriate environment for accountability practices 
26 45 66 34 5 
c. The judiciary and the courts play a significant role in maintaining high corporate 
governance practices 
40 63 52 14 7 
d. The corporate governance regulatory, supervision and monitoring bodies are 
efficient 
33 60 58 20 5 
e. The regulatory, supervision and monitoring bodies work well together. 36 61 59 13 4- 
f There is a need for establishing a separate and independent body to look after 
corporate governance issues in Saudi Arabia 
21 21 33 53 48 
Saudi companies comply with laws and regulations 15 44 80 27 10 
Section H. The corporate governance framework 
024. To what extent do aeree with the followine statements: 
Statement 1 2 3 4 3 
a. Social factors have a direct impact on corporate governance practices in Saudi 
Arabia 
2 12 32 67 63 
b. Cultural factors such as: favouritism, family ties and tribalism, have a direct impact 
on corporate governance practices in Saudi Arabia 
1 12 31 67 65 
c. The political situation in Saudi Arabia impacts on corporate governance practices 6 13 37 62 56 
d. The economic situation in Saudi Arabia impacts on corporate governance practices 6 13 40 67 49 
f. Corruption in Saudi Arabia has an influence on corporate governance practices 6 12 32 65 60 
g. The auditing and accounting profession in Saudi Arabia impacts on corporate 
governance practices 
8 12 33 70 33 
h. The cost of corporate governance affects the practice of corporate governance in 
Saudi Arabia 
26 27 47 48 28 
Please feel free to add any comments that you think are related to corporate governance practices in Saudi 
companies in general 
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